Research › Browse › Judgment

Supreme Court of India · body

1900 DIGILAW 13 (SC)

MOUNG THA HNYEEN v. MOUNG PAN NYO

1900-07-06

LORD HOBHOUSE, LORD LINDLEY, LORD MACNAGHTEN, SIR HENRY STRONG, SIR RICHARD COUCH

body1900
Judgement Appeal from a decree of the Special Court at Rangoon (April 26, 1899) affirming a decree of the judge of Moulmein (Sept. 23, 1898). The issue in this case was one of fact, whether the appellant was entitled to carry the sale proceeds of certain logs of timber specially marked as belonging to one Moung Pa Thaw, his debtor, to the credit of his account with that debtor, and in reduction pro tanto of that debtors liability; or whether the respondent had a prior lien on those logs as against Moung Pa Thaw, and had assigned the logs to the appellant on terms that he should be paid the amount of his lien first, and that only the balance remaining thereafter should be credited to Moung Pa Thaw. The Courts below decided in favour of the respondent. Haldane, Q.C., Lowis (of the Rangoon Bar), and M’Carthy, for the appellant. Cowell, for the respondent, was not heard. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD HOBHOUSE. This case has been very ably argued for the appellant, and there is no doubt a Law. Rep. 27 Ind. App. 166 ( 1899- 1900) Moung Tha Hnyeen V. Moung Pan Nyo 56 great deal of obscurity and some puzzling circumstances in it. But it has been the subject of an extremely elaborate and careful judgment by the First Court below, and that judgment has been examined by the Court of Appeal, who have agreed with the First Court. Although acute criticisms have been made upon some points in the case, there has been nothing to shew that there has been a miscarriage of justice, or that any principles of law or of procedure have been violated in the Courts below. This case is one which very decidedly falls within the valuable principle recognised here, and commonly observed in second Courts of Appeal, that such a Court will not interfere with concurrent judgments of the Courts below on matters of fact, unless very definite and explicit grounds for that interference are assigned. In all probability their Lordships would be doing a great deal more harm than good if they were induced to disturb judgments arrived at by the local judges on such criticisms as have been assigned in this argument. Their Lordships will humbly recommend Her Majesty to dismiss the appeal; and the appellant must pay the costs.