Judgement Appeal from a decree of the High Court (June 19, 1895) reversing a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Meerut (Dec. 23, 1892), and dismissing the appellants suit with costs. The plaint alleged that Syed Mehrban Ali, a wealthy Mahomedan who died on October 26, 1889, being the owner of property valued at Rs.4,00,000, did on October 16, 1889, executed " a deed of wakf," dedicating the whole of it to charitable and religious uses, and sent the same to the registrars office for registration, where registration was refused on the ground that the document did not contain a description of the property it purported to deal with sufficient to identify the same, and was, therefore, under the provisions of s. 21 of Act III. of 1877 (the Indian Registration Act, 1877), not admissible to registration; that Syed died before the omission could be sup plied ; that on November 4, 1889, the document was registered by one Syed Habib-ul-lah, described as " the general attorney and trustee " of the said Syed; and that Syeds sisters disputed the validity of the said " wakf." The prayer of the plaint was that the document night be declared to be a valid deed of wakf, and that the property therein dealt with might be declared to be wakf property and not descendible to or divisible amongst Syeds heirs. Of the issues settled, those which were raised on the appeal to the High Court were as to the validity of the wakf and as to the registration of the deed, so as to affect the property dealt with thereby. The wakf deed first sets out Syeds parentage and his possession of property, and then proceeds " As I have no male issue up to this time, and it is incumbent on every one not to neglect to secure benefit of his soul in the next world, I wish to establish a perpetual, lasting, and continuing charity, so that the charitable expenses may in future be defrayed without any difficulty or obstacle in my lifetime, and also after my death. Hence, in order to seek nearness to God, and to secure benefit and honour in the next world, I have, while in a sound state of body and mind, and of my free will and accord, without coercion or compulsion, made a family endowment (wakf khandani) of my property detailed below." And again, " Having withdrawn my proprietary possession from the property, the subject of the endowment, I have brought it in my possession as superintendent (mutawalli) which I can hold during my life under the terms of this document. Its income and profit shall, after defraying its necessary expenses according to the provisions hereafter made in this document, be applied to charitable purposes. No one shall by reason of his getting any stipend or maintenance allowance from the income of the property have a right to exercise pro prietary acts or power to make a transfer, &c. nor shall this endowed property be liable to be attached or sold in satisfaction of the personal debt of any superintendent or recipient of allowance ; because, it being an endowed property, all the rights of the superintendent and those for whom maintenance allowances have been fixed shall exist only for their personal maintenance." Then follows a list of the property, and then certain clauses of which clause 1 appointed the said Syed himself " mutawalli " or superintendent of the endowed property for his life, with power to use the income as he should think proper, according to the provisions of the Mahomedan law and the conditions set forth in the document itself. Clause 2 provided for his successors as "mutawallis," who were to be chosen, as he then had no son, first, from his wives, then from his daughters, and then from their descendants. Clauses 3 and 4 fixed the allowances for himself, his successors, his wives and daughters. Clause 5 gave him and his successor in the " mutawalliship " power to fix the expenditure. Clause 6 directed reinvestment of any surplus, which investments were to be regarded in turn as part of the endowment. Clause 7 stipulated that no one should have the right to call upon any " mutawalli " for an account. Clause 5 gave him and his successor in the " mutawalliship " power to fix the expenditure. Clause 6 directed reinvestment of any surplus, which investments were to be regarded in turn as part of the endowment. Clause 7 stipulated that no one should have the right to call upon any " mutawalli " for an account. Clause 8 prohibited the alienation of the endowed property, except for the purposes of exchange or for the purchase of other property in place of that sold, and gave a power to raise money, but only with the consent of the Collector of the district. Clause 9 provided for the event of a son being born to him, in which case such son was virtually to take the Syeds place, and was not to be accountable to any one; and the deed concluded as follows — " 10. If, God forbid ! none of my male or female heirs be in existence at any time, the authority for the time being shall have power to take the endowed property into and under his own possession and superintendence, use its income remaining after the payment of its necessary expenses, for my spiritual benefit in such matters (sic) as may, according to the Mahomedan faith and the Hanafi sect, to which I belong, be valid, and be for the benefit of the Mahomedans. " I have, therefore, executed this deed of family endowment that it may serve as evidence and be of use.” The Subordinate Judge held that a settlement such as this of property on ones self or for ones descendants is a charitable act and valid as a wakf under Mahomedan law, and that this wakf was not open to any objections according to Mahomedan or any other law. The High Court, in reference to the point as to registration, felt themselves bound by a decision of a Full Bench in Hardei v. Ram Lal (( 1889) lnd. L. R. 11 Allah. 319.), and admitted the document in evidence. The High Court, in reference to the point as to registration, felt themselves bound by a decision of a Full Bench in Hardei v. Ram Lal (( 1889) lnd. L. R. 11 Allah. 319.), and admitted the document in evidence. They then held_ that the words used in the deed which had been translated as " family endowment" aptly and fully described the nature of the settlors intentions in executing the said deed; that the object he had in view was to secure spiritual benefit for himself in the future world by making a family endowment of his property in favour of his descendants, on the principle that charity begins at home. They then criticised in detail the other clauses of the deed, and expressed their opinion that in executing the same Syed had nothing in view but to make a permanent provision for his descendants as long as any one descended from him survived, and to provide for the increase of the estate by investment of the surplus income. They declined to give any effect to the 10th clause, as the dedication under that clause was not to have effect till after the extinction of the settlors descendants at some indefinite time in the future. They pointed out that a very similar dedication had been held in the case of Abul Fata Mahomed Ishak v. Russomoy Dhur Chowdhry (( 1894) L. R. 22 Ind. Ap. 76.) to be illusory on account of its remoteness, and they expressed their opinion that, under the wakf deed in question, not only was there no immediate dedication of any substantial portion of the settlors property to charitable or religious uses, but that the settlor never intended to make any dedication whatever to such uses, his object being to make a perpetual settlement for the support of his descendants in order that he might thereby secure for himself spiritual benefits in the next world. Mayne and Raikes, for the appellants, contended that this decree was erroneous. Being directed by their Lordships to argue the point as to registration, they contended that the document was registered by a public officer acting within his jurisdiction, and even if irregularly registered it was so done in good faith, and it holds good in spite of irregularity. See Act III. of 1877, ss. 17 and 49. [Sir E. Couch. Being directed by their Lordships to argue the point as to registration, they contended that the document was registered by a public officer acting within his jurisdiction, and even if irregularly registered it was so done in good faith, and it holds good in spite of irregularity. See Act III. of 1877, ss. 17 and 49. [Sir E. Couch. Merely putting the deed on the register is not sufficient it must be registered according to the Act.] See s. 60 and Sah Mukhun; Lall Panday v. Sah Koondun Lall. (( 1875) L. R. 2 nd. Ap. 210, 215) Even if he acted in contravention of the Act in registering the deed when the deceased was not properly represented before him, his registration was not declared by any words in the Act to be a nullity. It was a mere defect in procedure, both substantially and technically. Reference was made to Act XX. of 1866, ss. 88. 47, 48, 49, and Mohammed Ewaz v. Birj Lall (( 1877) L. R. 4 lnd. Ap. 166, 175.), where it was held that registration alone will render a document admissible without inquiry as to whether the same was properly granted. See also Act III. of 1877, ss. 35 and 74, and In re Shaik Abdul Aziz. (( 1887) Ind. L. R. 11 Bomb. 691.) The power of the registrar holds good if he acts in good faith and finds that the parties are also so acting. As soon as the application is made the registrars jurisdiction arises. If the executing party is not present, the registrar must take steps to satisfy himself whether the presenter of the deed is authorized. If he is satisfied without due evidence, or by bona. fide mistake, that does not react on jurisdiction. Here the first presentation of the deed was by a person absolutely authorized. The authority had ceased at the time of actual registration; but even then the person to whom directions had originally been given was present, and it had been executed with intent that it should be registered in accordance with those directions. It was contended that a mere mistake under those circumstances would not destroy jurisdiction. Then as to the validity of the deed, it created a valid wakf. There was a substantial gift to charitable purposes. It was contended that a mere mistake under those circumstances would not destroy jurisdiction. Then as to the validity of the deed, it created a valid wakf. There was a substantial gift to charitable purposes. Where it is clear that an appropriation is made to charitable purposes, it will not be allowed to fail, merely because it is shewn to be not supplied with particulars and a scheme, provided that the Court can direct one. On the other hand, an illusory gift to the poor will not suffice to save a perpetual family settlement from being void. It was contended that on a fair construction of all the clauses of the deed the use of the word wakf was not colourable, but that the donees under the deed were to go on devoting money to charitable purposes as the donor himself had done. The powers given to the mutwalli were not such as would be given if the whole endowment were a pretence. Accordingly, this case does not come within Sheik Mahomed Ahsanulla Chowdhry v. Amarchand Kundu (( 1889) L. R. 17 Ind. Ap. 28.), Abdul Gafur v. Nizamudin (( 1892) L. R. 19 Ind. Ap. 170.), and Gnanasam-banda Pandara v. Velu Pandaram. (( 1899) L. R. 27 Ind. Ap. 69,76.) See Hedaya (Hamilton), vol. ii. p. 334, bk. xv. Reference was also made to Runchordas v. Parvatibhai (( 1899) L. R. 26 Ind. Ap. 71.); Chotalal Lakhmiram v. Manohar Ganesh Tambekar. (( 1899) L. R. 26 Ind. Ap. 199; S.C. ( 1887) Ind. L. R. 12 Bomb. 247) According to English law, the words of the endowment would be sufficient see In re Sutton (( 1885) 28 Ch. D. 464.); Lewis v. Allenby. (( 1870) L. R. 10 Eq. 668.) Branson, for the respondents, who was only heard on the point as to registration, contended that it was not a mere defect of procedure which had occurred, but an entire absence of authority on the part of the registrar, whose registration under the circumstances was absolutely null and void. There had been no presentation. The executant was dead, and under the Act the only person who could present was his representative or assign. His agent during life had no power after his death to appear for his representative, or to bind him in any way. Moreover, no list of property had been given under s. 21. There had been no presentation. The executant was dead, and under the Act the only person who could present was his representative or assign. His agent during life had no power after his death to appear for his representative, or to bind him in any way. Moreover, no list of property had been given under s. 21. There was nothing before the registrar which he had authority to accept. Mayne replied. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD ROBERTSON. The appellants were the plaintiffs in a suit before the Subordinate Judge of Meerut, and by their plaint they prayed that it should be declared that a deed executed in October, 1889, by Munshi Syed Mehrban AH, deceased, is a valid deed of wakf. The property affected by this instrument is said to be worth Rs.400,000. The plaintiffs are respectively wives and daughters of the deceased, for whom certain provisions are made in the deed. The defendants were two of his sisters, for whom no provision was made in the deed. Both sisters are now dead, and only one of them, Ulfat-un-nisa, is now represented on the record in pursuance of an Order in Council of August 7, 1900, which struck off the representatives of the other sister, Sharif-un-nisa, under circumstances set out in that order. Of the several issues settled by the Subordinate Judge, two only have been argued in this appeal. The first question is raised by the defendants plea that the deed founded on, not having been legally registered, cannot be admitted in evidence and cannot affect the property. The second question is raised by the defendants contention that, having regard to the terms of the deed itself, the property did not become a wakf property. Both questions have been considered by their Lordships. The question about registration turns on the Act III. of 1877. The deed in dispute being an instrument of gift of immovable property, it came under s. 17 of the Act, and registration under the Act was accordingly, by s. 49, indispensable in order to render it receivable as evidence of the transaction which it purported to record, and to enable it to affect the immovable property comprised therein. The question is, was it lawfully registered? It was de facto registered, but the history of that registration requires to be examined. The question is, was it lawfully registered? It was de facto registered, but the history of that registration requires to be examined. The deed as ultimately presented for registration and registered consists of two parts, of which the former part is dated October 16, 1889, and contains the deed of endowment and conditions, while the latter part is headed " Supplement or Detail of the Endowed Property," and consists of these particulars. It appears that at first the munshi who executed the deed, or his advisers, had not adverted to the requirements of s. 21 of the Registration Act; and as the deed as at first presented for registration did not contain " a description of the "property sufficient to identify the same," the registrar, on October 16, 1889, declined to register, but returned the deed " for correction and compliance with " those statutory provisions. The deed had been presented on behalf of the munshi by Saiyid Habib-ul-lah, who held his power of attorney. On October 24, 1889, the supplement or detail of the endowed property was added, so as to render the deed registerable, and on that day the deed so completed was executed by the munshi. On November 4, 1889, that deed of endowment (i.e., the completed deed) was presented for registration by the same Saiyid Habib-ul-lah. In the interval between the execution of the completed deed and its presentation to the registrar the munshi died. The legal question now to be considered turns on this last fact. The narrative, however, may be completed by mentioning that the registrar accepted the deed and registered it, recording in writing that the man who had executed it and whose attorney presented it for registration was dead. It was not attempted on the part of the appellant to justify the registration of the deed, as regularly done in accordance with the Act. The departure from the Act is indeed palpable, and the only question is whether it invalidates the registration. It was not attempted on the part of the appellant to justify the registration of the deed, as regularly done in accordance with the Act. The departure from the Act is indeed palpable, and the only question is whether it invalidates the registration. The Act, by s. 32, enacts that every document to be registered under it, whether such registration be compulsory (as in the present case) or optional (as in the case of other classes of instruments), shall be presented by some person executing or claiming under the same, or by the representative or assign of such person, or by the agent of such person, representative or assign, duly authorized by power of attorney. Now the case in hand is that of a person who, when he presented the deed for registration, as he says he did, on November 4, 1889, stood in no other relation to the deed than that, before the death of the person executing it, he had held his power of attorney. It is perfectly pLaln, not merely from the general law, but from the terms of this s. 32 itself, that after the mans death the only attorney who would have any locus standi would have been the attorney of the representative or assign of the deceased. It has been suggested, however, that the error of the registrar was a defect in his procedure only, and accordingly, under s. 87, does not invalidate the act of registration. To their Lordships the error appears to be of a more radical nature. When the terms of s. 32 are considered with due regard to the nature of registration of deeds, it is clear that the power and jurisdiction of the registrar only come into play when he is invoked by some person having a direct relation to the deed. It is for those persons to consider whether they will or will not give to the deed the efficacy conferred by registration. The registrar could not be held to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on him, if, hearing of the execution of a deed, he got possession of it and registered it; and the same objection applies to his proceeding at the instigation of a third party, who might be a busybody. The registrar could not be held to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on him, if, hearing of the execution of a deed, he got possession of it and registered it; and the same objection applies to his proceeding at the instigation of a third party, who might be a busybody. Now, it seems to their Lordships that when the deed was presented on November 4, 1889, it was presented by a volunteer, and the registrars minute shews that he proceeded to register at the request of one whom he knew to derive his power of attorney from a dead man. Nor is it possible to treat this action of the registrar as compliance with the request made on October 16, 1889, when the principal was alive. Not only had the deed in fact been executed afresh on October 24, but it was presented afresh on November 4, as the minute itself bears; and, even assuming the continuity of the proceeding, the death of the applicant brought it to an end. The registrar, indeed, did not merely disregard s. 32, for he proceeded to accept the admission of the alleged attorney as a good admission of the execution of the deed, although s. 34 requires in the case of a decease the admission of the representative or assign. Their Lordships were referred to two decisions of this Committee in support of the appellants contention. Neither case gives any countenance to the view that the absence of any party legally entitled to present a deed for registration is a defect in procedure falling under s. 87. In both those cases the registrar was throughout moved by a person having title, and was exercising his jurisdiction. The difference is, in their Lordships judgment, vital. They therefore hold the registration of this deed to have been illegal. Their Lordships have, however, considered the question whether, even assuming it to have been registered, the deed is, according to its terms, a valid deed of wakf. It will be so if the effect of the deed is to give the property in substance to charitable uses. It will not be so if the effect is to give the property in substance to the testators family. The deed begins with a statement that the grantor has always devoted a portion of his income to religious and charitable purposes, as seemed proper and expedient to him at the time. It will not be so if the effect is to give the property in substance to the testators family. The deed begins with a statement that the grantor has always devoted a portion of his income to religious and charitable purposes, as seemed proper and expedient to him at the time. He goes on to say that, as he has no male issue and it is incumbent on every one not to neglect to secure benefit of his soul in the next world, he wishes to establish a perpetual, lasting, and continuing charity, so that the charitable expenses may in future be defrayed without any difficulty or obstacle in his lifetime and also after his death. Hence, " in order to secure benefit and honour in the next world I have, of my free will and accord, without coercion or compulsion and while in a sound state of body and mind, made a family endowment (wakf khandani) to seek nearness to God." He goes on to say that he has withdrawn his proprietary possession from the property, the subject of endowment, and has brought it into his possession as mutawalli, " which I can hold during my life under the terms of this document. Its income and profit shall, after defraying its necessary expenses according to the pro visions hereafter made in this document, be applied to charitable purposes." No one was, by reason of his getting any maintenance, to have right to exercise proprietary acts, nor should the endowed property be liable to be attached or sold in satisfaction of any personal debts of any mutawalli or recipient of allowance, because it being an endowed property all the rights of the mutawalli and those for whom maintenance allowances have been fixed are to exist only for their personal maintenance. A detail of the property (wakf khandani), which was " the subject of the family endowment under this deed and the conditions attached thereto," was then given. The conditions follow the detail of the property, and are ten in number. A detail of the property (wakf khandani), which was " the subject of the family endowment under this deed and the conditions attached thereto," was then given. The conditions follow the detail of the property, and are ten in number. The first appoints the donor himself to act as mutawalli, and he is to use the income of the endowed property "in the way I shall think proper, according to the provisions of the Mahomedan law and the conditions of this document." No. 2 provides for one of his wives arid thereafter one of his daughters, and after their deaths some direct descendant, being successively mutawalli. No. 3 fixes Rs.300 a month as the allowance of the mutawalli for his or her own expenses and those of his or her children. No. 4 gives maintenance allowances to the wives and daughters of the donor. The fifth and sixth purposes are as follows " Whatever are the necessary expenses, such as the salaries of the servants for the endowed property, the expenses of visitors, marriages, deaths, presents, offerings, and other charitable purposes, like those of schools, &c, at this time, they shall during the time of my superintendence be defrayed by me during the term of my superintendence, and afterwards by every mutawalli, sub ject to the provisions of this deed, of his own authority and according to his own wishes." 6. " The surplus income of the endowed property remaining after the payment of the Government revenue, the village expenses, the expenses of the mutawalli, the salaries of the servants and stipend-holders and others, &c, shall accumulate, and the money accumulated shall be invested in the purchase of other properties, which shall also appertain to the endowed property and shall themselves be wakf property. The income of that also shall, in conformity with the 5th paragraph, be spent along with the income of the endowed property." By the seventh condition the mutawalli is to have a discretionary power, with reference to the increase or decrease in the income of the endowed property, to increase or decrease the fixed allowances or fix a new allowance. No one was to have a right on the ground of relationship, &c, to prefer a claim for increase or decrease or for a new allowance, or a claim against the mutawalli for the time being for rendition of accounts. No one was to have a right on the ground of relationship, &c, to prefer a claim for increase or decrease or for a new allowance, or a claim against the mutawalli for the time being for rendition of accounts. The eighth condition forbids sale and mortgage except in certain specified cases. The ninth condition relates to the contingency of a son being born to the donor after the execution of the deed. He is to be the mutawalli, with the aid of a munsarim during minority. He is to have Rs.300 a month for his expenses, " and shall be authorized to spend all the net profits of the endowed property according to his discretion in purchasing property and making addition to the endowed property, in the erection of houses, in performing shadioghammi, joyous and mourning ceremonies, and in other necessary and charitable matters." It was to be optional to him to create new allowances, to reduce, enhance, or put a stop to the allowances of the persons receiving allowances. No other recipient of allowances or relatives was to have power to take account from the mutawalli. The tenth and last condition declares that " if (which God forbid I)" none of the donors male or female heirs be in exist ence at any time, the authority for the time being shall have power to take the endowed property into and under his own possession and superintendence, use its income remaining after the payment of its cost of maintenance for the donors spiritual benefit in such matters as might, according to Mahomedan faith and Hanafi sect, to which the donor belonged, be valid and for the benefit of the Mahomedans. " I have therefore executed this deed of family endowment in order that the same may serve as evidence and be of use." The deed thus closes, as it began, by describing itself as a deed of family endowment. The donor contemplates, it is true, that his own liberality to religious and charitable purposes shall continue in future generations ; but this is only, as it turns out, to an uncertain and discretionary amount, and as an incident of the family endowment. When the deed is examined and collated, and its professions tested by its effective provisions, it proves to be what it calls itself, a "family endowment " pure and simple. When the deed is examined and collated, and its professions tested by its effective provisions, it proves to be what it calls itself, a "family endowment " pure and simple. Indeed, the theory of the deed seems to be that the creation of a family endowment is of itself a religious and meritorious act, and that the perpetual application of the surplus income in the acquisition of new properties to be added to the family estate is a charitable purpose. It is superfluous in the present day to say that this is not the law. The part of the deed which was most relied on by the appellants is the general statement or declaration with which it opens. The words particularly founded on are those in which the testator declares that " the income and profit of the endowment shall, after defraying its necessary expenses according to the provisions hereafter made in this document, be applied to charitable purposes." The reference to the subsequent part of the document carries us forward to the conditions, where those general intentions are put into concrete and effective shape. Now, the fifth and sixth conditions express in clear and definite language the manner in which the testator works out the ideas adumbrated in the words which have been quoted, and they place beyond dispute the relative positions of charity and family endowment in the testators scheme. The fifth condition provides for the payment of what it calls necessary expenses, and among those it expressly enumerates " offerings and other charitable purposes, like those of schools, &c, at this time." The sixth condition deals with the surplus income after those " expenses " are paid, and dedicates that income to the purchase of other properties; and the income of the new properties is to follow the same course as the income of the original estate. The amount to be applied under the fifth head is in the absolute and uncontrolled discretion of the mutawalli, and no one has a right to demand an account. On the terms of the deed itself, therefore, their Lordships hold that the property is not in substance dedicated to charitable purposes, but, on the contrary, is dedicated substantially to the maintenance and aggrandisement of the family estates for family purposes. The deed, therefore, could not be supported as constituting a wakf. On the terms of the deed itself, therefore, their Lordships hold that the property is not in substance dedicated to charitable purposes, but, on the contrary, is dedicated substantially to the maintenance and aggrandisement of the family estates for family purposes. The deed, therefore, could not be supported as constituting a wakf. Their Lordships will humbly advise Her Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed, and the appellants must pay the costs of the appeal.