JUDGMENT 1. This appeal arises out of a suit for arrears of rent brought by the Plaintiff-Appellant in respect of the putni for the cancellation of which there was brought in the Court below a suit which gave rise to appeal from Original Decree No. 339 of 1897 which has just been disposed of. The Plaintiff brought the suit in a double capacity, namely, in his own right and as shebait of the Deity Sri Sri Iswar Ram Chander Dev Thakur, and he asked for a decree for rent without prejudice to his right to prosecute the other suit which was pending when this suit was brought. 2. The reason which the Plaintiff gave for bringing this suit was that otherwise in the event of his being unsuccessful in the suit for cancellation of the putni his claim for rent for some years might be barred by limitation. The Defendants in this case do not deny the Plaintiff's right as landlord; but they allege that the suit was barred under sec. 12 of the CPC and that the Plaintiff was not entitled to maintain this suit he having denied the Defendants' status as tenants and brought a suit against them for cancellation of their putni in lease. They also urge that the Plaintiff was not entitled to maintain this suit as his name was not registered in the double capacity in which he brought this suit, under the Land Registration Act, VII of 1876, B.C. 3. The Court below has dismissed the suit on the ground that it was barred by sec. 12, Code of Civil Procedure, as the suit for cancellation of the putni and for mesne profits, though it had been disposed of by the first Court before the date of determination of this suit, was pending on appeals in this Court on that date. 4. In appeal it is contended for the Plaintiff-Appellant that, the Court below was wrong in holding that sec. 12, C.P.C., was a bar to the suit. 4. In appeal it is contended for the Plaintiff-Appellant that, the Court below was wrong in holding that sec. 12, C.P.C., was a bar to the suit. On the other hand it is urged on behalf of the Defendants-Respondents that not only is the decree of the Court below dismissing the suit right for the reason given in the judgment of that Court, but it is right also because the Plaintiff is not competent to maintain this suit against the Defendants when he does not admit their status as tenants and has been prosecuting against them : his suit for cancellation of the putni. It is also urged for the Defendants-Respondents that the provisions of the Land Registration Act are a bar to this suit. And, lastly, it is urged that, if the Plaintiff be held to be entitled to a decree in this case, the decree should be made with the condition attached to it that it shall not be competent to the Plaintiff to enforce it so long as he is prosecuting his claim for cancellation of the Defendants' putni; the Plaintiff should not recover interest or costs. 5. The points that therefore arise for consideration are (1) whether sec. 12 of CPC is a bar to this suit; (2) whether it is competent to the Plaintiff to maintain this suit when he has been seeking to set aside the putni tenure of the Defendants in another suit; (3) whether the suit is barred by the provisions of the Land Registration Act, and (4) whether the Plaintiff is entitled to recover any interest upon the arrears of rent. 6. We are of opinion that the first point should be decided in favour of the Plaintiff. Sec. 12, C.P.C., enacts that "except where a suit has been stayed under sec. 20, the Court shall not try any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit for the same relief between the same parties or between the parties under whom they or any of them claim, pending in the same or any other Court, whether superior or inferior in British India having jurisdiction to grant such relief or in any Court beyond the limits of British India established by the Governor-General in Council and having like jurisdiction or before Her Majesty in Council." 7. The previously instituted suit was one for cancellation of the putni and for mesne profits, no doubt for the same period. But can it be said that it was a suit for the same relief that is claimed in this suit ? We think that the question must be answered in the negative. It was argued that it would be unfair to the Defendants to allow the Plaintiff simultaneously to prosecute his claim for cancellation of the putni and for mesne profits and to recover rent in this suit, when it is possible that he may recover mesne profits in the other suit. We do not think that there will be any in justice or hardship. In the event of the Plaintiff succeeding in the other suit out of the amount that may be decreed as mesne profits, the amount recoverable by the Plaintiff as rent in this suit will have to be deducted, the amount of such mesne profits being in all probability much in the excess of the rent, of the putni. 8. We come now to the second point in the case; and we observe that if the Plaintiff were to be held not entitled to maintain this suit by reason of prosecuting the suit for cancellation of the putni, then the result will be this that the Plaintiff will not be able to institute any suit for arrears of rent until after his suit for cancellation of the putni is finally disposed of against him and in that case part of his claim for arrears of rent must be barred by limitation, the pendency of the suit for cancellation of the putni being no reason for preventing limitations from running. See the case of Hurro Prasad Roy Chowdhory v. Gopal Chandra Dutt L.R. 9 IndAp 82 (1882). But the Plaintiff may have honestly believed that he had a right to institute the suit for cancellation of the putni; and because he prosecuted that suit, that ought not to be a reason why in the event of his failing, he should lose a part of the putni rents, as he must, if he cannot sue for it during the pendancy of the first mentioned suit. If the Plaintiff had in the suit for cancellation of the putni and for mesne profits claimed rent in the alternative, in the event of his claim for cancellation of the putni being found by the Court to be untenable, there could have been no objection to his recovering rent. That being so, why should there be any objection to the present suit? We are therefore of opinion that the second point also must be decided in favour of the Plaintiff. 9. As to the third point the Plaintiff's name is registered as shebait of the Deity Ram Chandra Dev Thakur and one of the two capacities in which he brings this suit is as shebait of that Deity. Therefore, the objection based on the provisions of the Land Registration Act must also fail. 10. With regard to the claim for interest it is urged by the learned Advocate-General on behalf of the Defendants-Respondents, that as the putni rent was tendered to the Plaintiff's am-muktear but the Plaintiff objected to receive it, that ought to prevent any interest from running on the arrears of rent. Though rent was not received when tendered, the Defendants omitted to follow the procedure prescribed by sec. 61 of the Bengal Tenancy Act and to deposit the same in Court; and sec. 67 is imperative in its terms and enacts "that an arrear of rent shall bear simple interest at the rate of 12 p.c. per annum from the expiration of that quarter of the agricultural year in which the instalment falls due to the institution of the suit." We do not see therefore how we can under the law disallow interest. There is no dispute as to the amount of the claim; and that being so, we think that the Plaintiff must in his capacity as shebait have a decree for the amount claimed in the suit. There is no dispute as to the amount of the claim; and that being so, we think that the Plaintiff must in his capacity as shebait have a decree for the amount claimed in the suit. But having regard to the fact that the Plaintiff has not yet given up his claim for cancellation of the putni, we think that the decree should have this condition attached to it, that it shall not be competent to the Plaintiff to enforce the decree until the time for preferring an appeal to Her Majesty in Council from the decree of this Court in appeal from Original Decree No. 339 of 1897 has expired and no appeal to Her Majesty in Council is preferred, or in the event of an appeal being preferred unless the decree of this Court in the above-mentioned appeal is affirmed. 11. Having regard to all the circumstances of this case, we think that the Plaintiff must bear his own costs both in this Court and in the Court below. The Defendants will be at liberty to deposit the amount of the decree in Court in the meantime.