Judgement Appeal from a decree of the Special Court of Lower Burmah (April 26, 1899) affirming a decree of the judge at Moulmein (Sept. 7, 1898.) The Court, under the circumstances stated in the judgment of their Lordships, ordered the appellant to pay to Ko Moe, the respondents predecessor, Rs. 50,835 4a. 3p., with interest at the rate of 12 per cent, per annum from March 30, 1896, the date of suit; and further appointed the appellant receiver of the unpaid portion of the debt due to the parties from the estate of Moung Shoay Hpaw, deceased. Upon the issue whether the partnership was dissolved by mutual consent in or about March, 1887, there were concurrent findings of the lower Courts in the negative. The judge at Moulmein said that this defence was practically abandoned, and that the appellant only alleged that he considered the partnership to be at an end by reason of the plaintiffs refusal to contribute funds on one occasion when asked to do so, and that there was not a word of evidence of any dissolution by mutual consent. The Special Court also found that was " no proof in the Court below of dissolution by mutual consent." Accordingly, on June 1, 1896, the appellant, as the managing partner, was ordered to file his " accounts of the business of the partnership which stands dissolved from date of suit." The Commissioner appointed to take the accounts disallowed all payments by the appellant which were neither supported by voucher nor stated in his account-book to have been made on behalf of the partnership; also the advances made to the agents, and the disbursements said to have been made by his agent, Moung Gale. His reasons were that the appellant did not keep proper or any partnership accounts, and was unable to state how much of the advances was made on account of the partnership. Moung Gale also kept no separate account for such partnership business as was entrusted to him. The appellant " very candidly admitted that he treated the partnership business as though it were his own private business, and therefore made no distinction in his accounts between the two businesses." The judge adopted this report as the basis of his decree. Moung Gale also kept no separate account for such partnership business as was entrusted to him. The appellant " very candidly admitted that he treated the partnership business as though it were his own private business, and therefore made no distinction in his accounts between the two businesses." The judge adopted this report as the basis of his decree. The Special Court in Appeal said that " the Commissioner in taking the account proceeded in all respects regularly," and that it was " out of the question in taking accounts that items unsupported by a tittle of evidence should be allowed." It found on the appellants evidence and that of his witnesses that he kept no separate accounts of the partnership, which, as managing partner, he should have done; that there were presumably original materials which might have been produced by him but were not produced; and that on the documents produced it was impossible to distinguish between partnership and private account. Haldane, Q.C. and J. W. MCarthy, for the appellant, contended that the partnership was dissolved by the refusal of Ko Moe to make further advances to the appellant on the terms of the partnership agreement of October 20, 1885. Such refusal in the circumstances defeated the sole object of the partnership, and constituted a breach of the agreement which entitled the appellant to treat it as terminated. Ko Moe had, in fact, abandoned his interest in the concern, and had elected to put up with his loss rather than enter into the speculative transactions necessary to conduct it to a successful issue or to ensure any chance of so doing. By his laches and neglect to concern himself about the partnership venture, or to obtain accounts, and by his long delay, he had manifested an intention to abandon his interest, and could not be allowed, now that the appellant has secured the success of the enterprise, to reverse that intention and claim his share see Lindley on Partnership, bk. 3, c. 10, s. 3, and 6th ed. p. 470; Cowell v. Watts (( 1850) 2 H. & T. 224.); Senhouse v. Christian, ((1787) 19 Beav. 356, n.; 1 T. R. 560; 1 R. R. 300.) It was also contended that the accounts had been taken on a wrong principle. Every item not supported by vouchers had been rejected. 3, c. 10, s. 3, and 6th ed. p. 470; Cowell v. Watts (( 1850) 2 H. & T. 224.); Senhouse v. Christian, ((1787) 19 Beav. 356, n.; 1 T. R. 560; 1 R. R. 300.) It was also contended that the accounts had been taken on a wrong principle. Every item not supported by vouchers had been rejected. According to the common practice in Burmah, sums are constantly paid without vouchers, and in the forest regular receipts would be unusual and impossible. The Courts should have endeavoured to ascertain what in the circumstances of the case would have been a reasonable sum to allow for the expenses of management, and have charged the same in the partnership accounts. Cowell, for the respondents, was not heard. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD HOBHOUSE. The appellant in this case is the defendant below. The respondents are the representatives of the original plaintiff, who has died in the course of the suit. His death has not in any way varied the matters of dispute between the parties, who may for present purposes be conveniently styled plaintiff and defendant throughout. On October 20, 1885, the plaintiff and defendant, who resided at Moulmein, made a written agreement to advance Rs. 1,10,000 for obtaining 4445 logs of teak timber, which was therein stated to be lying in the Mhineloongyee forests and to have been hypothecated and delivered by the owner, Moung Shoay Hpaw, to the defendant as security for advances made by him. The parties were to advance the amount and to bear further expenses in the proportion of three shares to the plaintiff and two to the defendant, and the proceeds were to be shared in the same proportion. In the next year the partners advanced Rs. 30,000 more to the mortgagor in the same pro portion. In point of fact the timber said to be delivered was in Siamese territory, at a great distance from Moulmein, and it had to be dragged to and launched upon the river Salween, down which it must travel some hundreds of miles before reaching Kado, where the loose logs could be captured for their consignees. In August, 1886, the mortgagor of the timber died, and the defendant was declared his administrator in the following October. After that it was found that more money was wanted to recover the timber, and the partners provided Rs. In August, 1886, the mortgagor of the timber died, and the defendant was declared his administrator in the following October. After that it was found that more money was wanted to recover the timber, and the partners provided Rs. 20,000 in the stated proportions. In March, 1887, the defendant required Rs. 10,000 more to meet expenses, and the plaintiff declined to pay the two-fifths demanded of him. The defendant alleged in his written statement that the partnership was then dissolved by mutual consent. In 1896 the plaintiff brought this suit to take the accounts and to wind up the partnership. The preliminary question was whether it had been dissolved in March, 1887; and a separate issue was framed by the judge of Moulmein to try that question. The plaintiff denied that there was any dissolution, or any abandonment by him of his interest in the concern, and said that he did not advance the money demanded because the defendant would not render any account of his dealings with the last advance. The defndant said that on the plaintiffs refusal he considered the partnership to be at an end; that the plaintiff gave no reason for refusal; that he, the defendant, made no further demand, and gave no notice to the plaintiff that the partnership was dissolved. Upon this evidence the judge of Moulmein found that there had been no dissolution by consent; and on June 1, 1896, he passed an order which declared that the partnership was dissolved as from that date, and ordered the defendant as managing partner to file accounts. The defendant raised the same question again after the accounts were taken, both in the First Court and on appeal in the Special Court of Lower Burma. But he raised it in a different shape; not alleging mutual consent, but relying on the laches of the plaintiff and his abandonment of the undertaking. There was, however, no more evidence of express abandonment than of consent, and there was some evidence of the plaintiffs subsequent intervention in the partnership affairs. So the defendant had nothing to support his plea except the fact that the plaintiff had declined to advance money in March, 1887, and had left the management of the business to the defendant, who filled three characters. He was mortgagee prior to the partnership, he was legal representative of the mortgagor, and he was managing partner. So the defendant had nothing to support his plea except the fact that the plaintiff had declined to advance money in March, 1887, and had left the management of the business to the defendant, who filled three characters. He was mortgagee prior to the partnership, he was legal representative of the mortgagor, and he was managing partner. The Special Court held that they could not infer abandonment, and they maintained the judgment of the First Court on what they call this much-laboured and unsubstantial point. It has been laboured again with all the resources of able advocacy at this bar; but their Lordships have not been induced to doubt the soundness of the view taken by the Courts below. It is not necessary to enter again on an examination of the well-known class of cases exemplified by Norway v. Rowe. ((1812) 19 Ves. 144; 12 R. R. 157.) Even assuming in the defendants favour that the subject-matter of this partnership is as precarious as a mining speculation, it is a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts of each case, whether or no there has been abandonment, or loss of interest by laches. And there is no case, or, at least, none cited, in which the Court has held a partner to have lost his position on grounds so slender as those which exist here. On coming to take the accounts great difficulties were found. Besides the various characters filled by the defendant, another element of confusion appeared. He had dealings in timber peculiar to himself in the same quarter as the partnership dealings, and on a larger scale. His agent in the timber district was his brother Moung Galay, who had indubitably expended large sums of money, but on what account it was impossible to say. The defendant says — " I instructed my clerk to make an abstract of all my pay ments to Moung Galay, no matter on what account. I cannot distinguish the account on which the money was spent without Moung Galays accounts. He never specified in his demands the purpose for which he wanted the money, nor rendered accounts of his expenditure, although I asked for them. I did not discharge him, because he was my brother, and I knew he would not cheat me. I cannot distinguish the account on which the money was spent without Moung Galays accounts. He never specified in his demands the purpose for which he wanted the money, nor rendered accounts of his expenditure, although I asked for them. I did not discharge him, because he was my brother, and I knew he would not cheat me. I carried on the partnership as though it were my own business, and kept no separate account for it." Moung Galay is dead, and no accounts are produced as coming direct from him. Perhaps if there were any they would not make matters any clearer, for the defendant tells us again— " I made payments to Moung Galay for my own business, besides those for the partnership. Moung Galay never rendered accounts since Wahzo, 1252. The account I have filed (abstract 4) was made up from an account furnished by Moung Galay, and returned to him. In his account the expenditure on each business was not shewn separately, but Moung Hpo Tsin and he went through the accounts and ascertained what had been spent on each business." The Burmese year 1252 may be gathered from the documents to cover parts of the Christian years 1890, 1891. The clerk, Moung Hpo Tsin, was examined, and tells us " I wrote accounts marked copy of Moung Galays accounts A and B. Some of the entries were taken from Moung Galays accounts, and some from defendants cash-books," Further, he relates in cross-examination how Moung Galay brought an account-book ; how he and the clerk picked out items which the clerk copied into a book; how the account so prepared was taken to Mr. Thompson, who was advising the plaintiff with reference to settlement of the partnership affairs ; and how Mr. Thompson rejected the account as confused. " The accounts now produced as copies of Moung Galays accounts were written to make matters clear for the purposes of the dispute between plaintiff and defendant.” Further, he says that Moung Galay " did some timber business for defendant at Maihan. He also looked after defendants business with Pah Taw and Pan Nyo, and others. About two lakhs were sent up altogether to Moung Galay. In his demands he never specified the account for which the money was required. He also looked after defendants business with Pah Taw and Pan Nyo, and others. About two lakhs were sent up altogether to Moung Galay. In his demands he never specified the account for which the money was required. From 1252, when Moung Galay went up the second time, it is impossible to distinguish the expenditure on the partnership business from the expenditure on other accounts." From these statements it results that the accounts now put in are not those kept by the defendant, nor those kept by Moang Galay. They are a hash of some books or papers belonging to Moung Galay, and of others belonging to the defendant, and of verbal statements by Moung Galay, put together for submission to Mr. Thompson, and rejected by him as confused, and a re-hash of the same with some subsequent items for the purposes of the suit. They are doubtless tendered in good faith, for no attempt is made by the defendant to conceal their deficiencies or to claim for them more authenticity than they possess. The accounts were referred to a Commissioner, Mr. Bayly, whose report, made in November, 1897, shews that he went into the matter with much care. There was little difficulty on the receipt side. On the other side, owing to the lack of accounts, and to the confusion between the defendants private business and his executorship business and the partnership business, the Commissioner found himself compelled to disallow nearly all of the claims disputed by the plaintiff. He expressed an opinion that the defendant was entitled to some reasonable allowance for the services of his agents and for the expenses of getting the timber and of litigation connected with it, and for interest on money advanced by him; but he thought he had no authority to decide such matters, and so he referred them to the Court. Subject to the Courts decision, he found the plaintiff entitled to Rs. 50,835 la. 5p. as his two-fifths share of the money received by the defendant for which he has not accounted. On receipt of this report the judge of Moulmein overruled some objections taken by the defendant, among which were objections founded on the plaintiffs laches; but as to the Commissioners recommendations, the learned judge could not discover any more materials for guidance than were in the hands of the Commissioner. He found the plaintiff entitled to Rs. On receipt of this report the judge of Moulmein overruled some objections taken by the defendant, among which were objections founded on the plaintiffs laches; but as to the Commissioners recommendations, the learned judge could not discover any more materials for guidance than were in the hands of the Commissioner. He found the plaintiff entitled to Rs. 50,835 la. 5p., and then sent the case back to the Commissioner for the purpose of ascertaining the value of the assets in items 9 and 10 of " Statement 3. Assets of the partnership"; and also to ascertain from the parties what allowance they agree (as there is no evidence, and it is only by mutual agreement any allowance can be made) should be made for the services of the agents employed for the partnership business and for the expenses they (the agents) defrayed in "ounging" out the timber belonging to the estate of the deceased debtor, and in connection with the litigation in which the estate was involved; also the value of a set-off claimed by plaintiff. This further reference came to nothing, because the parties could not agree. In reporting that result to the Court the Commissioner added " It is possible, I consider, for defendant to give if he chooses full details of his own private work that was carried on by the partnership agents so as to enable me to allow a proper proportion of remuneration for the services of the agents in the partnership business; but he has hot done this, although he has had ample opportunity both before me and the Court to do so, nor has he furnished such particulars of the ounging work, including the employment of the partnership elephants, as would also enable me to ascertain the cost of ounging the partnership timber." After some further discussions and evidence, and after making an arrangement about the lawsuit in Siam, the case was brought again before the judge of Moulmein, who delivered a detailed judgment explaining why he could not vary the prior conclusions. He made a final decree in favour of the plaintiff for Rs. 50,835 4a. 5p. with interest and costs. On appeal the Special Court took the same view, confirming the judgment on the same grounds as were indicated by the Commissioner and by the two successive judges of Moulmein. He made a final decree in favour of the plaintiff for Rs. 50,835 4a. 5p. with interest and costs. On appeal the Special Court took the same view, confirming the judgment on the same grounds as were indicated by the Commissioner and by the two successive judges of Moulmein. Their Lordships have nothing to do now except to say that the appellants counsel have wholly failed to persuade them that a Court of justice can properly arrive at any conclusion more favourable to the appellant. If it be true, as is earnestly alleged on his behalf, that expenses honestly incurred for the partnership have been disallowed to him, the answer is that by his own acts in mixing up his private affairs with those of the partnership, and his omission to keep clear accounts of any kind, he has made it impossible even to conjecture what those expenses are. Their Lordships will humbly advise Her Majesty to dismiss this appeal, and the appellant must pay the costs.