JUDGMENT 1. These two appeals arise out of applications made by the Appellants, who are the judgment-debtors under sec. 311, C. P. C., to set aside the sale of certain properties sold in execution of decree in consequence of material irregularities in connection with the sale and consequent substantial injury to them. The judgment-debtors were share-holders in two permanent howla tenures, and it is their interest in these tenures which have been sold. 2. The application, out of which the appeal No. 165 of 1900 arises, related to a 5 annas share, and the application, out of which appeal No. 182 of 1900 arises, related roughly to a 6 annas share in these howlas respectively. 3. It appears that on the 23rd September 1899, the decree-holders obtained decrees against the judgment-debtors in respect of rent due for these howla interests and that on the 22nd November of the same year they applied for execution of their decrees and the 15th January 1900 was then fixed for the sale. On the 12th January the judgment-debtor applied for stay of execution under the provisions of sec. 546, C. P. C., they having preferred an appeal to this Court against the decrees. On this application the learned District Judge directed that the sale should be adjourned to the 22nd January in order to enable the judgment-debtor to furnish the requisite security, Then on the 22nd January, there is an order of the Judge, directing that as it was necessary to test the property pledged by the debtors this property was to be tested by the Nazir of the Mnnsif's Court and the Nazir was directed to submit his report in regard to the sufficiency of the property as security on or before the 27th January ; and the sale, the order proceeds, was accordingly adjourned to the 27th instant. On the 27th it was recorded that the report of the Nazir had not yet been received and that the sale stood adjourned, to the 1st February On the 1st February the report of the Nazir would seem to have been received. 4. There is an order of that date of the District Judge stating that the security offered was altogether insufficient and that he therefore refused to stay execution and he also directed that the sale should proceed. 4. There is an order of that date of the District Judge stating that the security offered was altogether insufficient and that he therefore refused to stay execution and he also directed that the sale should proceed. On the same day, the property in dispute in these appeals was sold and purchased by the decree-holders. Subsequently on the 2nd March the judgment-debtors made the applications under sec. 311, C. P. C., out of which these appeals arise. The irregularities of which he complained were, firstly, that the sale proclamations had not, in compliance with the provisions of sec. 287 read with sec. 274 of the Code, been fixed upon the property to be sold ; secondly, it was contended that the provisions of sec. 291 of the Code had been violated inasmuch as there had been a postponement of the sale for more than seven days without the issue of a fresh sale proclamation, and then he also complained that the orders postponing the sale were improper as they had been made to depend upon contingencies and that it was impossible under the circumstances that intending buyers could know at what time the sale would take place. There was another objection also based on the fact that in the orders by which the sale was postponed there was no hour fixed at which the sale should take place. 5. The learned Judge, before whom these objections were taken, overruled them. He was of opinion that, though in point of fact the sale which had been originally fixed for the 15th January 1900 did not take place till the 1st February, the total period having been made up of several short adjournments, none of which amounted to seven days, the provisions of sec. 291 did not apply to the case. In regard to the second matter he expresses no definite opinion though his order would lead one to suppose that he accepted the evidence put forward by the judgment-debtors in order to show that the service of the proclamation had not been in compliance with the provisions of the law. But he says that even if the proclamation was not duly served, that circumstance had not prejudiced the judgment- debtors. 6. But he says that even if the proclamation was not duly served, that circumstance had not prejudiced the judgment- debtors. 6. Then on the question of inadequacy of price his opinion appears to have been that the price was inadequate, but he attributed the inadequacy not to the irregularities in the publication of the sale to which reference has been made but to what he terms the numerous adjournments granted at the instance of the Petitioners and so he disallowed the application and confirmed the sale. 7. Now in our opinion the objections taken by the judgment-debtors to the sale are well-founded. On the evidence which has been placed before us on their behalf and which is altogether unrebutted by any evidence in the other side, it is clear that the sale proclamation was not fixed upon the property which was afterwards sold. One of the witnesses for the judgment-debtors who is a resident of the locality states that he never saw the proclamation at all. Another of his witnesses states that he did see the proclamation but that it was fixed to a school house upon the property not of the judgment-debtor but of the decree-holder at a distance of some half-a-mile from the judgment-debtor's property. It is clear that such a mode of serving a proclamation violates the principles on which the law on that subject is founded. And we have no hesitation in holding that there was in this respect a material irregularity in the publishing of the sale. 8. As to the second objection there appears to be only one direct authority, if it may be so called upon the point. In the case of Satish Chunder Rai Chowdhuri v. Thomas I. L. R. 11 Cal. 658 (1885), when the question came under consideration and Mr. Justice Field in delivering the judgment of the Court says this--"The irregularity alleged is this. The sale was originally fixed for the 20th May 1884. On that date an application was made by certain of the judgment-debtors (other than the minors, who are Appellants before us) for a postponement which was granted to the 20th May. On this latter date the judgment-debtor again applied for a postponement which was granted to 2nd June 1884. The sale was originally fixed for the 20th May 1884. On that date an application was made by certain of the judgment-debtors (other than the minors, who are Appellants before us) for a postponement which was granted to the 20th May. On this latter date the judgment-debtor again applied for a postponement which was granted to 2nd June 1884. It is said that these postponements made a postponement for more than seven days, being as a matter of fact a postponement of 12 days ; and that the subsequent sale without a fresh proclamation was a violation of the provisions of sec. 291, C. P. C. I should be disposed to agree with this contention and to say that there was an irregularity so far as regards the minors who were not parties to the application for postponement." 9. Now it might at first sight appear that had the objection been raised by the persons who had applied for the postponement and who were sui juris, the view of the Court might have been otherwise. The probabilities, however, are that, as is usually done in cases of the kind, the applicants have, as a condition of the postponement, waived their right to a fresh proclamation. There is nothing, it is true, in the report of the case to indicate expressly that this was so; but I am unable to perceive what difference in principle it could make whether the persons applying for the postponement were or were not sui juris. The question simply was whether a series of postponements less than seven days which taken in the aggregate amounted to more than seven days were equivalent in the sense of sec. 291 to a postponement for more than seven days. If not the minors could not have availed themselves of the provisions of sec. 291 and we take it therefore that we may properly infer from the passage referred to that in the view of the learned Judges where there is a series of short postponements which amounted in the aggregate to more than seven days a fresh proclamation of sale would be necessary under the provisions of sec. 291. 291 and we take it therefore that we may properly infer from the passage referred to that in the view of the learned Judges where there is a series of short postponements which amounted in the aggregate to more than seven days a fresh proclamation of sale would be necessary under the provisions of sec. 291. Independently of this case that, in our opinion, also would be so, and we certainly think that the failure in the present instance to issue a fresh proclamation of sale after the postponement of the sale to the 1st February was a material irregularity in the sense of sec. 311 of the Code. 10. In support of the other contentions raised by the Appellants the learned Counsel who appears on their behalf has cited the case of Surnomoyee Debi v. Dakhina Ranjan Sanyal I. L. R. 24 Cal. 291 (1896). There the sale was set aside on the ground not only that the orders of postponement involved a contingency somewhat resembling those contended for in the present case, but the learned Judges also insisted more than once in the judgment on the fact that the hour at which the sale would be held had not been mentioned in the order of postponements. The case, no doubt, supports the contention of the Appellants, but we consider it unnecessary to pursue the point further since the other irregularities to which we have referred are quite sufficient to vitiate the sale provided it be shown that the price fetched at the sale was inadequate and that the inadequacy resulted from the irregularities. As to whether the price was inadequate we have the evidence of two witnesses on behalf of the judgment-debtors and that evidence stands uncontradicted for I may mention, as I should have mentioned earlier, that the decree-holders have not adduced any evidence in support of their case. Now the judgment-debtor's interest in the 5 annas share of the howla with which appeal No. 165 is concerned was sold for Rs. 550 and in the other case the price realized was Rs. 300. There is evidence that the actual value of the two properties was from Rs. 2,500 to Rs. 4,000. There was therefore a very substantial difference between the price fetched and the actual value of the property. 550 and in the other case the price realized was Rs. 300. There is evidence that the actual value of the two properties was from Rs. 2,500 to Rs. 4,000. There was therefore a very substantial difference between the price fetched and the actual value of the property. One of the witnesses for the judgment-debtors states that he himself was prepared to bid up to Rs. 1,500 or Rs. 1,700 for the 5 annas share. Moreover, as already observed, the learned Judge appears to have taken the view that the price realized by the sale was inadequate and it remains therefore only to be seen whether that inadequacy resulted from the irregularities complained of in the publishing of the sale. It appears from the bid-sheet that there were only two bidders present at the sale. One of them was the decree-holder himself and the other a person who it is suggested though there is no evidence to support the suggestion, was a creature of the decree-holders But we think from the evidence of the two witnesses to whose depositions reference has been made above that had they known when the sale would be held they would have been present and bid for the property, and one of these persons is I have already mentioned was prepared to give a substantial sum for one of the properties. I may mention here incidentally that an application was made by the judgment-debtors to the District Judge for the summoning of certain other witnesses for the purpose as we are informed of showing that other persons also would have attended the sale had they known when it was to be held. 11. On this application the learned District Judge passed no order but the witnesses in question were not summoned. There is however, we think, sufficient evidence on the record to show that a very much higher price might have been fetched for these properties and a price very nearly approaching their asserted value had it been known that the sale was to take place upon the 1st February. And we think that we are justified therefore, in following the principle adopted by the Court in the case already referred to Surnomoyee Debi v. Dakhina Ranjan Sanyal I. L. R. 24 Cal. And we think that we are justified therefore, in following the principle adopted by the Court in the case already referred to Surnomoyee Debi v. Dakhina Ranjan Sanyal I. L. R. 24 Cal. 291 (1896) in inferring, as a matter of fact, that the inadequacy of price was due to the paucity of bidders which was directly the result of the irregularities in the publishing of the sale upon which the judgment-debtor has placed reliance. This being so, we have no alternative but to reverse the order of the learned Judge conferring the sales and to set those sales aside. The appeal will be accordingly decreed with costs in both Courts. We assess the costs of this Court at 4 gold mohurs in each appeal.