Judgement Appeal from a decision of the High Court under s. 26 of the Letters Patent of 1865 in review of proceedings before Boddam J., exercising the original criminal jurisdiction of the High Court. Before Boddam J. the appellant was convicted by a jury upon three charges, the first being a charge of conspiracy with one D Santos to commit the offences of extortion and of obtaining illegal gratification, and the other two of actually obtaining such illegal gratification on or about August 27, 1896, and May 10, 1897. The appellant was acquitted on another charge of obtaining illegal gratification on March 1, 1897. He was sentenced to three years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.8000, and in default to one years rigorous imprisonment. The appellant was charged jointly with D Santos in the first charge, D Santos being also charged as an abettor with respect to the three other charges against the appellant. In the first charge it was alleged that various sums of money were obtained by the appellant through the other accused, D Santos, during a period extending from August 27, 1896, to November, 1898, Law. Rep. 28 Ind. App. 257 ( 1900- 1901) N. A. Subramania Iyer V. King-Emperor 127 from various persons, and in pursuance of the alleged conspiracy, the said sums, including the three sums which were the subjects of the 2nd, 4th, and 6th charges, together with several other sums. D Santos pleaded guilty to the charges against him; and the presiding judge then tendered to him a conditional pardon under s. 338 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, upon condition of his making a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relative to the offences charged; and D Santos accepted such tender, and gave evidence upon the trial of the appellant; but by six of the jury it was declared that he had " not spoken the truth throughout," and the learned judge held his pardon to have been forfeited, and sentenced him to three years rigorous imprisonment. The appellant thereafter applied to the High Court upon a certificate of the Officiating Advocate-General of Madras to set aside his conviction, and the sentence passed upon him, or for such other order as the said Court might think fit. The appellant thereafter applied to the High Court upon a certificate of the Officiating Advocate-General of Madras to set aside his conviction, and the sentence passed upon him, or for such other order as the said Court might think fit. The points raised in the certificate of the Advocate-General, so far as material, were— (1.) That it was not competent to the judge to tender a pardon to D Santos, because " none of the offences in respect of which N. A. Subramania Iyer was being tried was, within the meaning of the Criminal Procedure Code, exclusively triable by the High Court, and that, therefore, the learned judge erred in law in admitting the evidence given by D Santos as a witness for the Crown after pardon had been tendered to him, and in placing the same before the jury." (2.) That " the learned judge erred in law in not striking out the 1st count from the indictment, but trying and convicting N. A. Subramania Iyer on it, and in allowing evidence to be adduced by the Crown in respect of the 1st count, as regards matters of alleged extortions of money and illegal gratifications therein specified, other than those forming the subject-matter of the 2nd, 4th, and 6th counts, and placing the same before the jury.” (3.) That " the said learned judge erred in law in trying N. A. Subramania Iyer on the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 6th counts at one trial." (4.) That the learned judge had wrongly excluded certain evidence; and (5.) That he had misdirected the jury. The High Court decided that the tender of a pardon to D Santos was not authorized by law, but that his evidence was rightly admitted; that there was a misjoinder of charges, and that the first count ought to have been struck out. They overruled the remaining objections so far as they were relied upon. They then considered the evidence and set aside the conviction on the second count, but affirmed the conviction on the sixth count. And they altered the sentence on the appellant to one of two years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.5000, and in default of payment of the fine a further term of nine months rigorous imprisonment. They then considered the evidence and set aside the conviction on the second count, but affirmed the conviction on the sixth count. And they altered the sentence on the appellant to one of two years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.5000, and in default of payment of the fine a further term of nine months rigorous imprisonment. Mayne, for the appellant, contended that the final judgment and sentence of the High Court were illegal and should be set aside, and that a verdict of acquittal should be directed to be recorded in his favour. The first point taken was that the High Court was wrong in holding that while the tender of pardon to D Santos was illegal, his evidence given to earn a pardon was admissible. Reference was made to Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 337, 338, 339, 342, 343, and to the Indian Evidence Act (I. of 1872), s. 24. The evidence was that of a man still under trial as accused, Law. Rep. 28 Ind. App. 257 ( 1900- 1901) N. A. Subramania Iyer V. King-Emperor 128 for conviction does not necessarily result from a plea of guilty see Act V. of 1898, s. 271, and Queen-Empress v. Chinna Pavuchi. (( 1899) Ind. L. R. 23 Mad. 151.) Inducements were used to him not in accordance with ss. 337 and 338 see also Reg. v. Hanmanta (( 1877) Ind. L. R. 1 Bomb. 610.); Queen-Empress v. Dala Jiva (( 1885) Ind. L. R. 10 Bomb.190.); Empress of India v. Asghar Ali. (( 1879) Ind.. L. R. 2 Allah. 260.) [The Lord Chancellor said that this point was irrelevant to the question of illegal trial.] The first account was wholly bad. It charged numerous offences spreading over more than two years in pursuance of a continuous conspiracy. In the first place, a conspiracy to do anything, the actual agreement between the parties, does not constitute the offence unless it amounts to an abetment, and when it amounts to abetment it is within the Penal Code see ss. 107, 108, 109, 111, 114, 115, 116, 117. In the second place, it is in contravention of the Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 233, 234, 235, 236, which plainly prohibit an indictment which charges numerous acts amounting to abetment and extending over more than a year. 107, 108, 109, 111, 114, 115, 116, 117. In the second place, it is in contravention of the Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 233, 234, 235, 236, which plainly prohibit an indictment which charges numerous acts amounting to abetment and extending over more than a year. The policy of the Procedure Code is to prevent a multiplicity of charges as likely to create prejudice and inconvenience. It limits the number triable to three when committed within the space of twelve months from the first to the last. Such provision amounts to a prohibition, and the neglect of it is not error, omission, or irregularity, within the meaning of s. 537, of a nature to prevent reversal of a sentence or order, but vitiates the whole trial and pro ceedings, and renders them illegal and in violation of the Code. The indictment being bad for misjoinder, and the judge having refused to strike out the first count, and having admitted and left to the jury evidence upon acts which could not be legally charged, the High Court was wrong in dealing with the case as if the count had been struck out ab initio, and as if the evidence given could be erased. There was no power under ss. 226-231 of the Procedure Code to strike out the charge, and no power in the High Court under the Letters Patent or any other Act to amend the indictment. The errors relied on by the appellant, besides amounting to illegality in the trial, affected his defence upon the merits and occasioned a failure of justice. They were objected to at the earliest stage at which objections could be made, and are not remedied by s. 537. Reference was made to hi the Matter of Luchminarain (( 1886) Ind. L. R. 14 Calc. 128, 131.); Queen-Empress v. Chandi Singh (( 1887) Ind. L. R. 14 Calc. 395.); Queen-Empress v. Fakir apa (( 1890) Ind. L. R. 15 Bomb.491, 498.) ; In re Abdur Rahman and Keramat. (( 1900) Ind. L. R. 27 Calc. 839, 844,845 and 847.) The High Court had no jurisdiction to substitute for the verdict of a jury, based upon evidence in part inadmissible and in part worthless, their own verdict founded upon the residue of such evidence, more particularly when that residue was inadequate to support it see clause 26 of the Letters Patent, and compare 11 & 12 Viet. c. 78, s. 2 ; Reg. v. Mellor (( 1858) D. & B. 468, 502, 519.); Makin v. Attorney-General of New South Wales. ([ 1894] A. C. 57.) The matter having been tried in a manner not authorized by law, the High Court was not competent to review the evidence see Letters Patent, clause 38; Reg. v, Navroji Dadabhio (( 1872) 9 Bomb. H. C. 358.); Reg, v. Hurribole Chunder Ghose (( 1876) Ind. L. R. 1 Calc. 207.) ; Imperatrix v. Pitamber Jina (( 1877) Ind. L. R. 2 Bomb. 61); Queen-Empress v. OHara (( 1890) Ind. L. R. 17 Calc.642.) ; Wafadar Khan v. Queen-Empress (( 1894) Ind. L. R. 21 Calc.955.); Macleod v. Attorney-General for New South Wales. ([ 1891] A. C. 455.) Phillips, for the respondent, submitted that the first charge was a good charge against the appellant, and that there was no misjoinder. The main charge is that of conspiracy. The acts done in pursuance or furtherance thereof are all parts of the same transaction. Every single act need not be and was not taken as a separate offence, or made the subject of a separate charge. The basis of all is the conspiracy, and the acts done in pursuance of it were not all charged as in themselves offences, three only being selected for that purpose. [The Lord Chancellor. It is not the joinder that is wrong. It is the trial of all the offences at the same time.] Sect. 235 of the Procedure Code says that, if in one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction more offences than one are committed by the same person, he may be tried at one trial for every such offence. That section provides both in its enactment and its illustrations for trying numerous offences Law. Rep. 28 Ind. App. 257 ( 1900- 1901) N. A. Subramania Iyer V. King-Emperor 129 at the same time, and the present case falls within the powers conferred. Even supposing that error or irregularity of procedure had occurred under s. 537 of the Procedure Code, the Court had power to say that no injustice had resulted. It was right in so holding in this case, for, having regard to s. 235, it could not be said that the trial in this case was in plain contravention of the spirit, policy, or provisions of the Code. It was right in so holding in this case, for, having regard to s. 235, it could not be said that the trial in this case was in plain contravention of the spirit, policy, or provisions of the Code. For the acts alleged in the first charge, although more than three, could have been given in evidence under those charges which were not liable to objection, and accordingly the accused was not prejudiced. The High Court having reduced the sentence, justice was satisfied and the reduced sentence should be allowed to stand. Mayne replied. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by THE LORD CHANCELLOR. In this case the appellant was tried on an indictment in which he was charged with no less than forty-one acts, these acts extending over a period of two years. This was plainly in contravention of the Code of Criminal Procedure, s. 234, which provides that a person may only be tried for three offences of the same kind if committed within a period of twelve months. The reason of such a provision, which is analogous to our own provisions in respect of embezzlement, is obviously in order that the jury may not be prejudiced by the multitude of charges and the inconvenience of hearing together of such a number of instances of culpability, and the consequent embarrassment both to judges and accused. It is likely to cause confusion and to interfere with the definite proof of a distinct offence, which it is the object of all criminal procedure to obtain. The policy of such a provision is manifest, and the necessity of a system of written accusation specifying a definite criminal offence is of the essence of criminal procedure. Their Lordships think that the course pursued, which was plainly illegal, cannot be amended by arranging afterwards what might or might not have been properly submitted to the jury. Upon the assumption that the trial was illegally conducted, it is idle to suggest that there is enough left upon the indictment upon which a conviction might have been supported if the accused had been properly tried. The mischief sought to be avoided by the statute has been done. Upon the assumption that the trial was illegally conducted, it is idle to suggest that there is enough left upon the indictment upon which a conviction might have been supported if the accused had been properly tried. The mischief sought to be avoided by the statute has been done. The effect of the multitude of charges before the jury has not been averted by dissecting the verdict afterwards and appropriating the finding of guilty only to such parts of the written accusation as ought to have been submitted to the jury. It would in the first place leave to the Court the functions of the jury, and the accused would never have really been tried at all upon the charge arranged afterwards by the Court. Their Lordships cannot regard this as cured by s. 537. Their Lordships are unable to regard the disobedience to an express provision as to a mode of trial as a mere irregularity. Such a phrase as irregularity is not appropriate to the illegality of trying an accused person for many different offences at the same time, and those offences being spread over a longer period than by law could have been joined together in one indictment. The illustration of the section itself sufficiently shews what was meant. The remedying of mere irregularities is familiar in most systems of jurisprudence, but it would be an extraordinary extension of such a branch of administering the criminal law to say that when the Code positively enacts that such a trial as that which has taken place here shall not be permitted that this contravention of the Code comes within the description of error, omission, or irregularity. Some pertinent observations are made upon the subject by Lord Herschell and Lord Russell of Killowen. ([ 1894] A. C. 494.) Where in a civil case several causes of action were Law. Rep. 28 Ind. App. Some pertinent observations are made upon the subject by Lord Herschell and Lord Russell of Killowen. ([ 1894] A. C. 494.) Where in a civil case several causes of action were Law. Rep. 28 Ind. App. 257 ( 1900- 1901) N. A. Subramania Iyer V. King-Emperor 130 joined, Lord Herschell says that "if unwarranted by any enactment or rule it is much more than an irregularity "; and Lord Russell of Killowen in the same case says " Such a joinder of plaintiffs is more than an irregularity it is the constitution of a suit in a way not authorized by law and the rules applicable to procedure." With all respect to Sir Francis Maclean and the other judges who agreed with him in the case of In re Abdur Rahman and Keramat (Ind. L. R. 27 Calc. 839,), he appears to have fallen into a very manifest logical error in arguing that because all irregularities are illegal, as he says in a sense, and this trial was illegal, that therefore all things that may in his view be called illegal are, therefore, by that one adjective applied to them, become equal in importance and are susceptible of being treated alike. But this trial was prohibited in the mode in which it was conducted, and their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the conviction should be set aside. Their Lordships will make no order as to costs.