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1901 DIGILAW 21 (SC)

RAJA PUDMANUND SINGH BAHADOOR v. HAYES

1901-07-13

LORD DAVEY, LORD HOBHOUSE, LORD ROBERTSON, SIR RICHARD COUCH

body1901
Judgement Appeal from a decree of the High Court (Aug. 2, 1897) modifying a decree of the District Court of Purneah (Jan. 19, 1895), which had decreed the appellants suit. The question decided in the appeal was as to the construction of the pottah dated June 27, 1874, and set out in their Lord-ships judgment. The appellants as lessors sued to recover possession of the property the subject of the pottah, which had been granted to Jogmaya Dai. The respondents contended that, " so long as the lineal descendants of Jogmaya Dai are alive, the plaintiffs have no right" to the moiety of the property granted to Jogmaya and her descendants. The District Court decreed the suit. The High Court modified this decree by directing delivery of possession to the appellants of eight annas instead of sixteen annas of the property in suit. The ground upon which the High Court proceeded was that on the death of Jogmaya, who left a descendant, Bholanath, her surviving, the respondents " had only revoked that portion of the lease which dealt with one eight annas share of the property, and they treated the then descendant of the lady as the owner of the other eight annas whom they had, as far as they could, put in possession." Further on they said " We are of opinion that Bholanath, under the terms of the family settlement and the decree passed thereon, had a right to specific performance of the agreement, and to compel the plaintiffs to give him a legal title if they refused. But, instead of refusing, the plaintiffs acquiesced in Bholanaths right, treated him as legal owner, and gave him possession, so far as they could, by the intimation they gave to the ryots and servants in 1297 [a.d. 1890]. We think, therefore, that the plaintiffs cannot succeed in getting a declaration that Bholanath cannot now hold the property as the legal owner, or that they can dispossess him from his eight annas share. We, therefore, cannot agree with the judge in the Court below in holding that the plaintiffs are entitled to possession and wasilat of the whole sixteen annas of the property as against Bholanath and the persons connected with the mortgage transaction. We, therefore, cannot agree with the judge in the Court below in holding that the plaintiffs are entitled to possession and wasilat of the whole sixteen annas of the property as against Bholanath and the persons connected with the mortgage transaction. We think, however, that they have a right to a declaration that as against them the mortgage made by the lady is not binding; and in modification of the decree of the Lower Court we direct that the plaintiffs be put in possession of eight annas share of the property with wasilat—according to the amount fixed by the Lower Court." Mayne and C. W. Arathoon, for the appellants, contended that on the true construction of the pottah it determined at the death of Jogmaya. With regard to the moiety which alone was the subject of appeal, there was a lease for her life only. The gift to Bholanath could not take effect, for Bholanath was unborn at the date thereof. There was no absolute gift to Jogmaya, for the restriction on alienation was inconsistent with her full dominion over the property leased. The gift was plainly to her for life with remainder to her descendants, to take effect on her death; and as there were no descendants except Bholanath, who was incapable of taking, the appellants were entitled to re-enter. Cowell, for the respondents, contended that the High Courts view of the transaction of 1874, as evidenced by the pottah, kabuliyat, and consent decree of that year, was correct, and that Bholanath was heir-at-law to the lessee, taking by inheritance and not by purchase. The essence of the compromise effected in that year was that Jogmaya, instead of holding the whole property in suit absolutely, should hold half thereof absolutely and the remainder for her life. By the perwanas of 10th Bysack, 1297, and by their plaint as originally filed, the appellants shewed by their conduct that they so understood the nature and effect of the transaction of 1874. It was submitted that both the intention and the legal effect of that transaction were, that as regards a moiety of the land leased it gave to the lessee an estate inheritable as Hindu law directs, but defeasible under contingencies, none of which had happened. It was submitted that both the intention and the legal effect of that transaction were, that as regards a moiety of the land leased it gave to the lessee an estate inheritable as Hindu law directs, but defeasible under contingencies, none of which had happened. Accordingly, the defendant was right in his contention that, so long as Bholanath or any oilier descendant of Jogmaya lived, the appellants had no right to possession of the moiety, the subject of appeal. Reference was made to Bhoobun Mohini Debia v. Hurrish Chunder Chowdhry. (L. R. 5 Ind. Ap. 138.) Mayne replied. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR RICHARD COUCH. The question in this appeal is as to the construction of a pottah (lease) made by Raja Lilanund Singh, the father of the appellant Pudmanund Singh, and by the latter on June 27, 1874. After reciting two deeds of gift by which Lilanund Singh gave to his daughter Srimati Jogmaya Dai two mouzahs therein described for her maintenance and that of her descendant with power to alienate the properties, that the properties were ancestral and at the time of the gift his son the first appellant was a minor, that a suit for setting aside the deeds had been brought on the part of Pudmanund Singh on the ground of their being illegal and was pending decision, that with a view to compromise the suit Jogmaya consented to relinquish the right which she had acquired under the deeds, and a compromise had been effected through the intervention of the Commissioner of Bhagulpore to the effect that Jogmaya " shall get an allowance of Rs.6000 per annum during her lifetime, and her descendants who may under the Hindu law become her heirs shall get one-half thereof in perpetuity and in lieu of the same whatever profits the mouzahs which are held by the said Mussamat Jogmaya Dai under the deeds sought to be set aside may yield annually over and above Rs.6000 being fixed at the jumma of those mouzahs, the said mouzahs shall be left in the possession of the said Jogmaya Dai, and on the death of the said Dai one-half of the said mouzahs shall permanently remain in the possession of her descendants who may be alive- at that time and be [her] heirs according to the Shastras on a jumma equal to one-half of the said jumma. The person holding possession of the property shall never have any right to alienate, i.e., to effect any sale, gift, or mortgage, or permanent mokurruri of the whole or a portion of the said properties," the Rajah and his son in effecting the compromise granted the pottah of the two mouzahs to Jogmaya Dai on the conditions specified by cancelling the former deeds. The conditions specified are that Jogmaya Dai should remain in possession of the properties during her lifetime, and pay to the lessors Rs.1234, the annual jumma, and on her death her descendants, who might according to the Shastras become her heirs, should permanently remain in possession of one-half of the properties and pay the annual jumma of Rs.617, that the lessee or her descendants should not have any power to transfer the property, and if there should be no descendants of the lessee, i.e., children born of her womb or their children, the lessors and their representatives should have power to resume and to take possession of the remaining one-half, and the properties mentioned in the pottah should revert to the Raj. On the same June 27 Jogmaya Dai executed a kabuliyat (counterpart), in which the terms of the compromise are stated to be substantially, though not in the same words, the same as in the pottah. The facts upon which the question in this appeal arises are these On June 3, 1883, Raja Lilanund Singh died. In June, 1885, Jogmaya Dai mortgaged one of the mouzahs in the pottah called Duleri Alakhhari to Dharam Chand Lal, since deceased, now represented by the respondents, his executors, and two other persons whose interests were afterwards acquired by him. She also gave a lease for ten years of the mouzah to Dharam Chand Lal in the names of two of his servants. Jogmaya died on April 9, 1889, and on March 22, 1892, notice was given to the mortgagees and the lessees for ten years to quit possession of the mouzahs. She also gave a lease for ten years of the mouzah to Dharam Chand Lal in the names of two of his servants. Jogmaya died on April 9, 1889, and on March 22, 1892, notice was given to the mortgagees and the lessees for ten years to quit possession of the mouzahs. On April 7, 1893, a suit was brought by Pudmanund Singh and two other sons of Lilanund Singh, minors, by their guardian, against Dharam Chand Lal and the other mortgagees and lessees, and also against Bholanund Jha, otherwise Bholanath, the grandson of Jogmaya Dai, a minor, in which the plaint asked that it might be held that the plaintiffs were not bound by the mortgage and lease, and that they might be put in possession of a moiety of the property without prejudice to their right to resume the other moiety in the event of there being no lineal descendants of Jogmaya Dai. On August 4, 1893, before the defendants had filed any written statement of their defence, the plaintiffs having learnt that Bholanath Jha was born after the death of Jogmaya Dai, and being advised that as he was not in exist ence at the time of granting the pottah the disposition of the property so far as it would apply to him was void according to Hindu law, applied to have the plaint amended so as to claim the whole of the mouzah, which was allowed. No appearance was put in on behalf of Bholanath Jha. Upon these facts the District Judge of Purneah made a decree in the plaintiffs favour for possession of the whole of the mouzah in dispute with mesne profits for three years. Dharam Chand Lal appealed from it to the High Court, which modified it by decreeing that the defendants should deliver to the plaintiffs possession of one-half only of the mouzah. The present appeal is from this decree, and the question is whether the whole of the mouzah has, under the terms of the pottah, reverted to the Raj. Mr. Dharam Chand Lal appealed from it to the High Court, which modified it by decreeing that the defendants should deliver to the plaintiffs possession of one-half only of the mouzah. The present appeal is from this decree, and the question is whether the whole of the mouzah has, under the terms of the pottah, reverted to the Raj. Mr. Cowell, who appeared for the respondents, did not dispute that Bholanath was by Hindu law incapable of taking under the pottah, not being then born; but he contended that the pottah might be construed as giving one-half of the mouzahs to Jogmaya Dai for life, and the other half to her for an inheritable estate, referring in support of his contention to Bhoobun Mohini Debia and Another v. Hurrish Chunder Chowdhry. (L. R. 5 Ind. Ap. 138.) That case is distinguishable from the present, as no previous life estate was given to the person who was held to take an absolute estate, and there were no words against alienation. If Jogmaya Dai took an estate of inheritance in that half, the restriction in the pottah of the power to alienate would be repugnant, or an attempt to take away the power which the law attaches to that estate. Jogmaya Dai could in that case at any time have disposed of that half by deed or by will. It was plainly not intended that she should have that power. According to the ordinary meaning of the words, the gift of the half is a specific one to her descendants, to take effect on her death. In the appeal to the High Court, Dharam Chand Lal was the only appellant, and the question between him and the present appellants (then respondents) was whether the death of Jogmaya Dai had put an end to the mortgage and accompanying lease, and the appellants had thereby become entitled to the whole of the mouzahs. With regard to the meaning of the pottah, the judges of the High Court only say it was agreed that Jogmaya Dai should remain on the property during her life on the annual jumma of Rs.1234, and that on her death her descendants would remain in possession of one-half of the property permanently on an annual jumma of Rs.617, and the other half should revert to the Raj. They then refer to the mortgage and subsequent proceedings, setting out at full length an order of 10 By sack, 1297 ( 1890), issued by the appellants to the patwari, the purport of which is that one-half of the mouzah had on Jogmayas death become fit to be resumed, and her direct heirs—i.e., the children of her womb—ought, according to the pottah, hold possession of the other half; and they say that the plaintiffs had only revoked that portion of the lease to the lady which dealt with one-half of the property, and they treated the then descendant of the lady as the owner of the other half whom they had as far as they could put in possession. The judges further say that " the respondents (present appellants) did not, nor could they, we think, deny that Bholanath had not in terms of the agreement an equity against the plaintiffs to carry out the agreement," and they were of opinion that he had a right to specific performance of the agreement, and to compel the plaintiff to give him a legal title. Their Lordships have some difficulty in following or understanding the observation of the learned judges. They can only say that they do not agree with it, and indeed they think the idea that Bholanath had any such equity is altogether erroneous. There was no ground for modifying the decree of the District Judge, and their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty to affirm it, and to reverse the decree of the High Court, ordering instead of it that the appeal to it be dismissed with costs. The respondents will pay the costs of this appeal.