Judgement Appeal from a decree of the High Court (Feb. 11, 1897) reversing an order of the judge of Mirzapur (July 22, 1896). By that order the District Judge decided that under a decree dated November 12, 1887, the respondent should be awarded mesne profits from the date of the decree up to November 12, 1890, that is for a period of three years. The High Court held that the decree-holder, the respondent, was entitled to mesne profits up to November 30, 1895. The questions in the appeal related to the effect of an Order in Council dated May 11, 1895, and the construction of s. 211 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV. of 1882). Law. Rep. 27 Ind. App. 209 ( 1899- 1900) Raja Bhup Indar Bahadur Singh V. Bijai Bahadur Singh 83 The final decree of ejectment in the case was the order of May 11, 1895, and possession was obtained by the respondent on November 30, 1895. On March 16, 1896, he petitioned the District Judge in the Execution Department, alleging that mesne profits were due from date of suit till recovery of possession. The appellant objected that he was not entitled to any further mesne profits under his decree, meaning the order of May 11, 1895. This was overruled, and an issue (being the second on the record) framed for what period are mesne profits recoverable. On this issue the District Judge said that his decision depended on the interpretation of ss. 211 and 244 of the Civil Procedure Code. He ruled that the case before him came " within the condition of s. 211," and that the question in dispute, in so far as it related to mesne profits which the decree had made payable after the expiration of the term of three years from the date of the decree, should not be decided in execution but by separate suit. In the result, he ordered that, according to the decree dated November 12, 1887, the mesne profits for only three years, that is, from the date of the aforesaid decree up to November 12, 1890, should be awarded to the decree-holder. Before the High Court a preliminary objection was taken by the judgment debtor that no appeal lay, inasmuch as the matter which was the subject of the appeal was not a final order but only an interlocutory one. Before the High Court a preliminary objection was taken by the judgment debtor that no appeal lay, inasmuch as the matter which was the subject of the appeal was not a final order but only an interlocutory one. This was for these reasons overruled " The question is not at all free from difficulty. Very able arguments on both sides have been addressed to us, and we have been forced into the present decision by the presence on the record of a formal order in which the judge of Mirzapur has embodied his finding on the second of the two issues before him. We do not at all determine to-day the general question as to whether such a decision standing by itself and unaccompanied by a formal order would be appealable. The order stands on the record, and there is no gainsaying the fact that it practically dismisses the claim of the decree-holder for some five or six years profits. That matter has been determined by the Court in a way that it never can go back again." Thereafter the High Court set aside the order appealed from, and directed the judge to determine the mesne profits in manner as prayed by the decree-holder. Their judgment was to the effect (1.) that the only operative decree which could be executed was the order of Her Majesty in Council, dated May 11, 1895; (2.) that the proper interpretation to put on a decree for mesne profits is that it is a decree for mesna profits up to date of possession see Fakharuddin Mahomed Ahsan Chowdhry v. Official Trustee of Bengal (( 1881) L. R. 8 Ind. Ap. 197.); (3.) that s. 211 of the Civil Procedure Code governed the case, and that, assuming the above Order in Council was the decree to be enforced, that section empowered the Court to give a decree for mesne profits from September 23, 1886, the date of suit, up to May 11, 1895, the date of the Order in Council, and thereafter up to November 30, 1895, the date of the decree-holder taking possession. Ross, for the appellant, the judgment debtor, contended that this judgment was erroneous. The order of July 22, 1896, was not an appealable order under the Code. It is not included in the orders enumerated in s. 588. It is an interlocutory, and not a final, order. Ross, for the appellant, the judgment debtor, contended that this judgment was erroneous. The order of July 22, 1896, was not an appealable order under the Code. It is not included in the orders enumerated in s. 588. It is an interlocutory, and not a final, order. Reference was made to Puran Chand v. Roy Radha Kishen (( 1891) Ind. L. R. 19 Calc. 132.); Anando Kishore Dass Bakshi v. Anando Kishore Bose (( 1886) Ind. L. R. 14 Calc. 53.) ; Girischunder Lahiri v. Shikhareswar Roy. (See ante, p. 110.) It was further contended that the order of May 11, 1895, and s. 211 of the Code had been wrongly interpreted, and that the respondent was only entitled to recover in the execution proceedings mesne profits for three years—that is, from November 12, 1887, to November 12, 1890. For any further mesne profits the respondents only remedy according to the Code of Civil Procedure was by a fresh suit. Law. Rep. 27 Ind. App. 209 ( 1899- 1900) Raja Bhup Indar Bahadur Singh V. Bijai Bahadur Singh 84 Raikes, for the respondent, was not heard. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD HOBHOUSE. This appeal is presented against an order made in the course of execution proceedings. The plaintiff in the suit, who was the original respondent in the appeal, claimed possession of land. On November 12, 1887, the District Judge passed a decree in his favour, ordering possession, and adding, " the plaintiff is also entitled to future mesne profits." The defendant, now appellant, appealed to the High Court, who, on July 19, 1889, reversed the decree and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff then appealed to the Queen in Council, who, on May 11, 1895, ordered that the decree of the High Court should be reversed and the District Judges decree of November 12 be affirmed. After that the plaintiff prosecuted his claims in execution of the decree so affirmed by the Queen in Council. He recovered possession on November 30, 1805. Then he proceeded to recover mesne profits. He claimed them from September 23, 1886, on which day his suit was brought, down to the recovery of possession by him. After that the plaintiff prosecuted his claims in execution of the decree so affirmed by the Queen in Council. He recovered possession on November 30, 1805. Then he proceeded to recover mesne profits. He claimed them from September 23, 1886, on which day his suit was brought, down to the recovery of possession by him. The defendant objected that no decree remained to be executed except that of the Queen in Council, which made no mention of mesne profits; but the District Judge held that the Queens order had come down for execution, and " its effect causes reference to be made to the original decree of this Court as a final decree in all applications for execution." Having thus settled that the Queens order gave mesne profits by reference to the original decree, the District Judge went on to frame issues. The second of such issues was, " For what period are mesne profits recoverable ? " It was arranged that this issue should be treated as preliminary to taking accounts, and should be argued separately. That was done, and the District Judge decided that mesne profits were due for the three years next after the date of the original decree, i.e., from November 12, 1887, to November 12, 1890. From this decree the plaintiff appealed to the High Court, who, in the first instance, addressed themselves to a preliminary objection made by the defendant that no appeal is given by the Procedure Code in such a matter. The High Court overruled that objection. As it has been renewed here, and earnestly pressed upon their Lordships by Mr. Ross, it may be convenient to dispose of it in the first instance. The High Court felt considerable difficulty on the point. They allowed the appeal on the ground that the District Judge had tried the question separately, and had embodied his finding in a formal order. They remark that it practically dismisses the claim of the decree-holder for some five or six years profits, und that in a way which, in the Court of the District Judge, is final. Therefore they hold it be an appealable order. They remark that it practically dismisses the claim of the decree-holder for some five or six years profits, und that in a way which, in the Court of the District Judge, is final. Therefore they hold it be an appealable order. Treating the question as if it were whether the order under consideration is final or interlocutory in its nature, and testing it by the ordinary principles applicable to such questions, their Lordships think, not only that the High Court are right in the particular circumstances of the case, but that there is not any need to rely upon the accident that the District Judge took the convenient course of trying the liability to account in a separate issue and deciding it in a separate judgment. His decision is a final one in its essence, and would be so equally whether it stood alone or was combined with decisions on other points. It resembles in principle a decree for account made at the hearing of a cause, which is final against the party denying liability to account, and is appealable, though it is also in another way interlocutory and may result in the exoneration of the accounting party, or even in the award of a balance in his favour. And it can make no difference in point of principle whether the decision be in Law. Rep. 27 Ind. App. 209 ( 1899- 1900) Raja Bhup Indar Bahadur Singh V. Bijai Bahadur Singh 85 favour of or against the liability to account. It is equally final in its effect, and as such equally open to appeal. But then Mr. Ross urges that we are not testing the question by general principles, but by the expressions of the Code which relate to appeals. That is true, and their Lordships turn to the. Code to see what it says. Sect. 540 gives a right to appeal to the proper Court from the decrees or from any part of the decrees of Courts exercising original jurisdiction. By s. 2 a decree is thus defined " The formal expression of an adjudication upon any right claimed or defence set up in a Civil Court, when such adjudication so far as regards the Court expressing it decides the suit. . . . An order .... determining any question mentioned or referred to in s. 244, but not specified in s. 588, is within this definition." Sect. . . . An order .... determining any question mentioned or referred to in s. 244, but not specified in s. 588, is within this definition." Sect. 244 is that which gives to the Court engaged in executing a decree jurisdiction to determine questions arising between the parties relating to the execution of the decree. Sect. 588 specifies a large number of orders from which appeals lie, including many made in execution proceedings, but not including such an order as the one under discussion. It appears to their Lordships that the plain meaning of s. 2 is to make this order a decree appealable under s. 540. Mr. Ross has not shewn any reason why the words of the Code should not he construed in their plain and obvious sense. On the contrary, the obvious sense is that which best accords with ordinary convenience and ordinary rules of practice. Turning from this purely technical question to the substance of the appeal, the High Court found the issue before them to be very simple. The District Judge held that it turned on the construction of ss. 211 and 244 of the Code. Sect. 244 prescribes that questions arising in execution, including this question, should be decided in the execution and not by separate suit. Sect. 211 enacts that in suits for possession of immovable property, " the Court may provide in the decree for the payment of rent or mesne profits in respect of such property from the institution of the suit until the delivery of possession to the party in whose favour the decree is made, or until the expiration of three years from the date of the decree (whichever event first occurs)." The effect of the District Judges application of these sections is somewhat startling ; because, though executing the Queens order, he holds himself to be limited in point of time as though he was executing his predecessors decree made in his own Court, and he counts the three years, for which alone he thinks he has the jurisdiction to estimate mesne profits, not from the date of the Queens order, but from the date of the decree of his own Court. Now, the plaintiff, it must be held, was entitled to possession throughout. In 1887 he got a decree for it, and had that been executed he would have had the profits. Now, the plaintiff, it must be held, was entitled to possession throughout. In 1887 he got a decree for it, and had that been executed he would have had the profits. But there was an appeal, and in 1889 the High Court took a view adverse to him, and passed a decree in the face of which he could claim nothing. Five years afterwards he succeeded in displacing that decree and in re-establishing his original right to possession. Then he is told that from November 12, 1890, down to November 30, 1895, the law debars him from recovering the income of his property, and allows his opponent to keep it. The District Judge expresses an opinion that the plaintiff might have brought a separate suit for this income, and that if he has lost some years profits it is by his own laches. How he could be charged with laches for not instituting a suit which with the decree of the High Court standing against him must have come to naught, is not easy to say. And if he were now to bring a fresh suit, or if he had done so in 1895 after reversal of the adverse decree, a substantial part of his just claim would be barred by art. 109 of the Limitation Act. But their Lordships will not further discuss the exact Law. Rep. 27 Ind. App. 209 ( 1899- 1900) Raja Bhup Indar Bahadur Singh V. Bijai Bahadur Singh 86 bearings of the two cited sections of the Code, because the High Court has given the simple and obvious solution of the difficulty which puzzled the District Judge. The Court is now executing, not the District Judges decree of 1887, but the Queens order of 1895, which, by affirming the District Judges decree, has adopted its terms and has carried on their effect down to a later date. All that the Courts below had to do, and all that this Board has now to do, is to construe the order of May, 1895, and to carry it into execution. Its meaning is hardly open to doubt. It affirms the District Judges decree which awarded " future mesne profits." That signifies profits future to November 12, 1887. The order of 1895, speaking with the language of the decree of 1887, clearly carries all profits up to its own date. Its meaning is hardly open to doubt. It affirms the District Judges decree which awarded " future mesne profits." That signifies profits future to November 12, 1887. The order of 1895, speaking with the language of the decree of 1887, clearly carries all profits up to its own date. If there had been delay for three years after May 11, 1895, s. 211 would be called into operation with reference to the order of that date. But to call it into operation with reference to the decree of November 12, 1887, is to deprive the later order of its obvious meaning. It is true that one of the arguments used for the defendant was that the later order has no meaning as regards mesne profits because they are not expressly mentioned ; but that is clearly wrong, and was hardly pressed at this bar. Agreeing with the High Court, their Lordships will humbly advise Her Majesty to dismiss this appeal, and the appellant must pay the costs.