JUDGMENT Maclean, C.J. - This is an appeal from the decree of the District Judge of Hughly, dated the 29th of January 1900, by which he removed the Defendant from his office of she bait of the idol, which is referred to in the pleadings and appointed a receiver of the debutter property. It is unnecessary to refer to the various steps in the litigation, which has been of a somewhat tortuous nature, but the suit ultimately came on for trial on the 29th of January 1900 when the decree to which I have referred was made. The Defendant who did not appear at the trial, or give his own or any evidence now appeals against that decree. We have heard nothing from the Appellant challenging the decree so far as it ordered his removal. The evidence of the Plaintiff is uncontradicted, and there are certain admissions in the defence of the Defendant--I refer to paragraphs 5 and 6 of his written statement--which, with the oral evidence given by the Plaintiff, justifies the view taken by the Court below and which, as I have said, was not challenged by the Appellant. That part, therefore, of the decree must stand. 2. Various objections, however, are taken to the appointment of the Receiver. It is said for the Appellant that in a suit framed under a special Statute, such as Act XX of 1863, the Religious Endowments Act, the Court can only exercise the powers given by that Statute, and that there is no power under that Act to appoint a Receiver. But it is contended, for the Plaintiff, that the Court has power to appoint a Receiver under sec. 503 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as the debutter property is the subject of the suit. Something was said about that property being under attachment, but nothing about attachment appears upon the record, and there is nothing to show there was or is any attachment. The question is, whether the suit having been brought under the Religious Endowments Act, the Civil Court can give any relief other than that which the Act empowers it to give. That Act, subject to what I will say in a moment as to sec. The question is, whether the suit having been brought under the Religious Endowments Act, the Civil Court can give any relief other than that which the Act empowers it to give. That Act, subject to what I will say in a moment as to sec. 5, gives the Court no power to appoint a Receiver or a manager of the debutter property, and I do not think the Court, in a suit framed under this Act, has any power to appoint a Receiver. It is noticeable that when the case was on a previous occasion remanded by this Court, the Plaintiff abandoned his claim for a Receiver. If the Plaintiff wished to have a Receiver appointed and to have the trust property administered under the directions of the Court, his proper course would have been to have proceeded under sec. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which he could not do without the previous sanction of the Advocate-General. In my opinion if a Plaintiff elects to proceed under the Religious Endowments Act of 1863, the Civil Court can only afford him that special relief which the special Statute says it may grant, and, if he wishes for any relief beyond that, his proper course is to proceed under sec. 539 of the Code which is much wider in its scope. No doubt, in certain events, which, at present at any rate, have not happened in the present case, and under certain conditions, the Civil Court has power, under sec. 5 of the Religious Endowments Act, to appoint a manager of a muth, temple, or other religious establishment. But the circumstances which would bring the jurisdiction of sec. 5 into operation have not occurred in the present case. I therefore think that the Court had no power to appoint a Receiver and that so much of the decree as appoints the Receiver must be discharged. 3. As regards the language of the decree in reference to the removal of the Defendant, that part of the decree which says that "from the date on which the said Receiver will take charge of the management of the said muth" must go out as being inapplicable seeing that the appointment of the Receiver has been set aside. 4. 3. As regards the language of the decree in reference to the removal of the Defendant, that part of the decree which says that "from the date on which the said Receiver will take charge of the management of the said muth" must go out as being inapplicable seeing that the appointment of the Receiver has been set aside. 4. I may, perhaps, in conclusion, throw out, for the consideration of both sides, and of all parties interested in this charitable endowment whether, having regard to the litigation that has already taken place and to some extent to the object the parties have in view, the best course of dealing with the matter would not be to institute a suit under sec. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 5. As the appeal is only partially successful there will be no costs. Banerjee, J. 6. I am of the same opinion. I think that the order for the appointment of a Receiver, which is part of the decree made in this case, cannot be sustained under sec. 503 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for this reason amongst others, that the prayer for the appointment of a Receiver which was the fourth prayer in the plaint as originally framed had been deliberately withdrawn by the Plaintiff when the case was remanded by this Court In a suit brought under sec. 14 of the Religious Endowments Act, XX of 1863, the Court may direct the removal of the trustee or manager of an endowment and if by reason of such removal of the trustee or manager, further interference of the Court becomes necessary by way of appointing a manager for the management of the endowment, such interference is provided for by sec. 5 of the Act. 7. It has been argued by the learned vakil for the Appellant that that section can have no application except where the vacancy in the office of the trustee or manager is a vacancy caused by the death, resignation or removal of the individual trustee or manager to whom the endowment has been transferred under sec. 4 of the Act and that in the way of any vacancy occurring by reason of the death, resignation or removal of any subsequent incumbent of the office, sec. 5 is in applicable. I do not consider this contention sound. 4 of the Act and that in the way of any vacancy occurring by reason of the death, resignation or removal of any subsequent incumbent of the office, sec. 5 is in applicable. I do not consider this contention sound. Sec. 5 is in my opinion applicable when ever a vacancy occurs in the office of a trustee or manager of an endowment which has been transferred to a trustee or manager under sec. 4. But then sec. 5 requires the happening of another contingency, namely, a dispute as to the right of succession, before a Civil Court can interfere and appoint a manager, and it is but reasonable that that should be so because if upon a vacancy in the office of trustee or manager arising some one steps in, claiming a right to the succession, and he is not opposed, he will go on with the management. It is only in the event of a dispute arising as to the right of succession that the Civil Court may be called upon to interfere, and as no such dispute has yet arisen in this case it was premature for the Court below to appoint a manager under sec. 5 of the Act.