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1900 DIGILAW 21 (SC)

SURJAN SINGH v. SARDAR SINGH

1900-07-21

LORD HOBHOUSE, LORD LINDLEY, LORD MACHAGHTEN, SIR HENRY DE VILLIERS, SIR RICHARD COUCH

body1900
Judgement Appeal from a decree of the Judicial Commissioners Court (May 15, 1897) reversing a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Kheri (Nov. 12, 1894). The suit was brought by the appellants, under the circumstances stated in their Lordships judgment, as next heirs of Munnu Singh, who died leaving a widow, who succeeded him, and a daughter who married the third defendant, and was the mother of two sons, who are the first and second defendants. On the death of the widow in 1881 the defendants were placed in possession of the village of Piparya Andu, which is the property in dispute, and mutation of names was made in their favour. In eleven years after her death the plaintiffs sued for the village, alleging that they were the next male heirs to Munnu. To make out this title it was necessary for them to establish, first, that by the custom of the family to which Munnu Singh belonged daughters sons could not succeed ; secondly, that they were the next reversionary heirs by male descent. Allegations to that effect were found in their favour by the original Court. The Judicial Commissioner reversed this decision, being of opinion that they had not made out their pedigree. He did not record any finding as to the alleged custom to exclude heirs by the female line. The evidence by which the appellants sought to establish their title as reversionary heirs of Munnu Singh consisted of a pedigree of all branches of the family to which the parties belonged, prepared in manner as stated in the judgment. The custom that daughters sons should be excluded was sought to be established by (1.) statements in village wajib-ul-arzes; (2.) oral testimony. The Subordinate Judge held that the plaintiffs, by producing the wajib-ul-arzes of various villages, had proved the custom excluding the sons of daughters, and that they had also estab lished the pedigree upon which they relied. The genealogical table produced he treated as an original document which was admissible in evidence, and apparently conclusive. The Judicial Commissioner found " that the family pedigree relied upon by the plaintiffs was inadmissible in evidence, inasmuch as the statements contained in it were not shewn to be the statements of the persons referred to in paragraph 1 of s. 32, Evidence Act. The Judicial Commissioner found " that the family pedigree relied upon by the plaintiffs was inadmissible in evidence, inasmuch as the statements contained in it were not shewn to be the statements of the persons referred to in paragraph 1 of s. 32, Evidence Act. Neither Rajah Balbhadar Singh nor the bards who prepared it were examined by the plaintiffs." And, after a review of the oral evidence of plaintiffs, he proceeded as follows — " We have, accordingly, only two witnesses, namely, Baldeo Singh and Gur Baksh Singh, who give the names of the lineal descendants of the three sons of Jugraj Sah, and thus shew the exact degree of relationship between the deceased Munnu Singh and the plaintiffs. But their evidence on this point is, in my opinion, of no value. Both are descendants of Rajah Pertab Singh by his first wife, and on their own shewing are distantly connected with the surviving descendants of Jugraj Singhs sons, the deceased Munnu Singh being according to them seventh in descent from the common ancestor, Rajah Pertab Singh. " The information of the witness Baldeo Singh appears to be derived from a family pedigree which he says he has at home. That pedigree was not produced by him, nor was it summoned by the plaintiffs. The family pedigrees referred to by the witnesses Sheoamber Singh and Balbhadar Singh were also not produced by them. " These family pedigrees would suave been the best evidence in proof of plaintiffs case, and their non-production justifies the presumption that if they exist they do not contain any entries in support of the plaintiffs claim. C. W. Arathoon, for the appellants, contended that this judgment erred in law in rejecting the pedigree as inadmissible in evidence. He referred to Indian Evidence Act, s. 32, and contended that the pedigree was an original document sufficiently proved by the oral evidence in the case, and corroborated by a wajib-ul-arz of Aurungabad dated October 26, 1894. He referred to Bejai Bahadur Singh v. Bhupindar. (( 1895) L. R. 22 Ind. Ap. 139.) As to the effect of the wajib-ul-arz, see Uman Pershad v. Gandharp Singh. (( 1887) L. R. 14 Ind. Ap. 127.) Mayne, for the respondents, contended that the appellants had failed to make out their reversionary title, the pedigree not being proved by the witnesses, and therefore not being admissible under s. 32. Ap. 139.) As to the effect of the wajib-ul-arz, see Uman Pershad v. Gandharp Singh. (( 1887) L. R. 14 Ind. Ap. 127.) Mayne, for the respondents, contended that the appellants had failed to make out their reversionary title, the pedigree not being proved by the witnesses, and therefore not being admissible under s. 32. As regards the wajib-ul-arz, even if admissible it did not prove the appellants relationship to Munnu, on which their title depended. Arathoon replied. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR RICHARD COUCH. The appellants in this case sued for possession of the village of Piparya Andu, on the ground that on the death of Mussammat Gulab Kuar the property devolved on them as the reversionary heirs of her deceased husband Munnu Singh. He was the proprietor of the village, and the first summary settlement was made with him on the annexation of the Province of Oudh. After that he died, and the second summary settlement of the village after the Mutiny was made with Gulab Kuar. The judgment of the Assistant Commissioner, given on August 3, 1869, on a claim by her against the Government, stated that, Munnu Singh being hereditary proprietor held up to annexation, the summary settlement of 1857 was made with him, he died without leaving male issue, and the settlement was therefore made with his widow. And the Court decreed the proprietary right in the entire village in favour of Gulab Kuar, and also in favour of co-sharer. On January 7, 1881, Gulab Kuar made a will, by which she devised the village to her deceased daughters three sons, Sardar Singh and Baldeo Singh, the respondents, and Bahadur Singh, who died before her. On July 8, 1881, she made a gift of some land in the village to Durga Singh, the other respondent, their father. Gulab Kuar died on July 12, 1881, whereupon, on August 10, 1881, an order for mutation of names of Munnu Singh was made in favour of Sardar Singh and Baldeo Singh and the other claimants, the appellants being referred to the Civil Court. Their suit was not instituted till November 80, 1892, more than eleven years after the dismissal of their claim. Their suit was not instituted till November 80, 1892, more than eleven years after the dismissal of their claim. The case stated in their plaint is that they and Munnu Singh are the descendants of Rajah Jugraj Sah by his second wife, that they are entitled to inherit the estate of Munnu Singh as his next heirs, that Gulab Kuar was in possession of the village only with the rights of a Hindu widow, and as such was not competent to alienate the property beyond her lifetime, that the will and deed of gift are consequently invalid, and that according to a well-established family custom daughters and their issue are excluded from inheritance. The respondents denied the alleged relationship of the plaintiffs with Munnu Singh and their reversionary title, and the existence of any custom by which daughters and their issue are excluded from inheritance. They alleged that the will and deed of gift were valid, as Gulab Kuar was in possession of the village and had the rights of an absolute proprietor, and that apart from the will Sardar Singh and Baldeo Singh, being sons of Munnu Singhs daughters, were entitled under the Hindu law to inherit his property on the death of his widow in preference to collateral heirs. The Subordinate Judge who tried the suit found that the appellants relationship to Munnu Singh and their reversionary title were proved, that Gulab Kuars possession was only that of a Hindu widow, and that the will and deed of gift were invalid, and made a decree in the plaintiffs favour. The defendants appealed to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh, which has decided only one of the questions that were raised, namely, whether the appellants are the reversionary heirs of Munnu Singh. To prove this, the appellants produced a pedigree of the family of Rajah Pertab Singh, which shews that the plaintiffs are the collateral heirs of Munnu Singh. This pedigree was objected to as not being admissible in evidence. It was admitted by the appellants counsel that it was prepared under the following circumstances, as deposed to by one of their witnesses. He was examined in 1894, and his evidence is that the pedigree was prepared in his family thirteen years ago. The bards were called to dictate it. It was prepared from the history given by them. It was admitted by the appellants counsel that it was prepared under the following circumstances, as deposed to by one of their witnesses. He was examined in 1894, and his evidence is that the pedigree was prepared in his family thirteen years ago. The bards were called to dictate it. It was prepared from the history given by them. It was copied from certain papers in the possession of the bards. In the year when the Rajahs marriage was settled in Surajpur, a dispute about it arose. Then they sent for the bards and got the pedigree prepared. The dispute was said to have been about the class of Thakurs to which the Rajah referred to belonged, and arose about the time of the death of Gulab Kuar. In their Lordships opinion the Appellate Court has rightly held that the pedigree was not admissible, or, as the Indian Evidence Act says, relevant; s. 32 of the Act, which would make the statements in the pedigree relevant, only applies when the statements are made by a person who is dead or cannot be found, or has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the case, appears to the Court unreasonable. Neither any of the bards nor Rajah Balbhadar Singh, who assembled the bards of the family and with their assistance had the pedigree drawn up, was called as a witness, and no proof was given that they were within any of these descriptions, which made it unnecessary to call them. A wajib-ul-urz of the village of Aurungabad, dated October 26, 1894, was relied upon for the appellants. It contained a statement purporting to have been made by Pitam Singh, deceased, but it is too vague to be of any value in proof of the appellants claim. The oral evidence, produced by the plaintiffs was that of six witnesses, three of whom appear to have derived their information from family pedigrees which were not produced, and the others did not state the source of their information. The Appellate Court was of opinion that this evidence was not sufficient to prove the relationship with Munnu, in which view their Lordships agree. The Appellate Court was of opinion that this evidence was not sufficient to prove the relationship with Munnu, in which view their Lordships agree. Apparently the Subordinate Judge who decided in the plaintiffs favour was of this opinion, as in his judgment he says it was " shewn by the genealogical table," and did not rely upon other evidence. The pedigree not being admissible, the appellants failed to prove that they were the collateral heirs of Munnu Singh, and the Appellate Court, without giving any finding on the alleged custom to exclude daughters and their issue, set aside the decree of the lower Court and dismissed the suit. Their Lordships being of opinion that it was rightly dismissed, they will humbly advise Her Majesty to affirm that decree and to dismiss this appeal. The appellants will pay the costs.