JUDGMENT : BURKITT, J. This is an appeal against an order of the Subordinate Judge of Mainpuri, disallowing the appellant, judgment-debtors objection to the execution of a decree for costs held by the respondents, decree-holders, against them. The date of the final decree (High Court) in the case is November 18, 1889. It is admitted that no application for execution was “made till June 21, 1895. Execution of the decree was then admittedly time-barred by more than two years, Nevertheless the Execution Court admitted that application and directed a notice to be issued to the judgment-debtors under the provisions of section 248 of the Civil Procedure Code. Nothing further was done and the application was for default of further prosecution struck off the file of pending cases on July 27, 1895. Nearly 3 years afterwards on June 16, 1898, the present application for execution was put in. The judgment-debtors objected that the execution was time-barred, but the learned Subordinate Judge rejected their objection because “if the former objection was filed beyond time, yet as the judgment-debtors made no objections in respect thereof, they are not entitled to do so.” We know of no authority for so broadly stated a proposition of law, As to the facts it is perfectly clear as shown by the report of the serving officer that the notice under section 248 was not personally served on the judgment-debtors, and the Court did not, under section 82, declare the notice to have been duly served. 2. These were two very important facts to which the learned Subordinate Judge, did not, but to which we must give full weight. The Subordinate Judge, therefore, is wrong in the reasons he has given,. and he ought not to have summarily rejected the judgment-debtors objections which were put forward when the present proceedings came to their notice, The argument of the learned advocate for the respondents based on sub-section 5 of article 179 of the Limitation Act is good so far as it goes. The present application being within 3 years from the date of issuing the notice under section 248, is not barred as far as the preceding application of June 25, 1895, is concerned. The present application being within 3 years from the date of issuing the notice under section 248, is not barred as far as the preceding application of June 25, 1895, is concerned. But when the former application was made, the period within which execution proceedings could by law be taken, had long passed, and the improper admission of that application and the issue of notice on it could not, in our opinion have the effect of reviving a decree which had long ceased to be capable of being put into execution. We therefore allow this appeal, we set aside the decisions of the two lower courts and we direct that the respondents' application of June 18, 1898, be rejected with costs in all the three courts.