Judgement Appeal from a decree of the High Court (April 5, 1898) reversing a decree of Jenkins J. (March 9, 1897). The question decided herein was whether an adoption of the appellant, which was admittedly carried out in fact, constituted him in law the adopted son of Hurridas Dutt, the husband of the respondent Srimutty Surnomoye Dasi, who purported to adopt him as a son to her late husband. Hurridas Dutt was a Hindu inhabitant of Calcutta, a Sudra, and subject to the Dayabhaga School of Law. He died on October 30, 1875, leaving his sole widow the respondent, Srimutty Surnomoye Dasi, and two daughters, from whom are descended the other respondents. On the day of his death he executed his will, the material passages of which are set out in their Lordships judgment. He appointed his wife, his father Modhu Sudan Dutt, and his uncle Dwarka Nath Dutt, his executrix and executors. The will was proved by the widow and uncle. The adoption of the appellant was made in 1881 by the widow with the consent of the uncle, who was then the surviving executor. The suit was brought on August 1, 1894, by the appellant, claiming that the estate of the testator had vested in him, and that he was entitled to possession. The respondents contended that there had been no valid adoption of the appellant as son to the testator, inasmuch as the power to adopt given by the testator was invalid in law. Jenkins J. held that the testator, desiring the adoption of a son to himself, in accordance with the provisions of the Hindu law, gave his wife the power to adopt a son, and only associated the other executors with his wife for the purpose of ensuring a wise exercise of her discretion in the selection of a son for adoption, and not with any intention of making it an essential condition of the adoption that they should take a part in the ceremony at such adoption, from which they were by law excluded. He accordingly decided that the power to adopt was a good one and well given; also, that it had survived to those by whom it was exercised, and was validly exercised by the widow when she adopted the appellant with the approval of the surviving executor. He accordingly decided that the power to adopt was a good one and well given; also, that it had survived to those by whom it was exercised, and was validly exercised by the widow when she adopted the appellant with the approval of the surviving executor. The material passage of his judgment is— " The argument urged against the validity of the power is shortly this. It is said that though a husband can delegate to his widow a power to adopt, still he can delegate it to no one else; consequently, it is argued, the present power to adopt is bad, because though it is delegated to the widow, still it is not to her alone, but to her in association with others. Now, it is admitted on the part of the defendants—indeed, it is a part of their argument—that though the widows discretion under a delegated power is absolute in the sense that she cannot be compelled to act upon it unless or until she so chooses, still any condition or clog can be imposed upon the exercise by her of this delegated power; and it therefore appears to me that, so far as the association of the two executors was a fetter on the absolute discretion and choice which might otherwise have existed, it cannot have vitiated the power. It may be that the widow alone is capable of performing the actual ceremony of adoption—that her hand alone can receive the child; but I do not find in the phraseology used by the testator any direction requiring or even justifying the inference that he desired or intended that the executors should take a part in the ceremony from which they are incapacitated by the rules of Hindu law. "It is clear from the prefatory recital with which the 8th clause of the will commences, that the testator did desire the adoption of a son in accordance with the provisions of the Hindu law, and, though it may be unprofitable to speculate as to his motive, I think that he had a purpose beyond the mere designation of a beneficiary to take under his will; and I must decline to put on the language of the will a construction that would render its provisions useless. In my opinion, the testator associated the other executors with his wife for the purpose of ensuring a wise exercise of her discretion in the selection of a son for adoption, and not with the intention of making it an essential condition of the adoption that they should take a part in the ceremony from which they were precluded ; and I therefore hold that the power of adoption is valid." In appeal (Maclean C.J., Macpherson and Trevelyan JJ.) held that, according to the true construction of the will, the power to adopt was a joint power given to three persons named, the widow and the two executors, and that such power was according to Hindu law a bad and invalid power. Trevelyan J. added that, even if the joint power were a good one, it ceased to have any effect or validity upon the death of the testators father, one of the joint donees thereof. Asquith, Q.C., Mayne, Branson, and W. C. Bonnerjee, for the appellant, contended that on the true construction of the ill (clause 8) there was a power to adopt validly given to the widow. It was clear that the governing intention of the testator was that there should be an adoption, and the will should be so construed as to give effect to that intention. In terms it was given jointly to three persons, only one of whom could legally acquire it and act upon it. It should be construed as a conditional power given to the widow, exercisable only on her fulfilling the condition, which was to obtain the assent of her co-executors to her choice of a boy to be adopted. It is matter of common knowledge that only the widow can be the donee of a power to adopt to her husband after his death, and it ought not to be attributed to a testator that he intended to vest such a power in his executors unless no other construction of his words was possible. The widow acted on a legal authority given to her with the concurrence of an executor who was not authorized to adopt. The widow acted on a legal authority given to her with the concurrence of an executor who was not authorized to adopt. Each of the three parties was authorized to play his part, but only the act of one of them operated to effect a valid adoption, and its validity was not destroyed by the fact that the co-operation of the others was ineffectual, except as fulfilling the condition on which alone the widows authority vested in her. The power on its true construction is a several power. The grant to the three meant that it was granted to them so far as they were legally capable of holding and exercising it—that is, one was to adopt with the consent of the other two. Reference was made as to the construction of powers to Bai Motivahoo v. Bai Mamoobai. (( 1897) L. R. 24 Ind. Ap. 93, 105.) A fair view of the testators will is that he did not intend the three persons to act in the adoption, but merely that they should concur in the choice; he could only have meant that that one should act who alone was capable of acting with any effective result. Cohen, Q.C., Crackanthorpe, Q.C., and Phillips, for the respondents, contended that, according to the true construction of the will, the testator gave the power to adopt to three persons jointly—his widow, his father, and his uncle. He did not intend to give his widow sole power to adopt either with or without the concurrence of the co-executors. There was no distinction expressed as to which of them should act, and which of them should concur. All must act or none, for the power was a joint one; the widow had no power singly and separately to receive a child in adoption. If the latter was his intention, it was not carried out by appropriate words; and such words cannot be supplied by conjecture see Hunter v. Attorney-General ([ 1899] A. C. 309, 317.); Abbott v. Middleton. (( 1858) 7 H. L. C. 68, 114.) Asquith, Q.C., replied. May 2. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD HOBHOUSE. This is a suit instituted before the High Court of Judicature in Calcutta in its original jurisdiction for administration of the estate of Hurridas Dutt, who died on October 30, 1875, having executed a will on the same day. May 2. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD HOBHOUSE. This is a suit instituted before the High Court of Judicature in Calcutta in its original jurisdiction for administration of the estate of Hurridas Dutt, who died on October 30, 1875, having executed a will on the same day. He had no son, but left a widow Surnomoye Dasi and two daughters, who were all defendants below and now are respondents. The plaintiff in the suit, now appellant, claims to be the son of the testator adopted by virtue of a power contained in his will; and the cardinal question in the suit is whether or no he bears that character. The material passages in the will, which was written in English, are as follows — " I appoint my wife Srimutty Surnomoye Dasi the executrix, and my father Babu Modhu Sudan Dutt of Mullicks Street aforesaid, and my uncle Babu Dwarka Nath Dutt of Thun-toneah in Calcutta aforesaid, the executors and trustees of this my will.” Paragraph 8 " Whereas having no son born to me of my body I am desirous of adopting one in my lifetime, but in case I depart this life before carrying such my desire into effect, I hereby authorize and empower my wife and executrix Srimutty Surnomoye Dasi, and my executors and trustees, to whom I give full permission and liberty, to adopt after my decease a son, and in case of his death during his minority or on attaining his full age and without leaving male issue, to adopt a second son, and in case of his death during minority or on attaining such age and without leaving male issue, to adopt a third son, and no more. In any of the above cases of adoption, should the adopted son die leaving a son or sons, the power of adoption shall cease or remain in abeyance during the life or livestime of such son or sons of such adopted son, but shall revive on the death of such son or sons during minority." Paragraph 13 "I authorize and empower my said executrix and executors and trustees and the survivor of them and the trustee for the time being of this my will, to appoint any other person or persons to succeed them or him in the execution of the trusts of this my will." Paragraph 15 " In case of any accident arising to cause my wife to depart her natural life before adoption of a male child my surviving executors are empowered to act with my full consent and direction to adopt a male issue. Dated this 30th October 1875." By the 9th clause the testator provided an income for his wife and adopted son during the life of his wife, and directed accumulation of the surplus income. The adopted son is to take the property if he survives the widow and attains the age of eighteen, otherwise it is given over to the daughters. The will was proved by the testators widow and his uncle Dwarka Nath Dutt. The testators father, Modhu Sudan Dutt, did not renounce probate, but he never took any part in the administration of the estate. On August 9, 1876, a deed was executed by which the widow purported, with the consent of Dwarka Nath Dutt as executor, to accept Joti Pershad Mullick, a boy five years old, as the adopted son of the testator. In the year 1877 Modhu Sudan died, and in January, 1881, Joti died, being then ten years old. On February 9, 1881, a deed was executed by which the widow purported, by virtue of the authority given to her by the will, and with the consent of Dwarka Nath Dutt as executor, to accept the plaintiff, then a boy of eight years old, as the adopted son of the testator. After attaining his majority the plaintiff instituted this suit in the year 1894. The cause was heard in the first instance before Jenkins J., who held that the plaintiff was rightly adopted, and proceeded to determine the other questions arising under the will. After attaining his majority the plaintiff instituted this suit in the year 1894. The cause was heard in the first instance before Jenkins J., who held that the plaintiff was rightly adopted, and proceeded to determine the other questions arising under the will. He held, first, that the testator had given the power of adoption to his widow, subject only to the assent of the other executors; secondly, that the death of Modhu Sudan did not destroy the power; and, thirdly, that the terms of the adoption deed were in sufficient conformity with those of the will. Both parties appealed from his decision. The Court of Appeal, consisting of Maclean C.J. and Macpherson and Trevelyan JJ., were unanimous in holding that there was no adoption of the plaintiff. Their main ground was that the power of adoption which the testator purported to give was one which the law does not allow. They further intimated an opinion that, even if the power could be held valid by virtue of the construction adopted by Jenkins J., it could not be exercised after the death of Modhu Sudan. They therefore dismissed the suit. Their Lordships felt no doubt during the argument that the testator could not confer any such power as he desired. That no one can adopt a son to a dead man except his widow is such a rudimentary principle of Hindu law, and one so constantly occurring in ordinary life, that it is difficult to suppose any educated man to be ignorant of it. That the widows choice of a boy may be restricted in various ways, and among them by requiring the consent of persons named by the husband, is also familiar law. If it turns out that such consent cannot be procured, she has no authority to adopt, and that is the question which has been raised in this case with reference to the death of Modhu Sudan. But the fundamental objection arises, not on the events that have happened, but on the provisions of the will as it stood at the testators death. It never gave any authority at all to the widow. In terms, the literal construction of which admits of no doubt, he authorized an appointment, not by his wife, but by her and the two others whom he had appointed executors and trustees. It never gave any authority at all to the widow. In terms, the literal construction of which admits of no doubt, he authorized an appointment, not by his wife, but by her and the two others whom he had appointed executors and trustees. Whether he intended the authority to be attached to the office can make no difference; or if it did make any, it would not be favourable to the plaintiff. It was given, not to a single person, but to several. Not only so, but the testator went on to authorize his surviving executors to adopt a boy after his wifes death; while rather significantly he did not authorize her to adopt after their death; and yet she was more likely to be the survivor than the members of the elder generation. The suggestion that the testator-really meant to give authority to the widow, restricted by the consent of the others, cannot be accepted as a legitimate construction of his will. It is a mere speculation, and we may speculate in other directions. When using the term adoption, the testator may have been thinking merely of the choice of a male successor in the pro perty ; seeing that he does not leave the adoption to carry with it the ordinary right of succession, but subjects the inheritance to rather capricious conditions, postponing enjoyment during the widows life, and making the boys interest in the corpus contingent on his surviving the wife and attaining eighteen. Such speculations however are, in a case in which the language conferring the authority is clear, and there is nothing in other parts of the will inconsistent with it, quite beyond the legitimate range of judicial interpretation. The joint power conferred on the three executors being invalid, the plaintiff has no status in the family, and his suit was rightly dismissed. Their Lordships will humbly advise Her Majesty to dismiss this appeal, and the appellant must pay the costs.