Judgement Appeal from a decree of the High Court (July 1, 1897) varying a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Zilla Pubna, in Bengal (July 8, 1893), which had dismissed the respondents suit. The respondent sued as widow and executrix of Hara Nath Chowdhry, who died on October 6, 1884, to establish her title against the appellants predecessor, Janhavi Chowdhrani, and to recover possession of certain alluvial lands which had been gradually re-formed by a change in the course of the river Brahmaputra, locally known as the Jamuna. The boundaries of the land in dispute are described in their Lordships judgment. That dispute first arose between Janhavi and the respondents husband in 1867, and led to proceedings under s. 318, Act XXV. of 1861 (Criminal Procedure Code), the result of which was that the respondents husband was maintained in possession of land, the boundaries of which were described in the order " On the south the timbers fixed in the ground on the boundary of Dortha, on the north Khas Kalikapore, on the east the flowing river Jamuna, and on the west the flowing Sota of the Daokhoba." It was admitted by the appellant that the land now in dispute was in existence about the year 1876, the river then having completely washed away the villages to the east, and become the western boundary of Basjan. In that year a dispute as to possession of this land arose between the plain tiffs husband, claiming to have had possession since 1867, and Dwarkanath Roy claiming as an accretion to Basjan. On June 19, 1876, an order was passed under s. 530, Act X. of 1872 (Criminal Procedure Code), maintaining the possession of the plaintiffs husband over the land in dispute, bounded as follows " North by the south boundary of Khas Kalikapore or by a straight line drawn from that south boundary to the river Jamuna on the east. East by the river Jamuna. West by the river Daokoba, and the marra Sota (dry channel of a river). East by the river Jamuna. West by the river Daokoba, and the marra Sota (dry channel of a river). The marra Sota will also form "the south boundary of the disputed land south of that be Dortha or Nischintapore." The respondents husband and the respondent remained in peaceful possession till the end of the year 1888; when the appellant again disturbed her possession; and eventually an order was passed under s. 145, Act X. of 1882 (Criminal Pro cedure Code), which determined that at the time of the proceedings the appellant was in possession, and directed the plaintiff to sue in the Civil Courts. The plaint recited the title of the plaintiff to the villages Suriber, Natipara, and Jagannathpore to the west of the disputed land, and the proceedings in connection with the alluvial land in dispute in the years 1867, 1876, and 1888. She alleged that the land sued for is the same land as was covered by the orders passed in the year 1867, and on June 19, 1876, and based her title thereto on three grounds (1.) that the land is capable of identification as originally forming a portion of the said three villages; (2) that the newly formed land is an alluvial accretion to the said three villages ; and (3.) that she had held adverse possession of the land for a period exceeding twelve years. The appellant filed a written statement by which she denied that the land now in dispute is the same land that was in dispute either in 1867 or 1876. She alleged that the lands sued for originally formed a portion of her village Salal, that they were submerged before 1852, and that as the lands re-formed she at once took possession, and had all along retained possession. She denied the respondents possession, and relied on the order of 1888 and her possession under it. She alleged that the lands sued for originally formed a portion of her village Salal, that they were submerged before 1852, and that as the lands re-formed she at once took possession, and had all along retained possession. She denied the respondents possession, and relied on the order of 1888 and her possession under it. The Subordinate Judge decided that " there was nothing to shew that the lands in suit are re-formations on the original sites of the mouzahs Jagannathpore, Natipara, and Suriber, and so the case of re-formation on old sites of mouzahs comprised within the plaintiffs zemindari fell to the ground/ He also decided that " the evidence as it stood was quite insufficient to make out the plaintiffs title to the disputed land on the basis of accretion to her mouzahs by means of gradual accession." As to the title by adverse possession, he was of opinion that the plaintiff had failed to establish the identity of the lands now in dispute with the lands in dispute in 1876, and that the evidence produced by her did not establish her possession. On these findings he dismissed the suit with costs. The High Court, for reasons stated in its judgment, admitted in evidence a copy of the order of the magistrate passed under s. 530, Act X. of 1872, on June 19, 1876, and allowed formal proof to be given of the preparation of the map of Kalikapore as surveyed in 1864. It then modified the judgment of the Court below, coming to the conclusion that such portion of the land now in dispute as lay to the south of a line drawn due east to the river Jamuna from the south-eastern corner of Kalikapore was the same land as was in dispute in the year 1876, and that the plaintiff had all along held possession thereof till such possession was disturbed in 1888. That the plaintiff had acquired a title thereto by accretion to her said villages of Suriber, Natipara, and Jagannathpore, or, at any rate, a title by adverse possession for a period of twelve years. In the result, the High Court decreed the plaintiffs possession of the said portion of land with mesne profits, and dismissed her suit for the remainder with costs in proportion to the amount decreed and dismissed. In the result, the High Court decreed the plaintiffs possession of the said portion of land with mesne profits, and dismissed her suit for the remainder with costs in proportion to the amount decreed and dismissed. Cohen, K.C., and Branson, for the appellant, contended that the finding of the Subordinate Judge that the respondent had not proved title in herself to the lands in suit either as reformation of her original estate or as accretion thereto, or by adverse possession thereof, was right, and ought not to have been altered. Unless such title was proved, the issue being mainly one of identity, there was no ground for disturbing the appellants possession under the order of 1888. The High Court as the foundation of their decree admitted in evidence the proceeding of 1876, to which the appellant was not a party. It did so on the ground that it was relevant for the purpose of shewing whether the disputed land was then in existence. It also allowed the respondent to give evidence to render admissible a map marked in the Lower Court Exhibit XXXIA, but rejected as not proved. Accordingly, a witness was called and stated that he had written certain measurements on the map at the dictation of one Tarini Churn Chuckerbutty, who had since died. It was contended that no ground was shewn for admitting either the order of 1876 or the map in evidence, and that there were no sufficient reasons for reversing the finding of the Subordinate Judge, and the report of the Amin to the effect that the disputed lands did not form any part of the lands which were the subject of the proceedings in 1866-7, and again in 1876. Mayne and Be Gruyther, for the respondent, contended that the proceedings of 1876 were admissible in evidence under s. 13 of Act I. of 1872. The order then made was a transaction by which the right of possession then claimed was recognised. It did not relate to title, and was not in any sense a res judicata see Rajah Run Bahadoor v. Mussumat Lachoo Koer (( 1884) L. R. 12 Ind. Ap. 23, 33.); and the fact that the appellant was not a party was immaterial. It did not relate to title, and was not in any sense a res judicata see Rajah Run Bahadoor v. Mussumat Lachoo Koer (( 1884) L. R. 12 Ind. Ap. 23, 33.); and the fact that the appellant was not a party was immaterial. It was evidence under s. 13 that such an order was made that the order was between certain specified parties, and related to certain land with certain specified boundaries, which were capable of being identified by contemporaneous evidence such as maps, or other orders or reports relating thereto. Reference was made to Ambler v. Pushong (( 1885) Ind. L. R.11 Calc. 365); Luckinarain Jagadeb v. Maharaja Jodunath Deo (( 1893) L. R. 21 Ind. Ap. 39, 44); Raj Coomar Roy v. Gobind Chunder Roy (L. R. 19 Ind. Ap. 140.), to shew that in boundary cases the onus is on the appellant to shew that the decree apealed from is wrong, and how it should be amended. The High Court was right in admitting the disputed evidence, and in finding that the land in suit is the same land of which the respondent was found in possession in 1867-76. The respondent had acquired a good title to the land in suit, not merely by adverse possession for more than twelve years, but by gradual accretion under s. 4, Regulation XI. of 1825. Cohen, K.C., replied, and upon the question of onus probandi referred to Khagendra Narain Chowdhry v. Matangini Dibi (( 1890) L. R. 17 Ind. Ap. 62.), Rajah Burdacant Roy v. Chunder Coomar Roy (( 1868) 12 Moores Ind. Ap. Ca. 145.), and to Nogender Chunder Ghose v. Mahomed Esof. (( 1872) 10 Beng. L.R. 406, 426.) The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD LINDLEY. This appeal is from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William, in Bengal, which modified the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge of Pubna and Bogra. The plaintiff (now the respondent) is the widow and executrix of one Hara Nath Chowdry, who died on October 6, 1884. She sued the defendant (the appellant) to establish her title and to recover possession of certain alluvial lands which had been formed by a change in the course of the river Brahmaputra, locally known as the Jamuna. The plaintiff (now the respondent) is the widow and executrix of one Hara Nath Chowdry, who died on October 6, 1884. She sued the defendant (the appellant) to establish her title and to recover possession of certain alluvial lands which had been formed by a change in the course of the river Brahmaputra, locally known as the Jamuna. The land in dispute lies between the villages of Suriber, Natipara, and Jagannathpore on the west, and the villages of Chalaljore Khati (referred to in the litigation as Salal), Bhetuakhola, and Khosatolly on the east. The greater portion of the land lies to the south of a line drawn from the southern boundary of Kalikapore to the river. The plaintiff is the owner of the said three villages to the west, as also of the village Bhetuakhola to the east. The defendant is the owner of the village Salal. The village Kalikapore is to the north of Suriber, and the village Basjan lies to the south of Bhetuakhola and east of Khosatolly. The river has shifted its bed during the last fifty or sixty years. It was formerly considerably more to the wrest than it now is. In 1866 a dispute arose in regard to land left by the river between the present defendant and the plaintiffs husband. This led to proceedings under s. 318, Act XXV. of 1861, and resulted in an order dated May 23, 1867, by which the plain tiffs husband was maintained in possession of the land, the boundaries of which were described in the order as follows " On the south the timbers fixed in the ground on the boundary of Dortha, on the north Khas Kalikapore, on the east the flowing river Jamuna, and on the west the flowing Sota of the Daokhoba." In 1876 another dispute arose relating to land, said to be the land now in dispute, between the plaintiffs husband claiming to have had possession since 1867, and Dwarkanath Roy claiming as an accretion to Basjan. On June 19, 1876, an order was passed under s. 530, Act X. of 1872 (Criminal Pro cedure Code), maintaining the possession of the plaintiffs husband over the land then in dispute, bounded as follows " North by the south boundary of Khas Kalikapore, or by a straight line drawn from that south boundary to the river Jamuna on the east. East by the river Jamuna. East by the river Jamuna. West by the river Daokoba, and the marra Sota (dry channel of a river). The marra Sota will also form the south boundary of the disputed land, south of that be Dortha or Nischintapore." After the rainy season of 1888 disputes arose between the plaintiff and the defendant as to the land in question in this suit, and the usual possessor, proceedings took place before the deputy magistrate of Tangail under s. 145, Act X. of 1882 (Criminal Procedure Code), and by an order dated December 31, 1888, he determined that at the time of the proceedings the defendant was in possession, and confirmed him in such possessions, and directed the plaintiff to sue in the Civil Courts. On December 22, 1891, in consequence of the said order, the plaintiff instituted the present suit. The plaintiff in her claim alleged that the land now sued for is the same land as was covered by the orders of 1867 and 1876, and she based her title thereto— (1.) On the ground that the land now in suit is capable of identification as originally forming a portion of the said three villages. (2.) On the ground that the newly formed land is an alluvial accretion to the said three villages; and (3.) On the ground that she had held adverse possession of the said lands for a period exceeding twelve years. The defendant filed a written statement by which she denied that the land now in dispute is the same land that was in dispute either in 1867 or 1876, and submitted that the order of 1876 was not admissible in evidence against her. She alleged that the lands sued for originally formed a portion of her village Salal, that they were submerged before 1852, and that as the lands re-formed she took possession, and had all along retained possession. She denied the plaintiffs possession, and relied on the order of 1888, which was confirmed by the High Court. Issues were settled for trial in the case; the only issues now material were as follows— 1. 1. Are the boundaries of the disputed land correctly stated in the plaint. If not, what is the correct boundary? 2. 3. Was plaintiff in possession of the disputed land within twelve years previous to the date of the suit? Is plaintiffs claim barred? 4. 1. Are the boundaries of the disputed land correctly stated in the plaint. If not, what is the correct boundary? 2. 3. Was plaintiff in possession of the disputed land within twelve years previous to the date of the suit? Is plaintiffs claim barred? 4. Does the disputed land appertain to plaintiffs mouzahs Jagannathpore, Natipara, and Suriber? Is it a formation on the old site of and adjoining to those mouzahs? Has the plaintiff any title to the disputed land? Some time after these issues were settled the following instructions were issued by the Court to the Civil Court Amin— "1. The Amin is to prepare a map shewing in their proper places the mouzahs Jagannathpore, Natipara, Rehai, Suriber, and Behtuakhola, and the disputed land as pointed out by the plaintiff on the basis of the thak and survey maps of those mouzahs. "2. The area and boundaries of the disputed land are to be shewn in the map. "3. The Amin is to ascertain on comparison of the khas and thak and survey maps sent herewith of the mouzahs stated to be on the boundaries of the disputed land given in the plaint in the present suit (1.) North, settlement map of Khas Kalikapore prepared in 1271 ( 1866) by Tarini Churn Chuckerbutty and Mohim Chunder Mozoomdar; (2.) West, thak and survey maps of Jagannathpore, Natipara, and Suriber; (3.) East, thak and survey maps of Behtuakhola and Basjan; (4.) South, thak and survey maps of Dortha, with the boundaries men tioned in the judgments and shewn in the maps in cases, under s. 318 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the 23rd May, 1867, and under s. 530 of the same Code of the 19th June, 1876, whether the land claimed in the present suit lies within the lands (in dispute) in those two cases." The question of possession was not referred to the Amin. The Amin, having made the investigation directed, made his report on February 5, 1893, accompanied by a map called the Amins map. By his said report the Amin found amongst other things— 1st. That no portion of the disputed land fell within the boundaries of the three villages of Jagannathpore, Natipara, and Suriber belonging to the plaintiff, or seemed to have been formed contiguous thereto. 2nd. By his said report the Amin found amongst other things— 1st. That no portion of the disputed land fell within the boundaries of the three villages of Jagannathpore, Natipara, and Suriber belonging to the plaintiff, or seemed to have been formed contiguous thereto. 2nd. That the land now in suit was not the subject of the magisterial proceeding under s. 318 of the Criminal Procedure Code in 1867, nor yet of the proceedings in June, 1876, under s. 530 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The case then came on for trial, and evidence, oral and documentary, was given and put in on either side ; and on July 8, 1893, the Subordinate Judge delivered his judgment. He held that the plaintiff had not proved that the land in question was a re-formation upon the site of her lands. He held that the plaintiff had not attempted to make out nor establish any case of title by gradual accretion. He then took up the question of possession, and came to the conclusion that the proceeding of 1867 did not support the plaintiffs case of adverse possession, and that the plaintiffs evidence was insufficient to establish a title by adverse possession, while the witnesses called on behalf of the defendant had shewn her possession for more than twelve years. He therefore dismissed the said suit with costs. Against this judgment the plaintiff appealed to the High Court at Calcutta. The High Court admitted in evidence the proceedings in 1876, which the Subordinate Judge had rejected on the ground that the defendant was not a party to them. The High Court also admitted a map (XXXIA) as evidence for the plaintiff; and in the result the High Court made a decree, dated July 1, 1897, modifying the decree appealed from, and deciding that the plaintiff had proved her title to the southern and larger part of the land in question, and decreed her possession of that portion with mesne profits, and dismissed her suit for the rest of the land with costs. From this decree the defendant has appealed. There is no cross-appeal by the plaintiff. From this decree the defendant has appealed. There is no cross-appeal by the plaintiff. The appellants main contention is that, having been in possession at the time of and under the order of 1888, the onus is on the plaintiff to prove her title to the land in dispute, and that she is unable to do so ; and that she has failed to prove the identity of the land claimed, or any part of it, with land to which she or her late husband had or have any title by possession or otherwise. Before considering the merits of this controversy, it is desirable to clear the ground by determining the effect of the orders made in May, 1867, June, 1876, and December, 1888. (The order of 1888 is not in the record.) These orders are merely police orders made to prevent breaches of the peace. They decide no question of title; but under s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1882 (relating to disputes as to immovable property) the magistrate is, if possible, to decide which of the parties is in possession of the land in dispute ; and if he decides that one of the disputants is in possession, the magistrate is to make an order declaring such party to be entitled to retain possession until evicted in due course of law, and forbidding all disturbance of such possession until such eviction. The Criminal Procedure Acts in force in 1866 and 1876 were to the same effect. These police orders are in their Lordships opinion admissible in evidence on general principles as well as under s. 13 of the Indian Evidence Act to shew the fact that such orders were made. This necessarily makes them evidence of the following facts, all of which appear from the orders themselves, namely, who the parties to the dispute were ; what the land in dispute was; and who was declared entitled to retain possession. For this purpose, and to this extent, such orders are admissible in evidence for and against every one when the fact of possession at the date of the order has to be ascertained. If the lands referred in such an order are described by metes and bounds, or by reference to objects or marks physically existing, these must necessarily be ascertained by extrinsic evidence, i.e., the testimony of persons who know the locality. If the lands referred in such an order are described by metes and bounds, or by reference to objects or marks physically existing, these must necessarily be ascertained by extrinsic evidence, i.e., the testimony of persons who know the locality. If the orders refer to a map, that map is admissible in evidence to render the order intelligible; and the actual situation of the objects drawn or otherwise indicated on the map must, as in all cases of the sort, be ascertained by extrinsic evidence. So far there appears to be no difficulty. Reports accompanying the orders or maps and not referred to in the orders may be admissible as hearsay evidence of reputed possession 2 Tay. Ev. s. 517. (See 1 Taylor, s. 622 (9th ed.)) But they are not otherwise admissible unless they are made so by s. 13 of the Indian Evidence Act. To bring a report within that section the report must be " a transaction in which the right or custom in question was created, claimed, modified, recognised, asserted or denied, or which was inconsistent with its existence." These words are very wide, and are wide enough to let in the reports forming part of the proceedings in 1867, 1876, and 1888. Their Lordships are of opinion that the High Court did not err in receiving the report made in the proceedings of 1876 to the reception of which Mr. Cohen objected. As regards possession under a magistrates order, although the order confers no title, the fact of possession remains, and the person in possession can only be evicted by a person who can prove a better right to the possession himself. (See as to these orders, Ambler v. Pushong, Ind. L. R. 11 Calc. 365.) The order of 1888 and possession under it threw upon the plaintiff the burden of proving her title ; and she did so to the satisfaction of the High Court so far as the larger part of the land in dispute is concerned. But the onus is not now on her to shew that the judgment in her favour is right; it is for the appellant to shew that it is wrong, and where and why it is wrong. Some valuable observations on this point will be found in Raj Coomar Roy v. Gobind Chunder Roy (L. R. 19 Ind. Ap. 140.), where boundaries could not be accurately ascertained. Some valuable observations on this point will be found in Raj Coomar Roy v. Gobind Chunder Roy (L. R. 19 Ind. Ap. 140.), where boundaries could not be accurately ascertained. It was there said (L. R. 19 Ind. Ap. 146.) that, to induce this Board to reverse the judgment appealed from, the appellant must do something more than shew that the plaintiffs title is not free from doubts ; the appellant must at least give some acceptable explanation of the circumstances which have led the Court below to its conclusion. Their Lordships adopt this principle. As regards the map XXXIA (which their Lordships take to be XXXA (Exhibit XXXA is the second map in the book , but there is no map XXXIA) in the record), it appears that a copy of this map was admitted by the Subordinate Judge at the trial, but was ultimately rejected by him, as the copy was not proved. An interlocutory order was made by the High Court giving the plaintiff liberty to prove the map on the hearing of the appeal, and directing the original to be called for from the collectors office. Their Lordships are of opinion that the High Court were quite right in allowing the plaintiff to prove this map if she could, and in directing the original to be produced from the collectors office. A witness, No. 30, was accordingly called on the hearing of the appeal, and the original map was shewn him. He said he assisted in preparing it for one Tarini Churn Chuckerbutty, who was dead. Both of them prepared it as Amins, and the collector, Mr. Boxwell, tested the accuracy of the measurement. Mr. Boxwell is dead. The witness himself was not a skilful surveyor, and the accuracy of his work is not reliable if unchecked; but it appears to their Lordships that the map was sufficiently proved to be admissible in evidence. Its date does not appear, but it was apparently made in 1866, or about that time. It is referred to in the instructions to the Amin. It shews more or less accurately where the river then was, and approximately at all events the situations of the places marked upon it. Its date does not appear, but it was apparently made in 1866, or about that time. It is referred to in the instructions to the Amin. It shews more or less accurately where the river then was, and approximately at all events the situations of the places marked upon it. It is plain from the maps and from the evidence that during the last thirty or forty years the bed of the river Jamuna has shifted from west to east, and that the lands in dispute in 1867, 1876, and 1888 were always on the west of the river as it then was. The river was always their eastern boundary. There was never any dispute as to land east of the river. The Subordinate Judge made a mistake in this respect, as was pointed out by the High Court. The order of 1867 and the evidence relating to the lands mentioned in it have been much discussed and closely examined. Their Lordships find it impossible to ascertain accurately where the boundaries of the land then in dispute are now; but the lands apparently must have been the western part of the lands in dispute in this suit. The northern boundary and eastern boundary and the position of the river seem to make this reasonably plain. This was also the conclusion arrived at by the High Court. Again, with reference to the order of 1876, although their Lordships find it impossible to identify some of the boundaries mentioned in the order, they are satisfied that the land in dispute in this suit, or the greater part of it, existed in 1876, and was in dispute between Haranath and his then rival, Dwarka Nath. No other land than some part of the land now in dispute can be found which was in dispute in 1876. The southern boundary of the land in dispute is described in the order of 1876 as the marra Sota, and elsewhere as the streamlet and Dortha village. This boundary their Lordships are unable to identify, but a dry sota to the south is spoken to by several witnesses, and to the south of that is Dortha. The northern boundary, i.e., the southern boundary of Khas Kalikapore, or a line drawn along or from the southern boundary of Khas Kalikapore to the river Jamuna, presents no difficulty; nor does the eastern boundary, namely, the river Jamuna. The northern boundary, i.e., the southern boundary of Khas Kalikapore, or a line drawn along or from the southern boundary of Khas Kalikapore to the river Jamuna, presents no difficulty; nor does the eastern boundary, namely, the river Jamuna. The north and east boundaries are plain enough. The west boundary is described as the river Daokoba, and the marra Sota, and elsewhere as the dry bed of a stream, and by undisputed parts of the villages Behai, Suriber, and Natipara. The exact locality of this stream their Lordships are not satisfied about; but the Daokoba and the villages forming the rest of the western boundary are shewn in the Amins map, and a dry sota to the west is mentioned by some of the witnesses. From the order of 1876 and the Amins map it seems, therefore, plain that that part of the land now in dispute which lies south of the line mentioned in the order of 1876 and between the above-named villages on the west and the river Jamuna on the east certainly included the land in dispute in 1876. Land north of that boundary was apparently not then in dispute, and the plaintiffs claim to the land now in dispute but north of that line has been negatived, by the High Court. All, therefore, that is really left obscure is how far south the land in dispute in 1876 extended. The order and map do not enable their Lordships to ascertain this satisfactorily. But, however far south the disputed land extended, Haranath was in possession of it, and was confirmed in that possession in 1876. Now as to possession since 1876. The plaintiff put in evidence a number of kabuliyats chittas accounts and receipts. The Subordinate Judge described them as mere paper transac tions entitled to no weight. Such documents do not prove themselves, and are valueless without proper oral evidence respecting them. As to many of them such evidence is not forthcoming. But many of them were produced by the persons J who made them, and were put in without objection. They add little to the oral testimony, and their Lordships do not attach much importance to them. They do not, however, reject them as inadmissible for what they are worth. But the plaintiff called a number of witnesses, all of whom knew the locality. They add little to the oral testimony, and their Lordships do not attach much importance to them. They do not, however, reject them as inadmissible for what they are worth. But the plaintiff called a number of witnesses, all of whom knew the locality. Some of them describe the shifting of the bed of the Jamuna from time to time. Many of them were tenants of Haranath, and after him of the plaintiff, and although their Lordships are unable to determine the exact positions of the lands of which they speak, still these witnesses appear to their Lordships to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that the land in dispute south of Khas Kalikapore and of a line continuing its southern boundary to the river was in the possession of Haranath before as well as after 1876, and was after his death in the possession of the plaintiff until 1888, when the defendant turned her people off. Their Lordships have examined the evidence adduced by the defendant. Possession by Haranath and by the plaintiff of any part of the land in dispute is denied by one at least of the defendants witnesses. But, having regard to the order of 1876 and the evidence given by the plaintiffs witnesses, their Lordships cannot accept this denial as accurate. It may, however, be true as to some of the northern portion opposite Salal, and some of the witnesses apparently were speaking of that. Apart from this denial, their Lordships find nothing which really tends to displace the evidence for the plaintiff. No possession by the defendant before 1888 is proved. The real truth is that the defendants case is based on the order of 1888, and on the defendants possession since that date, and on the inability of the plaintiff to prove a better title to the land she claimed. The Subordinate Court thought she failed to do so. The High Court took a different view as to the greater part of the land. Their Lordships have studied the whole evidence afresh, and although there are many details which they cannot say are free from obscurity, still their Lordships have come to the conclusion, not only that the decree of the High Court ought not to be disturbed, but that it is right. Their Lordships will, therefore, humbly advise His Majesty to dismiss the appeal, and the appellants must pay the costs of it.