JUDGMENT 1. This was an appeal from a decision of the District Judge of Jessore, dated the 12th of July 1900, dismissing an application under sec. 50 of the Probate and Administration Act in which the Petitioner, the present Appellant, sought to set aside letters of administration granted to the opposite party, on the ground that she had submitted a false inventory and has been wasting the estate of the deceased. The learned District Judge dismissed the application on the ground that Petitioner had no locus standi and that accordingly it was not necessary to proceed with the case. This order has now been appealed against on the ground that the applicant before the District Judge was the sister's son of the deceased and was therefore the presumptive reversioner to the property and accordingly had a locus standi and an interest in the estate which justified him in applying for revocation of the letters of administration. In support of this contention our attention has been called to the case of In the petition of Hurro Lal Shaha : Kamona Soondary Dasi v. Hurro Lal Shaha ILR 8 Cal. 570 (1882) and the case of Khettramoni Dassi v. Shyama Churn Kundu ILR 21 Cal. 539 (1894). The former of these cases seems exactly in point. The applicant in that case was the sister's son of the deceased. He was the next presumptive reversioner, and it was therefore held that he had a right to apply for revocation of probate. 2. The next case is also in point, showing that a presumptive reversioner has a right to apply under sec. 50 of the Probate and Administration Act. 3. The learned pleader for the Respondent cites the case of Kishen Dai v. Satyendra Nath Dutt I.I.R. 28 Cal. 441 (1901). But we do not think that this case has any material bearing on the question before us. We think, therefore, upon the rulings cited by the learned pleader for the Appellant, that we must set aside the order of the District Judge and remand the case to him for trial. 4. The case is accordingly remanded to the District Judge to be tried on the merits. The costs will abide the result, the pleader's fee in this Court being assessed at two gold mohurs.