Judgement Appeal from a remand order of the High Court (Aug. 10, 1893) and an order of the High Court (Feb. 11, 1897) reversing with costs a finding on remand of the Subordinate Judge of Monghyr (Jan. 12, 1895), and also the original order for execution of the Subordinate Judge (April 9, 1892) made in the suit in which the decrees of the above Courts have been made respectively on March 25, 1889, and June 2, 1891. The order of April 9, 1892, was for execution of the decree of June 2, 1891. The Subordinate Judge said — " The judgment debtor urges that properties, Nos. 519, 520, and 528 are kamat lands in Mouzahs Ramchunderpore, Gobindpore, &c, which have been decreed to defendants, and that, inasmuch as kamat lands belong to the proprietors, the decree-holder cannot get possession of them. The plaintiffs claimed the jote lands, and the mouzahs separately, and he got a decree for both in the First Court, but the High Court dismissed his claim in respect to the mouzahs only ; therefore the decree to properties Nos. 512, 520, and 528 stands unaffected, and plaintiff must get possession according to his decree. In the execution of the decree it cannot be inquired into as to whether the High Court would have dismissed the claim in respect of these properties if it had been proved that they were kamat lands. The objection is not tenable, and this Court cannot now go behind the decree." In appeal the High Court remanded the case. They said — " The plaintiffs seek to execute the decree against the kasht lands included in the mouzahs aforesaid on the ground that the High Court whilst dismissing their claim for a share of the mouzahs themselves, did not make any declaration as to their right in respect of the jotes. The defendants object that the lands are included in their subsequently acquired property, and not covered by the High Court decree. The judge in the Court below has overruled the objections of the defendants simply on the ground that the High Court, while it disallowed the claim of the plaintiffs as against the mouzahs, did not say anything as against the jote lands. The judge in the Court below has overruled the objections of the defendants simply on the ground that the High Court, while it disallowed the claim of the plaintiffs as against the mouzahs, did not say anything as against the jote lands. " In this Court the learned counsel for the defendants has objected that as the properties themselves were acquired after the separation, and as the High Court has disallowed the plaintiffs - claim with regard to these properties, the kamat lands which are included in these properties cannot possibly have been allowed to the plaintiffs , and certainly there is no reference to them either in the judgment or in the decree of the High Court. The plaintiffs pleader contends that the kasht lands were shewn in the schedule to the plaint attached as having belonged to the family previous to Ram Sahais death; that the plaintiffs obtained a decree in respect of these kasht lands in the First Court, that the High Court did not deal with that portion of the First Courts decree, and that therefore they are entitled to have execution of the decree as against these lands." They concluded this part of the judgment as follows " We must therefore remand the case to the Lower Court for an inquiry whether or not the kamat lands, regarding which the decree is sought to be executed, belonged to the family by proprietary right before the purchase by the defendants, or whether they held it under zurpeshgi as is contended for by counsel for defendants. The parties will be at liberty to adduce evidence on the question." The order was affirmed as to No. 528. Under this remand the Subordinate Judge found that the disputed lands were not acquired by virtue of the proprietary rights in the disputed villages, but were jote lands of the family. The High Court in appeal found that on the evidence the lands in question must be declared not subject to the decree. The terms " kamat," "jote," and " kasht " are thus defined in Wilsons Glossary — " Kamat The cultivation which a cultivator carries on with his own stock, but by the labour of another ; the land which a zemindar or landowner keeps in his own hands, cultivating by labourers in distinction to that which he lets out in farms " (Wils. p. 254, col. 1). p. 254, col. 1). “ Jote Tillage, cultivation; tenure of a cultivator " ("Wils. p. 242, col. 1). "Kasht Cultivation, agriculture, tillage" (Wils. p. 267 (The commoner term mouzah is denned by authority to be a parcel or parcels of land having a separate name in the revenue records, " and of k nown limits" Wils. s.v. mauza.), col. 1). Branson, for the appellants, contended that there was no ground or jurisdiction for the remand order of the High Court dated August 10, 1893. The decrees of . 1889 and 1891 plainly affirmed the decree-holders title to the properties Nos. 519 and 520 of Sched. A of the plaint. No issue had been raised before either Court which passed those decrees as to the appellants title in the said properties. It was not open to the High Court in execution proceedings under such decrees to alter or vary them as the result of further inquiries. There is no procedure authorized by the Code with that view. The decrees were final, and, if open to appeal or rehearing by another or the same Court in proceedings properly taken for that purpose, they must at least be treated in execution proceedings founded thereon, as being exempt from liability to the smallest alteration by the Court which is employed in executing them. C. W. Arathoon, for the respondents, contended that the onus was on the appellants, and that they had failed to establish that the lands in question were awarded by the High Court decree which was under execution. The High Court had dismissed their claim to the two villages in which the lands in question lay. The whole villages being excluded from the decree, it had to be very clearly established that nevertheless the appellants were entitled under the decree to part of them. The Subordinate Judge found that both the decrees—original and appellate—did not deal with the kamat lands, and on that finding he should have dismissed the claim. Although a decree cannot be varied or amended in the execution department, it can be construed whenever the decree-holder and the judgment debtor differ as to its effect. The appellants were not heard in reply. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD HOBHOUSE. Although a decree cannot be varied or amended in the execution department, it can be construed whenever the decree-holder and the judgment debtor differ as to its effect. The appellants were not heard in reply. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD HOBHOUSE. The appellants, who were plaintiffs below, sued the defendants, now respondents, for their shares of a joint family estate, and they obtained a decree on March 25, 1889. The property sued for was described in schedules attached to the plaint. Sched. A specified every parcel of land by serial numbers and, where necessary, by quantities, and Scheds. I., II., III. contained the same parcels, also specified by numbers and quantities, but classified according to date of acquisition by the family. The decree declared the plaintiffs right to a share of the properties mentioned in Scheds. L, II., and III., with the exception of some properties not now in dispute, and it ordered that the plaintiffs should be put into possession. The defendants appealed, and the High Court passed judgment on June 2, 1891. After varying the decree of the First Court in some particulars, which will be presently examined, the High Court ordered that, save and except as aforesaid, the said decree should be affirmed. Upon this decree of the High Court proceedings were taken in execution, in the course of which questions have been raised as to certain parcels of land which are the subject of this appeal. Part I. of Sched. A is headed " Schedule of properties such as milkiuts (proprietary) and mokurruri interests and houses and kasht (occupancy rights)." No. 519 is described as " kasht lands in Mouzah Ramchunderpore." Its area is stated as 967 bighas 5 cottas, and it corresponds in description and measurement with two parcels entered in Scheds. I. and II. under the numbers 24 and 117 respectively. Sched. I., Part II., is headed " List of properties of the kasht (jote) class acquired, &c," and the area of kasht-jote land in Mouzah Ramchunderpore is stated under No. 24 at 755 bighas 10 cottas. Sched. II., Part II., is headed " Kasht lands and purchased ryoti occupancy rights,5 and the area of kasht lands in Ramchunderpore is stated under No. 117 at 211 bighas 15 cottas. Sched. II., Part II., is headed " Kasht lands and purchased ryoti occupancy rights,5 and the area of kasht lands in Ramchunderpore is stated under No. 117 at 211 bighas 15 cottas. The plots which make up the areas are also described in all three schedules by their boundaries and by the names of persons in some way connected with them. In these schedules, therefore, is shewn twice over, according to different classifications, the exact description, measurement, and boundaries of the kasht or jote (the words appear to be synonymous) lands sued for in Mouzah Ramchunderpore. The mouzah itself was also claimed in the suit, and it appears as a separate subject of claim, described as such without any measurements or boundaries in Sched. I., Part I., No. 6, Sched. II., Part L, No. 31, Sched. III., Part I., No. 289, and in Sched. A, No. 597 and other numbers. Other parcels of kasht land are situate in Mouzah Alibali, containing in the whole 257 bighas 7 cottas. It is sufficient to say of them that they and the mouzah itself are entered in the Scheds. I., II., III., and A just in the same way as has been shewn for Ramchunderpore and the kasht lands within it. The plaintiffs clearly sought to recover the two mouzahs and also certain well-defined parcels of land situated within the limits of the mouzahs and held by some species of sub-tenure or recognised mode of enjoyment; and clearly the Subordinate Judge affirmed their title to all the properties as described in the schedules. The High Court held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the mouzahs, but only to part of the funds employed in acquiring them. In varying the Subordinate Judges decree they struck out so much as awards to the plaintiffs Nos. 306 and 308 mentioned in the schedule, and also certain other numbers not shewn in the portions of the schedules inserted in the present record, and apparently not material to the present purpose. The schedule referred to by the High Court is Sched. III., and Nos. 306 and.308 are numbers denoting the two mouzahs, Ramchunderpore and Alibali. The numbers denoting the kasht lands within the two mouzahs are left untouched. The schedule referred to by the High Court is Sched. III., and Nos. 306 and.308 are numbers denoting the two mouzahs, Ramchunderpore and Alibali. The numbers denoting the kasht lands within the two mouzahs are left untouched. In the execution proceedings the defendants alleged that the parcels sued for as kasht land are kamat land; that kamat land can only belong to the proprietors of the mouzah in which it lies, and that, as the plaintiffs claim to the mouzahs had been negatived, they could have no claim to the parcels in question. The Subordinate Judge pointed out how the case stood upon the pleadings and decrees; intimated that it was not for him to inquire how the High Court would have acted if it had been proved that the land claimed as kasht was really kamat; and held that the plaintiffs must get possession according to the decree under execution. Accordingly he passed an order for execution on April 9, 1892. The defendants appealed, and by order of August 10, 1893, the High Court remanded the case for further inquiry. They treat the lands sued for under the title of kasht as being kamat; and they say that the High Court decree of June, 1891, makes no reference to these kamat lands; and that the Court, while disallowing the plaintiffs claim to the mouzahs, did not make any declaration as to their right to the jotes. They cannot say whether the lands are included in the decree or not. This inability is not intelligible to their Lordships except on the hypothesis that the documents were presented to the Court in some imperfect fashion. As they stand in this record, nothing can be plainer on their face than that the High Court of 1891 deprived the plaintiffs of certain scheduled items bearing numbers which denoted the mouzahs, and awarded to them other items bearing numbers which denote kasht or jote lands lying within the ambit of the mouzahs and defined by measurements, boundaries, and personal names. It is nowhere suggested that there is any difficulty in identifying the parcels so awarded. To say that the plaintiffs shall not have them because in the process of execution the defendants raise a new question as to the nature of their relation to the mouzah, is to rehear the decree, not to execute it. It is nowhere suggested that there is any difficulty in identifying the parcels so awarded. To say that the plaintiffs shall not have them because in the process of execution the defendants raise a new question as to the nature of their relation to the mouzah, is to rehear the decree, not to execute it. The learned judges conclude as follows — We must therefore remand the case to the Lower Court for an inquiry whether or not the kamat lands, regarding which the decree is sought to be executed, belonged to the family by proprietary right before the purchase by the defendants, or whether they held under zurpeshgi, as is contended for by counsel for defendants. The parties will be at liberty to adduce evidence on the question." On this remand the Subordinate Judge, the successor of the Subordinate Judge of April, 1892, took a large amount of evidence, and made an order on January 12, 1895. He referred again to the earlier proceedings to shew that the lands, being claimed as jote or kasht, were not suggested to be kamat till after the decree of June, 1891. On the evidence he found that they are actually jote. On appeal the High Court came to a different conclusion, and on February 11, 1897, they made an order dismissing with costs the plaintiffs application as to these lands. Their Lordships have not examined the evidence taken on remand so far as to form any clear conclusion of their own as to the character of the parcels in dispute; but the judgments below shew that it cannot be put higher for the defendants than as a very doubtful matter. It is not necessary for them to decide it, because, as the foregoing remarks have shewn, it is concluded by the decree of June, 1891, affirming the decree of March, 1889. To reopen the question in execution was an error of procedure, and one of a substantial kind, calculated to cause great irregularity in the conduct of suits. In the judgment of their Lordships the proper course will be to discharge the orders of the High Court dated August 10, 1893, and February 11, 1897, and that of the Subordinate Judge dated January 12, 1895; and to direct that the defendants shall pay to the plaintiffs all costs of the litigation subsequent to the Subordinate Judges order of April 9, 1892. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty in accordance with this opinion. The effect of the discharges will be to set up again the Subordinate Judges order of April 9, 1892, which indeed the High Court did not disturb in any respect but that of the kasht lands. The respondents must pay to the appellants the costs of this appeal, including those of an application made by them for delay on the ground that an appeal preferred by them from the High Court decree of June, 1891, was pending before this Board.