JUDGMENT Maclean, C.J. - We are asked in this case to review our decree which is dated the 15th of August 1899 and which was based upon a compromise arrived at by the parties. The case comes before us under these circumstances. The suit was one for the partition of certain joint family property, and the main point in dispute was,-- there were other points,--whether the cost of a house which had been built upon this family property had been defrayed by Basant Coomar Sarkar, who was the son of Kedarnath Sarkar, one of four brothers jointly interested in this property, or whether the funds for building the house came out of the joint family property. 2. The Court below decided against Basant Coomar Sarkar, and he appealed to this Court ; that was appeal No. 184. There were two other appeals which dealt with other matters as to which some of the parties were dissatisfied but the point, to which I have alluded, was the main point, and the point upon which the arguments were centred in this Court. 3. The case came before us and was argued for some two or three days, and on the third day overtures were made, and, I think, very properly made for the compromise of the questions in dispute. The matter was discussed between the parties, who were represented by counsel, and experienced pleaders, and, ultimately, they agreed to terms ; and we were asked, on behalf of certain infants in the suit, the children of Taraknath, who was one of the four brothers, to sanction that compromise on behalf of those infants. We thought that the compromise was, under the circumstances, a very fair and reasonable one, and we accordingly sanctioned the compromise on behalf of the infants. This took place on the 28th of July 1899, and the decree embodying the terms of the compromise was not finally drawn up until the 15th of August. We thought that the compromise was, under the circumstances, a very fair and reasonable one, and we accordingly sanctioned the compromise on behalf of the infants. This took place on the 28th of July 1899, and the decree embodying the terms of the compromise was not finally drawn up until the 15th of August. On the 20th of November, and not until the 20th of November, Bhutnath, who was one of the four brothers, and who has since died and is now represented by his heirs.--for we gave leave to-day to substitute those heirs,--and Punchanan, who was another of the brothers, asked us to review that decree, and they based their application on the following grounds :-- They say that the learned vakils who represented them upon that appeal, had no authority to compromise the case, and they pretend, for I am satisfied on the evidence that the statement is untrue,-- that Bhutnath was very ill at the time, and that his son, Purna Chandra, who was present in Court during the whole of the hearing of these appeals, and who most undoubtedly, authorized the learned vakils, who were appearing for the Respondents to enter into this compromise, had no authority, whatever from his father, Bhutnath or from his uncle, Basanta Coomar, to accept such terms. They further say that, owing to Bhutnath's illness, his son Purna Chandra who had throughout been watching these appeals, and who was in Court for the express purpose of watching what was going on, never told his father or his uncle, although they were living jointly together at the time and in the same house, that this compromise had been entered into, until the end of last October. 4. This story, to my mind, is absolutely unworthy of the least credit. We have had the advantage, with the assent of the learned counsel who appeared for the Petitioners of hearing from Babu Sib Chandra Palit, who was one of the vakils then appearing for the present Petitioners,--a gentleman of considerable experience and professional position,--and who was present when the appeals were argued and when the compromise was effected, as to what really took place between himself and his clients. We are indebted to him for what he has told us, and we accept his statement most unreservedly. We are indebted to him for what he has told us, and we accept his statement most unreservedly. He tells us the matter was very fully discussed between Purna Chandra Sirkar who was purporting to act for his father and uncle and himself, and that Purna Chandra Sirkar was fully acquainted with the terms of the proposed compromise, and understood and approved of them, and that when asked by myself as to who was instructing him to make this compromise, he pointed out Purna Chandra Sirkar who was standing close to him, and who never suggested that he had no authority in the matter or that he did not understand the terms of the compromise, and he further tells us that he actually gave the draft of the terms of the compromise to Purna Chandra himself that very day, before he left the Court, and that Purna Chandra took the draft, in order, presumably, to communicate the terms of the compromise to his father and his uncle, the present Petitioners, I have no doubt he did this; for I do not believe a word of his story, that he did not tell his father or his uncle until the end of October. That is a most improbable story. It is hardly conceivable, living as they all were together, interested as they all were in these appeals, that, having sent Purna Chandra, as he himself admits into Court, to watch the case, they should not have had the curiosity when he came back to ask him what had happened, or that he should not have thought it worth his while to tell them what had been done. 5. It is impossible to believe that part of the case. No possible reflection can be east upon the learned vakil I have named in relation to his part in the matter. 6. It is a curious feature that no complaint of this compromise is made until the 20th of November 1899, nearly 3 months afterwards. The decree was not drawn up until the 15th of August 1899, and it is almost incredible that, if they did not assent to the compromise, some complaint would not have been made, either to the Court which was then sitting, or some representation would not have been made to the effect that they had given no authority for the compromise and were not bound by it. The only reason assigned for this silence is that Bhutnath was too ill to be told of the matter I have disposed of that already. 7. It is however urged for the Petitioners that, taking all these facts to be found, as I have found them, the opposite party have not subtantiated that Purna Chandra had any authority to bind either his father or his uncle Basanta Coomar to this compromise. 8. I do not propose on this occasion to go into the important and difficult question as to the power of the vakil of this Court, to bind his client by a compromise of the suit--in which he is retained. 9. In the view I take of the present case, it is unnecessary to decide that question, nor the further one of whether the question can be decided upon an application for review, or whether an independent suit ought not to be brought to set aside the decree. 10. The view I take of the case is that, even if, Purna Chandra had no authority to bind his father and uncle in the first instance, the evidence shows that they subsequently ratified his acts and the compromise. 11. I am satisfied that Bhutnath and Punchanan were told by Purna Chandra that the compromise had been effected, and I have no doubt, were told on the 28th July, and they remain silent until the 20th of November. But beyond that we have distinct evidence on the part of the opposite party that Basanta Coomar removed all his moveable property from the house, in conformity with the terms of the compromise, and that he did that in the first week of August following and delivered up possession of the new building to the Petitioners, and that they forthwith put in two Durwans for the purpose of taking possession. That statement is corroborated by his father Kedarnath. If this is true, and it is not denied, it is obvious that the Petitioners knew of the compromise, and acted upon it, and adopted it, for it could only have been on the footing of the compromise that Basanta Coomar went out and the Petitioners accepted possession of the house. 12. That statement is corroborated by his father Kedarnath. If this is true, and it is not denied, it is obvious that the Petitioners knew of the compromise, and acted upon it, and adopted it, for it could only have been on the footing of the compromise that Basanta Coomar went out and the Petitioners accepted possession of the house. 12. It is true that the learned counsel who appeared for the Petitioners, asked almost at the end of his argument for leave to put in an affidavit upon this point, to which we declined to accede, as, in our opinion, such evidence could have been, and ought to have been put in before. 13. The conduct of the Petitioners would indicate that they knew all about the compromise, that they were satisfied with it, and that they acted upon and adopted it and this view is strongly corroborated by their long silence, before they repudiated it. 14. Then it is said that the compromise cannot be binding on Punchanan, because he only appeared in appeal No. 286 and not in the two other appeals. The appeals, however, were undoubtedly heard together, and he was certainly represented in one of them. But whether appeared or not in the other appeals can be of little consequence if afterwards, with knowledge of the compromise he ratified and adopted what had been done, as I think he did. 15. I am not impressed with the honesty of the applications, which in my opinion fail and are not bond fide, and all three rules must be discharged with costs, ten gold mohurs in each case. Banerjee, J. 16. I am of the same opinion. 15. I am not impressed with the honesty of the applications, which in my opinion fail and are not bond fide, and all three rules must be discharged with costs, ten gold mohurs in each case. Banerjee, J. 16. I am of the same opinion. Three questions arise for determination in these rules ; first, whether it is competent to the Petitioners, by way of an application for review of judgment, to ask us to set aside the decree that has been made upon a compromise, on the ground that the compromise was entered into on their behalf without their authority ; second, whether a vakil, as a matter of law, has authority, by his very appointment as a vakil in a case, to compromise that case; and, third, whether, as a matter of fact, the learned vakil who consented to the compromise on behalf of the Petitioners, had authority from them to do so and whether that compromise was ratified and acted upon by the Petitioners. 17. If it was necessary to determine the first question stated above, then, having regard to the comprehensive language of sec. 623 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and to the observations of Mr. Justice Wilson in the case of Aushootosh Chandra v. Tara Prasanna Roy I. L. R. 10 Cal. 612 (1884) I should be inclined to answer that question in the affirmative. I may add that the case of Lalji Sahu v. The Collector of Tirhut 6 B. L. R. 648 (1871) also lends some support to this view. But as in the view we take upon the third question raised in the case, the application of the Petitioners must be rejected, it is not necessary to discuss the first question further. 18. Upon the second question, it was argued for the Petitioners that a vakil is not, as a matter of law, authorized, from the mere fact of his appointment as a vakil in a case, to compromise the case without special authority from his client; and in support of this contention, the cases of Jagapati Mudaliar v. Ekambara Mudaliar I. L. R. 21 Mad. 274 (1897), Gour Pershad Doss v. Sookdeb Ram Deb 12 W. R. 279 (1869) and several other cases were relied upon, On the other hand, it was argued for the opposite party, in the first place, that a vakil, by the mere fact of his appointment as vakil in the case, has authority to compromise it in the same manner as counsel has similar authority under the English law ; and in the second place, that even if a vakil be held not to have the same authority as counsel in this respect, still he may be held to have the same authority as a solicitor has in English law to compromise a case; and in support of this argument the cases of Venkata Nara Simha Naidu v. Bhashya Karlu Naidu I. L. R. 22 Mad. 538 (1899), Jang Bahadur Singh v. Shankar Roy I. L. R. 13 All. 272 (1890), Mathews v. Munister I. L. R. 20 Q. B. D. 141 (1887), and Macaulay v. Polley L. R. 2 Q. B. 122 (1897) and several other cases were cited. 19. When a person engages an advocate or a vakil to conduct his case, it must follow, that he authorises his advocate or vakil to make binding admissions before the Court in the course of his conduct of the case. If the admissions made by an advocate or a vakil in the course of his conduct of a case are not to be held binding, it would give rise, as their Lordships of the Privy Council pointed out in the case of Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Sing 2 M. I. A. 253 (1839), to the greatest inconvenience that a vakil has power to make a binding admission was held in the case to which I have just referred, and also in other cases decided in this Court, of which, I may refer to Kaleekanund Bhuttacharjee v. Gireebala Debi 10 W. R. 322 (1868), and Kower Narain Roy v. Sreenath 9 W. R. 485 (1868). But though that is so and though upon the question I am now considering there ought not to be any difference between the privilege of an advocate or that of a vakil, a distinction must be drawn between an admission made upon any point by counsel or vakil in the course of his conduct of a case, which still leaves the ultimate decision of the case in the hands of the Court, and a compromise assented to, which really takes the case out of the hands of the Court so far as the determination of any question of law or fact is concerned, and requires the Court merely to record the agreement arrived at by the parties. It cannot very well be said that, because a party engages a counsel or vakil to conduct his case, he, thereby, also authorises him to enter into a compromise with his adversary. An admission made on any disputed point means only that the counsel or vakil making it declines to argue the point which it may be useless to dispute or which there may not be any good ground for disputing. It amounts to giving up or not disputing an untenable or an immaterial point. A compromise, however, means something more than that. It is not merely the giving up of an untenable point, but it may, and often does, involve the giving up of something more, in consideration of obtaining a compensating benefit, each party giving up what, though tenable, may not be of much value to him as compared with the value of that which he secures in return. And that is a matter into the consideration of which a counsel or a vakil may not be quite competent to enter. Accordingly, it has been held in several cases, in this country, that a vakil, though he is authorised to make binding admissions on behalf of his client in the course of conducting a case, is not necessarily authorised to make a binding compromise on his behalf. I need only refer to the latest case on the point, namely, that of Jagapati Mudaliar v. Ekambara Mudaliar I. L. R. 21 Mad. 274 (1897). I may add that the English law, when it lays down the rule that counsel has authority to enter into a compromise on behalf of his client, goes a little too far. I need only refer to the latest case on the point, namely, that of Jagapati Mudaliar v. Ekambara Mudaliar I. L. R. 21 Mad. 274 (1897). I may add that the English law, when it lays down the rule that counsel has authority to enter into a compromise on behalf of his client, goes a little too far. The only legitimate ground upon which that rule can be based is, that a presumption arises when counsel enters into a compromise on behalf of his client that he has done so with his client's assent. I think that a similar presumption ought to arise in the case of a compromise entered into by a vakil on behalf of his client. It is, however, a presumption after all, and it ought not to be an irrebuttable presumption. But in the view I take, in concurrence with the learned Chief Justice, upon the third question, it becomes unnecessary for me to say more upon this point. Coming now to the third point, and starting with the presumption in favour of a vakil when he enters into a compromise, that he did so with the authority of his client, let us see what the Petitioners have shown to satisfy us that the compromise in this case was entered into without due authority from them. The Petitioners come before us with the improbable story that, although Purna Chandra, the son of the Petitioner Bhutnath, and nephew of the Petitioner, Punchanan, was present in Court when the terms of the compromise were settled, and although the order for drawing up a decree in terms of the compromise was not made until more than two weeks after the date on which the terms were settled, Purna Chandra did not during all this time communicate the terms of the compromise either to Bhutnath or to Punchanan though they were all living together. The only reason assigned for not communicating the terms of the compromise to Bhutnath was, that Bhutnath was very ill at the time, a statement which is amply refuted by the counter-affidavits put in on behalf of the opposite party. The only reason assigned for not communicating the terms of the compromise to Bhutnath was, that Bhutnath was very ill at the time, a statement which is amply refuted by the counter-affidavits put in on behalf of the opposite party. And when in addition to the statements contained in those affidavits, we have from the learned vakil who assented to the compromise on behalf of the Petitioners the statement made before us without objection by counsel on either side, that Purna Chandra took from him a draft embodying the terms of compromise and never raised any objection to them before the decree was drawn up; a statement, which I unhesitatingly accept as true, there remains not the slightest doubt that the terms of the compromise were communicated to the parties and they assented to it. I therefore think that the learned vakil was authorised to make this compromise. I am further of opinion that after the compromise was made, the parties concerned and amongst others the Petitioners before us acted according to it. The compromise therefore, is binding on them, and the rules must consequently be discharged with costs.