Judgement Appeal from a decree of the High Court (March 18, 1898) affirming a decree of the District Judge of Coimbatore (March 31, 1897). The suit was brought by the appellants to set aside the alleged adoption of the second defendant to one Kuppier, deceased, and to declare the invalidity of a will said to have been made by Kuppier in favour of the second defendant. Both Courts found in favour of the will as a matter of fact, and also in favour of the adoption as a matter of law, though upon different grounds. The point decided in appeal was whether, according to the true construction of the will set out in their Lordships judgment, there was a valid gift to the second defendant as a persona designata, or whether it was conditional upon his adoption as a son to the testator having been validly effected. The First Court decided this question in favour of the second defendant as a persona designata; the High Court held it unnecessary to decide it, as the adoption was complete and valid. Mayne, for the appellant, contended that the will was only intended to operate in favour of the second defendant when he was duly adopted. The gift should be construed as conditional upon the adoption having been validly effected. He cited Fanindra Deb Raikat v. Rajeswar Dass (( 1885) L. R. 12 Ind. Ap. 72.); Nidhoomoni Debya v. Saroda Pershad Mookerjee (( 1876) L. R. Law. Rep. 27 Ind. App. 162 ( 1899- 1900) Subbarayer V. Subbammal 53 3 Ind. Ap. 253.); the Pittapur Case. (( 1898) L. R. 26Ind. Ap. 83.) In the case in 3rd Ind. Ap. the testator evidently intended the boy to take under the will whether he was adopted or not; here, unless the boy were adopted, he could not perform the acts required of him by the testator. The gift in this case is conditional upon the donee having obtained the qualification which entitled him to do what was required of him. C. W. Arathoon, for the first three respondents, contended that the boy was intended to take as a persona designata under the will regardless of his having obtained the status of an adopted son. The gift was to him absolutely in any event. Mayne replied. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD MACNAGHTEN. C. W. Arathoon, for the first three respondents, contended that the boy was intended to take as a persona designata under the will regardless of his having obtained the status of an adopted son. The gift was to him absolutely in any event. Mayne replied. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD MACNAGHTEN. In this case their Lordships have only to consider the meaning and effect of the will of one Kuppier, which is found by both Courts below to have been executed when the testator was of sound disposing mind. Mr. Mayne, who appeared for the appellants, admitted that if the decision of the Court was against him on the construction of the will, success on other points would be of no avail. The question is whether the minor respondent, Venkataramanier, is entitled to inherit under the will, assuming that he was not validly adopted by the testator. The will is in the following terms— "Will left on the 26th February, 1896, corresponding to 16th Masi of Manmatha year, by me Kuppier, son of Venkatarayer, Brahman by caste, cultivator, residing at Chinna Dharapuram, Karur Taluq. Whereas I possess the undermentioned immovable and movable properties, money, out-standings and debts, whereas I, having no issue, have been keeping Venkataramanier, a minor, aged about 10, son of Venkatadasappaiya of Andan Kovil, Brahman, cultivator, who is my brother-in-law, as adopted son and protecting him for, the last 3 years, whereas I am now seriously ill, whereas my mother Venkalakshmi Ammal is in her dotage, and whereas my adopted son, the said Venkataramanier is a minor and con sequently incapable of managing the said properties and of protecting us, my wife Subbammal shall until the said minor becomes a major, administer the said properties as guardian of the said minor, discharge the debts, maintain the undermentioned charities which I have been conducting, bring up the said minor, have his thread ceremony, marriage, &c, celebrated, maintain me and my mother Venkalakshmi Ammal till our lifetime, and after our demise have our funerals, &c, performed for us by the said minor. Afterwards the said minor on his attaining majority shall take charge of the said properties, debts, &c, and until the lifetime of the said Subbammal he shall as per her orders look after the said properties and discharge the debts, also maintain the undermentioned charities and after the said Subbammals lifetime he shall perform her funerals, &c, and possess and enjoy with all rights the said properties, &c, from generation to generation so long as the sun and moon last, and maintain and conduct the said charities. Thus have I of my own accord and with my free will and consent executed this will. " (Signed) Kuppier." It appears to their Lordships that the gift to the minor is not conditional on adoption. The testator no doubt refers to the minor as his adopted son, but he explains what is meant by that expression by stating that he had been keeping the minor " as adopted son "—that is, with a view to his adoption. The case on which Mr. Mayne principally relied was the case of Fanindra Deb Raikat v. Rajeswar Law. Rep. 27 Ind. App. 162 ( 1899- 1900) Subbarayer V. Subbammal 54 Dass. (L. R. 12 Ind. Ap. 72.) There this Board had to construe an angikar-patra which contained an allegation of the adoption of the person who claimed to inherit, and then proceeded to make a statement which might be construed either as a disposition of property or as a decal-ration of the consequences flowing from adoption. Their Lordships held that the author of the angikar-patra had no power to adopt a son who would succeed to the estate; and, on the language of the particular instrument before them, they held it was not a disposition of property, but only a statement of what would have happened if there had been an adoption in fact and no angikar-patra had been executed. The language of one instrument does not afford much assistance in the construction of another. Their Lordships, however, may observe that the language of the will in the present case is more like that of the will in the case of Nidhoomoni Debya v. Saroda Pershad Mookerjee (L. R. 3 Ind. Ap. 253.), to which Mr. Mayne also referred. The language of one instrument does not afford much assistance in the construction of another. Their Lordships, however, may observe that the language of the will in the present case is more like that of the will in the case of Nidhoomoni Debya v. Saroda Pershad Mookerjee (L. R. 3 Ind. Ap. 253.), to which Mr. Mayne also referred. There it was held that the gift of the testators property to a person whom the testator declared he had adopted took effect, although in consequence of the proper ceremonies not having been performed by the testators widows the adoption might not be in all respects complete. Their Lordships will, therefore, humbly advise Her Majesty that the appeal ought to be dismissed. The appellants will pay the costs of the respondents appearing on that appeal.