Judgement Appeal from a decree of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh (Nov. 21, 1895) reversing a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Bahraich (Sept. 5, 1893) and dismissing the appellants suit with costs. The appellant was the owner of a one-half share of the village of Murwa, which lies to the east of the respondents village of Randa. It was the case of both sides that the river Ghogra until the year 1879-80 flowed from north to south through the village of Randa, save that at the south-eastern extremity of Randa the river divided the two estates. The plaint alleged that the river Ghogra moved first in the year 1880 to the east, diluviating the south-western corner of Murwa, which reformed on the western bank of the said river adjacent to the respondents village of Randa. That the river continued to move eastward till all the northern part of Randa which lay to the east of the Ghogra was diluviated, as were also 1314 bighas of Murwa, all of which reformed on the west of the river as an accretion to Randa. That the respondent according to custom took possession of and held such accretion until 1890, when the Ghogra, shifting to the west, re-diluviated the 1314 bighas of Murwa, which reformed in situ against Murwa, and then continuing its westerly course diluviated 2058 bighas of Randa, and reformed the same on the east bank of the Ghogra in juxtaposition to Murwa as an accretion thereto by gradual accretion. Law. Rep. 27 Ind. App. 81 ( 1899- 1900) Sardar Jagjot Singh V. Rani Brijnath Kunwar 2 The respondent traversed these allegations, and pleaded that she had been constantly in possession of the lands in suit. The issues were (1.) Was the land in suit annexed to Murwa by " gradual accession " ? (2.) If so, ought it to be considered an increment to the plaintiffs tenure either under the particular rule laid down in clause 1, s. 4, or on the general principles of equity and justice made applicable by clause 5, s. 4, of Regulation XI. of 1825. The First Court held that the first issue was clearly proved in the appellants favour; and on the second that the appellant was entitled thereto under the regulation. The Appellate Court held, relying upon Nogender Chunder Ghose v. Mahomed Esof (( 1872) 10 Beng. of 1825. The First Court held that the first issue was clearly proved in the appellants favour; and on the second that the appellant was entitled thereto under the regulation. The Appellate Court held, relying upon Nogender Chunder Ghose v. Mahomed Esof (( 1872) 10 Beng. L. R. 406.) and Lopez v. Muddun Mohun Thakoor (( 1870) 13 Moore’s Ind. Ap. Ca. 467.), that the land in suit had not become annexed to Murwa by gradual accession within the meaning of the regulation, and that in consequence the judgment below must be reversed. Further, they held—(a) that the land in question, being admittedly a part of the estate of Randa, was not according to the decided cases land " gained " within the meaning of clause 1, s. 4 ; (b) that no issue had been raised as to the existence of an established local usage entitling Murwa to the land in question, nor had any evidence been given expressly directed to such an issue, nor were there before the Court materials to enable the Court to find such a custom. C. W. Arathoon, for the appellant, contended that on the evidence and a right construction of Regulation XI. of 1825, s. 4, clauses 1 & 2, the Appellate Court should have found that the lands in suit were a gain to the appellants village of Murwa by gradual accretion see Nogender Chunder Ghose v. Mahomed Esof. (10 Beng. L. R. 406, 428.) The Subordinate Judge had investigated the case on the spot, and it was contended that his finding was right in favour of the gradual accretion. He was also right in holding in favour of the appellants contention as to clause 5 of s. 4, that on the principles of equity and justice he was entitled to the land claimed, because on two previous occasions the respondent had taken some of his land under similar circumstances. This with other evidence was prima facie proof of a local established usage in favour of the appellants claim. The reason why no further evidence had been given was that the respondent had set up a false case from the outset, in denying that there had been any changes at all in the course of the river. This with other evidence was prima facie proof of a local established usage in favour of the appellants claim. The reason why no further evidence had been given was that the respondent had set up a false case from the outset, in denying that there had been any changes at all in the course of the river. There had never been in the progress of the suit any question of reformation the con troversy had turned upon the area of the two villages changing every year owing to alluvion and diluvion, which involved gradual accretion rather than reformation. Branson, for the respondent, was not heard. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD ROBERTSON. So far as the essential facts are concerned, the case of the appellant is clearly disclosed in the plaint. He claims a certain piece of land measuring 2058 bighas, and his theory is that this land has become his by alluvion. Yet, while the exigencies of pleading make him describe it as " new alluviated land," it is in this same plaint said to be "land of the defendants" (respondents) "village." The 2058 bighas have indeed a perfectly definite history, which in their Lordships judgment entirely excludes the appellants claim. The appellant is proprietor of a village called Murwa; and the respondent is proprietor of a village called Randa. In 1866, which is the commencement of both parties rights, the river Ghogra was flowing in a course which intersected Kanda, and the portion of Randa which was on the eastern bank lay between the river and Murwa. This description, which was true in 1866, is also true now. It is the fact, however, that in the interval between 1866 and 1891 the river had first departed from and then substantially resumed the course in which it now runs, so far as concerns those two properties. The appellants case is entirely founded on this intervening but now obsolete history. It appears then that, about the year 1885, the river began to work its way eastward, with the result that Law. Rep. 27 Ind. App. 81 ( 1899- 1900) Sardar Jagjot Singh V. Rani Brijnath Kunwar 3 it came to have on the western bank of its new course not only all of Randa that had formerly been on its east bank, but also some part of Murwa. Rep. 27 Ind. App. 81 ( 1899- 1900) Sardar Jagjot Singh V. Rani Brijnath Kunwar 3 it came to have on the western bank of its new course not only all of Randa that had formerly been on its east bank, but also some part of Murwa. It is said, and it may be assumed, that while this situation of things lasted the disjoined part of Murwa was taken possession of by the respondent. But the Ghogra did not long adhere to this course, and soon began to recede to the west; and by 1891 it once more had to its east, not only the whole of Murwa, but (intervening between it and Murwa) the 2058 bighas now in dispute, which the appellant in his plaint admits to be historically part of Randa. For a time, during the wanderings of the river, this land seems to have been submerged; and the appellant says that it emerged "in an altered form, not capable of being identified." This disguise has fortunately not misled the appellant himself, or prevented his recognising the 2058 bighas as Randa land. These being the facts, it is manifest that the case does not fall within the well-known chapter of law which treats of the formation of new land through the gradual and imperceptible washing up of particles by a river or the sea. Nor have we even to deal with the more complicated case, in which a piece of land is first disintegrated by water action and thereafter reintegrated or reformed by water action. The only note of similarity to alluvion to which the appellant could point was that the process of change was so far gradual; but this means merely that the river took several years to change its course. Now, the mere fact that a change in a rivers course has placed land belonging to A. in contiguity to the lands of B. could never deprive A. of the lands and transfer them to B. And the proposition maintained by the appellant is by several steps nearer than this to paradox; for he contends that if after temporary aberrations a river at last leaves the land of A. in statu quo ante it must be held to be an accession to B., his next neighbour. It is superfluous to say that neither the statute law of India nor the general principles of juris-prudence lend the slightest support to such unreasonable conclusions. The 11th regulation of 1825, by the 1st sub-section of Section IV., declares land gained by gradual accession to be an increment of the land to which it is thus annexed; and by the 5th sub-section, in all other cases not specifically provided for in the regulation, where land is gained by alluvion or by dereliction of a river or the sea, the Court is to be guided by the best evidence they may be able to obtain of established local usage, if there be any applicable to the case, or if not by general principles of equity or justice. It is perfectly plain that neither the specific provision of the 1st sub-section nor the general principles of equity and justice lend the slightest support to the pretension of the appellant, which is to land that would be gained, not from the river, but from a neighbour. So far as local usage is concerned, it is enough to say that no case of such usage is presented on record. What seems really to underlie the appellants claim is a crude idea that, because the respondent once had possession of that pact of Murwa which for the time was transferred to the west side of the river, therefore the appellant ought now to have in property the 2058 bighas belonging to Randa. No attempt was made to formulate this as a legal proposition. Their Lordships are of opinion that the judgment of the Judicial Commissioner concurred in by the Assistant Judicial Commissioner was right; and they will humbly advise Her Majesty that the appeal ought to be dismissed. The appellant will pay the costs of the appeal.