JUDGMENT 1. In this case the Appellants have been convicted by the learned Sessions Judge of Rungpur under sec. 147 of the Indian Penal Code. Mr. Cotton on behalf of the Appellants took a legal objection to the conviction on the ground that the accused had been charged in the Court below on two separate counts, which were as follows :--First, "that you on or about the 12th day of June 1900 at Pamalpukur with others, numbering more than five, committed a riot against Tailla Nasya, Fazar Jamardi and others with the common object of abducting one Ayna Bibi and thereby committed an offence punishable under sec. 147 of the Indian Penal Code, and within the cognizance of the Court of Session." Secondly, "that you on or about the 12th day of June 1900 at Pamalpukur abducted one Ayna Bibi with intent that she might be compelled or knowing it likely that she would be compelled to marry any person against her will or in order that she might be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, or knowing it to be likely that she would be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse and thereby committed an offence punishable under sec. 366 of the Indian Penal Code and within the cognizance of the Court of Session." 2. One of the assessors was of opinion that the accused were guilty only under sec. 147 and not under sec. 360 whilst the other thought they were guilty on both the counts. 3. The learned Sessions Judge agrees with the first. He says that "as regards the intention of the accused, I agree with the first assessor that it has not been proved that the accused abducted the woman with the object of seducing her to illicit intercourse or to force her to marry one of them. I am, therefore, of opinion that only the charge under. sec. 147 of the Indian Pernal Code has been proved against the accused." And he goes on to add :--"Agreeing with both the assessors I find the accused guilty under sec. 147 of the Indian Penal Code. Agreeing with one of the assessors and disagreeing with the other assessor I find the accused not guilty under sec. 366 of the Indian Penal Code, of which charge they are acquitted." 4. 147 of the Indian Penal Code. Agreeing with one of the assessors and disagreeing with the other assessor I find the accused not guilty under sec. 366 of the Indian Penal Code, of which charge they are acquitted." 4. In the first count, the accused were charged with rioting with the common object of abducting Ayna Bibi and the moment the accused were found not guilty under sec. 366 the common object which made their acts punishable under sec. 147, fell to the ground. In order to support the conviction under sec. 147, it would be necessary to find that the common object of the unlawful assembly had been established. Now the common object charged was abduction of the woman and reading the two charges together, it is clear that the intention of the abduction contemplated by the Court was that, the woman might be seduced or forced to have illicit intercourse or to many some one. But the learned Sessions Judge distinctly finds at the close of his judgment that this intention has not been proved. This leaves a charge of bare abduction, which per se (without the intention pointed out in the different sections dealing with the subject) does not appear to us to be an offence under the law. In this view, we are supported by the case of Badhoomookhee Debee and ors. v. Sreenath Haldar 15 W. R. Cr. 4 (1871). It may be that some other offence was committed in the carrying of the woman, but no other offence was charged, and the woman, who is said to have been forcibly taken away is married to one of the accused, and has given evidence in the present case for the defence. Had the case stood differently we should have felt it necessary to send back the case for a retrial ; but having regard to the above fact and to the position of the women, we think it unnecessary and inexpedient, to do so. On the findings of the learned Judge we are of opinion that the off nee of which the accused have been convicted has not been established, and we accordingly set aside the conviction, and direct that they be discharged.