Judgement Appeal from a decree of the Judicial Commissioner (Nov. 19, 1896) reversing a decree of the Additional Civil Judge of Lucknow (Dec. 13, 1893). The respondent, Arjun Singh, sued to recover possession of the villages of Sikandarpur, Amolia and Samnapur, making title thereto as next heir to his brother Sheo Narain Singh, to whom he alleged the said villages had been orally granted by Rajah Bisheshar Bux Singh in the year 1879, and the question decided was whether this grant conveyed a heritable estate to Sheo Narain. In 1856 Rajah Daljit Singh was talookdar of Bansinghpur in the district of Rai Bareli. According to the custom of his family, the talook descended to a single heir. He accordingly assigned the villages of Bankagarh, Davindgarh, Nadiran Kuer Khera as maintenance during his lifetime for his three younger sons, Arjun, Shankar Bux, and Sheo Narain. The summary settlement of December 14, 1858, was made after his death with his eldest son Jagmohan in respect of all the villages comprised in the talook except Bankagarh and Davindgarh. For these two Arjun Singh and Shankar Bux obtained decrees for regular settlement in 1869. But Sheo Narain never obtained possession of Nadiran Kuer Khera. Jagmohan Singh obtained a decree in regular settlement for Sheogarh village, which included the village originally assigned to Sheo Narain. In 1879 Jagmohan died and was succeeded by his son, Bisheshar Bux, who under an oral arrangement placed Sheo Narain in possession of the three villages in suit. Sheo Narain, on the other hand, relinquished all claim to Nidhan Kuer Khera. Bisheshar Bux filed in the revenue department applications for mutation of names in respect of these three villages in favour of Sheo Narain. That which related to Sikandarpur was as follows — " That, whereas, agreeably to my verbal promise, I have, after the execution of the deed of relinquishment regarding the village Nidhan Kuer Khera, .... given the entire village Sikandarpur valued at Rs. 13,500, and Samnapur, valued at Rs. 4400, .... owned and possessed by me, to my own uncle (paternal), Sheo Narain Singh, for his maintenance, and placed him in possession and occupation of both the said villages; and .... given the entire village Sikandarpur valued at Rs. 13,500, and Samnapur, valued at Rs. 4400, .... owned and possessed by me, to my own uncle (paternal), Sheo Narain Singh, for his maintenance, and placed him in possession and occupation of both the said villages; and .... I pray that the name of Sheo Narain Singh may, in the terms of this application, be substituted and entered in records in place of my name in respect of the zemindary Hakhiat and Lambardari of the entire village Sikandarpur, as its proprietor in perpetuity." The application as regards Samnapur was in the same terms, except that the words "in perpetuity " were inserted after the words "for his maintenance," and that the words "as its proprietor in perpetuity" were omitted at the end. Sheo Narains deed of relinquishment was as follows— " . . . . My father, Rajah Daljit Singh, had, during his lifetime, given me the muafi village of Nidhan Kuer Khera .... valued at Rs.2000, for my maintenance. I, however, lived jointly with him, the said rajah, and did not therefore take possession of the Guzara (village). On Rajah Daljit Singhs demise the village continued under possession and enjoyment of Rajah Jagmohan Singh. It is a small village, and it is not .possible for me to maintain myself from the profits thereof. For this reason, Rajah Bisheshar Bux Singh .... granted to me out of his own pleasure village Sikandarpur .... valued at Rs.13500, and village Samnapur, valued at Rs.4400 .... as an exchange for the (Guzara) village Nidhan Kuer Khera, under an oral agreement." After the deaths of Bisheshar Bux and Sheo Narain, the respondent sued the heir of the former to recover the villages, alleging that Sheo Narain was absolute owner, and that on the death of his widow he was the next heir. The appellant pleaded that the oral grant to Sheo Narain for his maintenance did not confer on him a heritable estate. The First Court held that the surrounding circumstances did not justify the inference that Bisheshar Bux intended to grant an estate of inheritance, and accordingly dismissed the suit. The Appellate Court held that according to the true intention of the grant Sheo Narain took a heritable estate. It considered, first, that the grants made by Daljit Singh to his three younger sons must be assumed to have been all of the same nature. The Appellate Court held that according to the true intention of the grant Sheo Narain took a heritable estate. It considered, first, that the grants made by Daljit Singh to his three younger sons must be assumed to have been all of the same nature. Secondly, that the absolute character of the grants to Arjun Singh and Shankar Bux was shewn by the evidence. Thirdly, that the character of the grant to Sheo Narain in 1879 was evidenced, from the presumption that, as the village of Nidhan Kuar Khera was held on an absolute tenure, the villages exchanged for it would have been given on a similar tenure; from the language used by the grantor in his application for mutation of names, and from the continued possession of Sheo Narains widow as a matter of right after her husbands death. De Gruyther, for the appellant, contended that it lay on the respondent to prove the grant of an estate of inheritance to Sheo Narain, and that he had failed to give any direct evidence thereof. With regard to inferences, if they were admissible or sufficient on a question of title, it was contended that the evidence was insufficient to warrant a finding that Daljits grant in 1856 had been of absolute estates to Arjun and Shankar Bux, and, even if it were, that did not justify an inference of Nidhan Kuer Khera being held absolutely by Sheo Narain; and still less was there any ground for the inference that the villages granted in exchange for it were granted absolutely. The possession by Sheo Narains widow in succession to him, which was relied upon, is reasonably explained by the talookdars liability to provide maintenance for Sheo Narains widow and daughter. Further, the terms of Sheo Narains deed of relinquishment and of Bisheshars application for mutation of names, even if these were evidence of the terms of the oral grant, did not contain any words sufficient to indicate the conveyance of an estate of inheritance. The following cases were cited Toolshi Pershad Singh v. Rajah Ram Narain Singh (( 1885) L. R. 12 Ind. Ap. 205.); Moulvi Muhammad Abdul Majid v. Fatima Bibi (L. R. 12 Ind. Ap. 159.); Baboo Lekraj Roy v. Kunhya Singh (( 1877) L. R. 4 Ind. Ap. 223.); Roshan Singh v. Balwant Singh. (( 1899) L. R. 27 Ind. The following cases were cited Toolshi Pershad Singh v. Rajah Ram Narain Singh (( 1885) L. R. 12 Ind. Ap. 205.); Moulvi Muhammad Abdul Majid v. Fatima Bibi (L. R. 12 Ind. Ap. 159.); Baboo Lekraj Roy v. Kunhya Singh (( 1877) L. R. 4 Ind. Ap. 223.); Roshan Singh v. Balwant Singh. (( 1899) L. R. 27 Ind. Ap.51.) Mayne, for the respondent, contended that the judgment of the High Court was right. The grants by Daljit in 1856 were made by way of absolute gift or partition so as to secure the succession of the whole residue of the talook to his own son. This view of the transaction was approved by the British Indian Association in 1868 in their award made on the occasion of a further claim being put forward by the younger members of the family on the ground of the partibility of the talook. The decrees of the Settlement Courts in favour of Arjun Singh and Shankar Singh in respect of their grants were expressed to be to them and their heirs. It was contended that the grants to them were clearly intended to be absolute and inheritable, and that there was no reason to suppose that the grant to Sheo Narain stood on any different footing. It was further contended that the combined effect of the transactions in 1879, following upon the previous transactions between the members of the same family which were all of them by way of compromise of litigated claims and not merely a discharge of recognised obligations in respect of maintenance, was to effect an absolute assignment of all the right which the grantor possessed and affected to dispose of. It lay on the appellant under the circumstances to shew that a special restriction of interest applied to the particular village in suit. The construction of the deed in this case should be a benignant one see Tagore Case. (( 1872) L. R. Ind. Ap. Supp. 47,55.) As regards the special construction applicable to grants for maintenance, the words " for maintenance" are words of description and not of limitation. The nature of the grant must be ascertained from the intention of the grantor, to be collected from all the terms of the deed. (( 1872) L. R. Ind. Ap. Supp. 47,55.) As regards the special construction applicable to grants for maintenance, the words " for maintenance" are words of description and not of limitation. The nature of the grant must be ascertained from the intention of the grantor, to be collected from all the terms of the deed. If there is no other indication of intention, the usage is to infer from those words that the grant is in lieu or in satisfaction of an obligation to maintain, and accordingly only for life. This inference may be removed by other words, and even by the surrounding circumstances. The following cases were cited as to the effect to be given to the circumstances in which the transaction took place Rajah Nursing Deb v. Roy Koylasnath (( 1862) 9 Moores Ind. Ap. Ca. 55,64.fs22) ; Bhaiya Ardawan Singh v. Rajah Udey Partab Singh (( 1896) L. R. 23 Ind. Ap. 64, 73.) ; Lalit Mohun Singh Roy v. Chukkun Lal Roy (( 1897) L. R. 24 Ind. Ap. 76, 88.) ; Sri Braja Kisora Devu Garu v. Sri Kundana Devi (( 1899) L. R. 26 Ind. Ap.66.) ; and the two cases cited by the appellant from 12 Ind. Ap. De Gruyther replied. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by Sir Richard Couch. Rajah Daljit Singh, a talookdar of Oudh, who died in 1857, had four sons, Jagmohan, Arjun, Shankar, and Sheo Narain. Jagmohan died in 1879, leaving a son, Bisheshar Bux, who died in December, 1887, leaving a son, Rameshar Bux. Shankar died in 1888, leaving two sons, and Sheo Narain died on July 23, 1884, leaving a widow, Jai Ratan Kuer, and a daughter, Mangal Kuer. The widow died on December 9, 1886. At the time of the annexation of Oudh in 1856, Daljit Singh was the talookdar of talook Bansinghpur in the district of Rai Bareli. After the death of Daljit, Arjun and Shankar made a claim against Jagmohan of half of the talook to be settled with them, the whole having been forfeited under Lord Cannings Proclamation. At the time of the annexation of Oudh in 1856, Daljit Singh was the talookdar of talook Bansinghpur in the district of Rai Bareli. After the death of Daljit, Arjun and Shankar made a claim against Jagmohan of half of the talook to be settled with them, the whole having been forfeited under Lord Cannings Proclamation. In the proceedings of the Financial Commissioners Court at Lucknow on February 9, 1869, with reference to the settlement of the forfeited estate, it is stated by the Commissioner that these two brothers refused to accept anything but a complete share of the estate, and had been several times on the point of creating disturbances ; that he had had the parties before him several times, the plaintiffs then appeared more reasonable, and were willing to withdraw their claim if the Rajah (Jagmohan) would make them some further allowance; that Jagmohan Singh was unwilling to alienate any of the property to the detriment of his own son, and maintained that the plaintiffs share was settled as younger sons by their father; that the talookdar defendant (Jagmohan), after some discussion, in which Maharajah Man Singh took part and advised him, consented to give up lands paying Rs.1000 more in perpetuity to the two plaintiffs, and had signed an agreement to this effect. There upon Colonel Barrow, the Financial Commissioner, ordered the settlement to be recorded. This was done by the Assistant Settlement Officer, who, on June 22, 1869, decreed the proprietary right in the village Bankagarh to Arjun and his heirs. On June 28, 1869, the same officer decreed the proprietary right in the village Davingarh to Shankar and his heirs. The facts as regards Sheo Narain are these. This was done by the Assistant Settlement Officer, who, on June 22, 1869, decreed the proprietary right in the village Bankagarh to Arjun and his heirs. On June 28, 1869, the same officer decreed the proprietary right in the village Davingarh to Shankar and his heirs. The facts as regards Sheo Narain are these. On May 2, 1879, Jagmohan having died on February 15 previous, he executed a deed by which, after stating that his father, Daljit, had during his lifetime given him the village of Nidhan Kuer Khera, Pergana Kumhrawan district, Rae Bareli, valued at Rs.2000, for his maintenance, that he lived jointly with the Rajah and did not take possession of the village, and on Daljit Singhs death the village continued under the possession and enjoyment of Jagmohan, and it was not possible for him to maintain himself from the profits thereof; that for this reason Bisheshar Bux had granted to him "out of his own pleasure village Sikandarpur, rental Rs.1050, valued Rs.13,500, and village Samnapur, rental Rs.420, valued at Rs.4400," as an exchange for the village Nidhan Kuer Khera under an oral agreement, and made an application for dakhil kharij, and had them duly registered, he relinquished all claim to that village and to any property left by the late Rajah. Accordingly, on May 2, 1879, Bisheshar petitioned the Assistant Commissioner of Lucknow that, when his name was substituted in place of Jagmohans, the name of Sheo Narain might be substituted and entered in records in place of his name in respect of the zemindary Hahkiat and Lambardari of the entire village Sikandarpur. On the same day he made a similar application for the village Samnapur. There is a difference in the words of these applications as stated in the record in this appeal. In the first it is said that Jagmohan had given the villages to Sheo Narain for his maintenance, and at the end, after the description of the village as in the district of Lucknow, are the words " as its proprietor in perpetuity." In the second these words are omitted after " Lucknow," but in the middle of the document, after the words " Sheo Narain for his maintenance," are the words " in perpetuity." The difference is not material, the meaning is the same. On the death of Sheo Narain, the tahsildar having reported it and that his widow was the proprietress and was in possession, mutation of names as to both villages was made in her favour, and she was in possession of them until her death on December 9, 1886. Bisheshar Bux having died, the suit in this appeal was brought by Arjun on October 10, 1889, against his son Rameshar, a minor, and Rani Sukraj Kunwar his guardian, the present appellants, for proprietary possession of the two villages of which they were alleged to be in possession, and, being heard by the Additional Civil Judge of Lucknow on December 13, 1893, it was dismissed. Arjun thereupon appealed to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh, which reversed the decree of the Lower Court, and decreed to the plaintiff possession of the villages. The case of Arjun was that according to the custom prevailing in the family a daughter is excluded from inheritance, and that he was the heir to Sheo Narain. The defendants denied the alleged custom, and asserted that Bisheshar granted to Sheo Narain a maintenance right only in the villages. The material issues of those Laid down were whether daughters were excluded from inheritance by the family custom and whether the right of maintenance was heritable. It may here be noticed that Shankar as well as Arjun having survived Sheo Narain, Arjun, if right in his contention, would be entitled to only a half share of the property. The First Court found that the custom to exclude daughters was proved, and, with reference to an argument for the plaintiff that Nidhan Kuer Khera was held by Sheo Narain as absolute owner, and that it must therefore be presumed that he obtained similar rights in the two villages, held that there was nothing to prove that it was given to him by Daljit Singh absolutely, and it was unlikely that two villages of large value were given to him absolutely in lieu of an insignificant village like Nidhan Kuer Khera. On the evidence in the petitions the Court held that there was nothing in them from which it could be gathered that it was the intention of Bisheshar Bux to create an estate of inheritance, and referred to the case of Abdul Majid v. Fatima Bibi (L. R. 12 Ind. Ap. 159; Ind. L. R. 8 Allah. On the evidence in the petitions the Court held that there was nothing in them from which it could be gathered that it was the intention of Bisheshar Bux to create an estate of inheritance, and referred to the case of Abdul Majid v. Fatima Bibi (L. R. 12 Ind. Ap. 159; Ind. L. R. 8 Allah. 39.), and to three cases in the Judicial Commissioners Court similar to the present, in which it had been held that heritable estates had not been created, and dismissed the suit. On appeal to the Judicial Commissioners Court that Court referred to the decision or award of the British Indian Association in a dispute between Arjun and Shankar and Jagmohan, in which the former two claimed that the ancestral property was held in common and was divisible, and each claimed one quarter of it. The opinion or award was against their claim. But the Court quotes from the award, which is a lengthy document occupying ten pages of the printed Record, two passages. One of them is " it is clear that Rajah Daljit Singh himself during his lifetime separated the plaintiffs, after giving them a suitable maintenance," and the other is "that it has been proved by trust worthy witnesses that Rajah Daljit Singh by this action," namely, the gift by him of a village to each of his three younger sons, intended to avoid future disputes. It is then said by the Court, "It is clear from the award that the talookdars who made it regarded the grants to the plaintiff and Shankar Bukhsh Singh as absolute." Their Lordships cannot agree to this conclusion from the award. Apparently the question whether the grants were absolute was not the matter in dispute. The question referred was whether the ancestral property though styled a Raj was held in common and was divisible. That appears in the statement in the so-called award of the points in issue and the opinion. There is no finding that the grants were absolute. Apparently the question whether the grants were absolute was not the matter in dispute. The question referred was whether the ancestral property though styled a Raj was held in common and was divisible. That appears in the statement in the so-called award of the points in issue and the opinion. There is no finding that the grants were absolute. The Court then says that the grants to Arjun and Shankar (which were made upon a compromise of the claim of a quarter share) being absolute, it seems to follow that the grant to Narain was one of the same nature; that the circumstance that Nidhan Kuer Khera, although granted to Sheo Narain for maintenance, was granted to him absolutely (which is erroneously taken as proved) goes to shew that Sheo Narain, when he stated in the baz-dawa that that village had been granted to him as maintenance, was referring not to a grant for life but an absolute grant; that there was therefore a strong presumption when he stated in the same document that the disputed villages were granted to him in lieu of Nidhan Kuer Khera he referred to an absolute grant of those villages, and that Bisheshar Bux when he stated in the application for mutation of names that he had granted those villages to Sheo Narain for maintenance was referring to an absolute grant of them; that this presumption is strengthened by "proprietor" and " for ever," and was not weakened by the fact that the disputed villages were of considerably greater value than Nidhan Kuer Khera, which was accounted for by Sheo Narain relinquishing all claims on the talook property movable and immovable, and that there was no reason to suppose that Bisheshar Bux would grant to his uncle, who had lived jointly with his father up to the latters death, the least he could well do. The construction is thus made by the Court to depend upon a fact as to Nidhan Kuer Khera, which was not proved, and the supposition by the Court of what Bisheshar Bux would do. It does not seem to have been in the mind of the Court that a statement of Sheo Narain in his own favour was not admissible evidence. It does not seem to have been in the mind of the Court that a statement of Sheo Narain in his own favour was not admissible evidence. But the Court had just before said, " There seems to be no doubt that where the purpose of the grant is the Guzara or maintenance of the grantee, such purpose goes to shew that the grant is intended to be for the life of the grantee; this was so held in Select Case No. 291, on the authority of Woodoyaditto Deb v. Mukoond Narain Aditto. (( 1874) 22 South. W.R. 225.) There seems also to be no doubt that in the case of a grant for maintenance the words proprietor and for ever will not per se create an inheritable estate." Their Lordships may observe that in the case in L. E. 12 Ind. Ap. 159, where this was held, the gift by a will was of the management of property, but it is also applicable in the construction of the gift in this case. The Court should have stopped here and dismissed the appeal, and not proceeded to give so insufficient a reason as followed for allowing it and reversing the decree of the First Court. This Court had found on the issue whether daughters were excluded from inheritance by the family custom in favour of the plaintiff Arjun. The Judicial Commissioners Court has taken no notice of this issue, and in the view which their Lordships take of the case it is not necessary to decide it. That Court also seems not to have been aware that Shankar survived Sheo Narain and left a son, and consequently Arjun could only inherit a half-share of the property. Their Lordships, being thus of opinion that the decree of the First Court ought not to have been reversed, will humbly advise Her Majesty to affirm it, and reverse the decree now appealed from with the costs of the appeal in which it was made. The respondent will bear the costs of this appeal.