JUDGMENT 1. In this case the Plaintiffs who are the putnidars of Mouzah Jaluidanga sued the Defendants for a declaration of title to and for possession of the land on which a certain aswatha tree stood, and for compensation for the wood of the tree taken by the Defendants. The allegations were that the tree stood on the side of a public way appertaining to Plaintiffs' putni mehal, that the tree and its site belong to the Plaintiffs and that on the tree being blown down its wood was appropriated by the Defendants. Only Defendant No. 2 contested the suit. He admitted the taking of the wood, but pleaded that the road and tree appertained to the Kanchontola Factory and are included in a mokurari lease of the factory and its land which the factory Sahibs held and which they sold to the Defendant in 1298, B. S. It was proved by one of the Plaintiffs, as stated in the judgment of the Appellate Court, that the Defendant has a tenure under the Plaintiffs in Mouzah Jaluidanga, but the Plaintiffs deny that the land in suit forms part of that tenure. The first Court held, that there was no credible evidence on either side of any acts of actual tangible possession of the subject-matter of the suit. The Munsif makes the following observations in the course of his judgment : There is not an iota of evidence that this land falls within the tenure of the Defendants. There is no evidence of possession of the Defendant for 12 years perfecting his alleged right by adverse possession. There is no evidence of his possession such as would give rise to an inference that he has a tenure in the land. On the question of title the Defendant has completely failed. As the evidence stands, it cannot be said that the Defendant has a tenure in this bit of land. It cannot also be said that he has no such tenure. The decision therefore hinges upon the question of onus. The Plaintiffs as putnidars are entitled to all the lands in that village except such to which they or their predecessors have created a right in other individuals. Under his tenure the Defendant is admittedly entitled to some land in the village. The decision therefore hinges upon the question of onus. The Plaintiffs as putnidars are entitled to all the lands in that village except such to which they or their predecessors have created a right in other individuals. Under his tenure the Defendant is admittedly entitled to some land in the village. The question therefore is whether the bit of land now in suit falls within that tenure or it falls beyond it. Here the tenancy is established. What is not established is that the land falls within it. The Munsif proceeded to hold that as the present possession of the land is with the Defendant, the presumption is that he has right therein, and that as the Plaintiffs had failed to rebut this presumption, and to show that the land does not fall within the Defendant's tenure the Plaintiffs must fail. In this view the Munsif relying upon the case of Rhidoy Kristo Mistri v. Nobin Chunder Sen 12 C. L. R. 457 (1883) dismissed the suit. 2. In appeal the learned Subordinate Judge agreed with the first Court that neither party had proved possession of the tree and its site. He sought to distinguish the case relied upon by the Munsif, and being of opinion that the rulings reported in Batai Ahir v. Bhuggobutty Koer 11 C. L. R. 476 (1882), Ram Monee v. Aleemoodeen 20 W. R. 374 (1873), Rajkishen Mookerjee v. Pearee Mohun Mookerjee 20 W. R. 421 (1873) govern the present case, he decreed the Plaintiffs' claim. It appears to us that the principle enunciated in Rhidoy Kristo Mistri v. Nobin Chunder Sen 12 C. L. R. 457 (1883), which was followed in Rajendro Kumar Bose v. Mohim Chandra Ghose 3 C. W. N. 763 (1894) is not applicable to the circumstances of the present case. In the latter case certain observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council are quoted to the effect, that the onus lies upon the landlord to prove his own title in order to disturb a possession of very long duration. Now in the present case both Courts have found that prior to the cutting of the tree and removal of the fuel by the Defendants the possession of neither party had been made out. Within a few months of that occurrence the Plaintiffs brought this suit. There was no possession in the Defendant to raise any presumption in his favour. Now in the present case both Courts have found that prior to the cutting of the tree and removal of the fuel by the Defendants the possession of neither party had been made out. Within a few months of that occurrence the Plaintiffs brought this suit. There was no possession in the Defendant to raise any presumption in his favour. Because he possesses a tenure of limited extent within the Plaintiffs' putni, no presumption of title can arise upon his seizure of a piece of land and claiming it as part of his tenure. The land is admittedly in Plaintiffs' putni, and directly the Defendant endeavours to appropriate it, the Plaintiffs come to Court and ask that the Defendant should either be made to restore it or to prove his title thereto. Under such circumstances we do not see why the Defendant should not be required to prove the affirmative proposition, viz., that the land is included in his mokurari holding rather than that the Plaintiffs should be expected to show that it is not. What was held in the cases referred to is that when a tenant has been on long and peaceable occupation of land as part of an admitted tenure it lies upon the landlord in a suit for ejectment to prove in the first instance that the land is his khas property and not the tenant's. In the present case the landlords have promptly demurred to the Defendant's act of appropriation, and have not given him ground to urge any presumption founded on previous possession. The only act of possession is the one of which the Plaintiffs complain as being forcible and unlawful, and for which they forthwith seek redress. The Defendant has failed to show that the land on which the tree stands is included within his mokurari tenure, and under these circumstances we think that the lower Appellate Court was right in decreeing the Plaintiffs' claim, and we accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs.