JUDGMENT 1. It is admitted that the cause of action against the sons arises on the same day as it does against the father, but the obligation, it is said, is different, and therefore the same article of the schedule of the Limitation Act does not apply. In our opinion this contention cannot prevail. The obligation of the sons arises simultaneously with that of the father and is subject to the same incidents, so that if by the fathers payment or other act the debt is extinguished, the said obligation is also extinguished. 2. The position of the sons is analogous to that of a surety. In that case it is clear that on the debt being barred against the principal debtor the surety has a good defence. And the same is the case in England in regard to the husbands liability for the wifes ante-nuptial debts, Beck v. Pierce 23 Q.B.D. 321. The plaintiff practically contends that she can have a right of action against the sons, though against the father she has no longer any remedy. This seems to us an absurd conclusion. We allow the appeal and restore the District Munsifs decree with costs in this and the Lower Appellate Courts.