Judgement Appeal from a decree of the above Court (April 29, 1899) affirming a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Barabanki (Aug. 24, 1898). The Courts below decreed specific performance of a contract dated August 31, 1897, by the second appellant, the Nawab, to sell the property in suit to the respondent; by cancelment of conveyance to the first appellant, the Raja, who was found to be not a bona fide purchaser, inasmuch as he bought with full knowledge of the contract of sale sued upon; and by executing a sale deed in pursuance of the said contract and in accordance with a certain draft sale deed dated September 2, 1897. The decree of the Appellate Court was simply that the appeal be dismissed with costs. The Raja petitioned for leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council, and on July 7, 1899, the Court granted leave to appeal, with the following remarks " This Court held that the contract for sale of the 31st August, 1897, was established, that the alleged approved draft conveyance put forward by the plaintiffs was not proved, that that approved draft was not an essential portion of the plaintiffs case, and that under the plaintiffs claim for general relief he could obtain a decree for specific performance by the execution of any sufficient conveyance. The draft conveyance put forward by Nawab Kasim Ali Khan originally differed only on one point from the draft conveyance put forward by the plaintiff. It excepted from the sale a dewan-khana belonging to the vendor, which exception finds no place in the draft conveyance put forward by the plaintiff. Certain amendments in the interest of the vendor which do not appear in the plaintiffs draft appear on the face of Nawab Kasim Alis draft. The plaintiff conceded that, on the merits, the amendments were proper amendments, and therefore the only material difference in the two drafts was the exception of a dewan-khana from sale to be found in Nawab Kasim Ali Khans draft conveyance. This Court has, there fore, not affirmed the decision of the Subordinate Judge, in so far as he held that the draft conveyance put forward by the plaintiff was established. It is, therefore, unnecessary in this case to inquire whether the appeal involves any substantial question of law. This Court has, there fore, not affirmed the decision of the Subordinate Judge, in so far as he held that the draft conveyance put forward by the plaintiff was established. It is, therefore, unnecessary in this case to inquire whether the appeal involves any substantial question of law. The case, as regards value and nature, fulfils the requirements of s. 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure." The certificate was framed as follows — "Certified that the above case fulfils the requirements of s. 596, Act XIV. of 1882, as regards value and nature, inasmuch as the value of the subject-matter of the suit in the Court of first instance was Rs.10,000, and the value of the matter in dispute on appeal to Her Majestys Privy Council also exceeds that amount, and as the decree appealed from does not affirm the decision of the Court immediately below. "This certificate is granted to Raja Tasadduq Rasul Khan and Nawab Kasim Ali Khan under b. 602, Act XIV. of 1882." De Gruyther, for the appellants. Mayne for the respondent, took a preliminary objection to the admission of the appeal by the Judicial Commissioners Court. The Court was in error in holding that there had been any finding by the Appellate Court that the draft conveyance had not been proved, and also in holding that the decision of the Court below had not been affirmed by a decree which simply dismissed the appeal with costs. The Judicial Commissioner had no power to grant leave to appeal unless the appeal involved, and was certified by the Court as involving, some substantial question. There was no substantial question of law. It was one of pure fact, in reference to which the law applicable did not admit of question, and the Court refused to inquire whether that was so or not. He referred to Banarsi Parshad v. Kashi Krishna Narain (( 1900) L. R. 28 Ind. Ap. 11) and Radha Krishn Das v. Rai Krishn Chand. (( 1901) L. R. 28 Ind. Ap. 182.) De Gruyther, for the appellant, contended that the Court below when it admitted the appeal was right in saying that it had not affirmed the decision of the Subordinate Judge in so far as he held that the draft conveyance put forward by the plaintiff was established. (( 1901) L. R. 28 Ind. Ap. 182.) De Gruyther, for the appellant, contended that the Court below when it admitted the appeal was right in saying that it had not affirmed the decision of the Subordinate Judge in so far as he held that the draft conveyance put forward by the plaintiff was established. The Court was the best interpreter of its own judgment, and on that interpretation it was unnecessary to inquire if the appeal involved any substantial question of law. The word " decision " in s. 596 does not mean merely the actual decree; it points to the judgment of the Court, and, if the judgments proceed upon different findings or reasons, the appeal lies as of right according to the true interpretation of the section. And but for the interpretation put upon their judgment and impliedly upon this section by the Court below, the appellant could have put forward substantial questions of law, from which he ought not under the circumstances to be debarred from now relying. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD DAVEY. A preliminary objection has been taken by Mr. Mayne, on behalf of the respondents, to the hearing of this appeal by their Lordships, on the ground that the order giving leave to appeal was not in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure. The certificate is in these terms— Certified that the above case fulfils the requirements of section 596, Act XIV. of 1882, as regards value and nature, inasmuch as the value of the subject-matter of the suit in the Court of first instance was upwards of Rs.10,000, and the value of the matter in dispute on appeal to Her Majestys Privy Council also exceeds that amount, and as the decree appealed from does not affirm the Court immediately below." Mr. Mayne contends that the statement that the decree appealed from does not affirm the decision of the Court immediately below is erroneous, or can only be made correct by shewing that the learned judges who gave the certificate in that form misinterpreted the words of s. 596 of the Civil Procedure Code. He points out that in this suit, which was a suit for specific performance of an agreement, the Court below decreed specific performance. He points out that in this suit, which was a suit for specific performance of an agreement, the Court below decreed specific performance. There was an appeal by the defendants (the present appellants), and the only order of the Appellate Court, the decree which is in fact appealed from, is one which simply dismisses the appeal. It says " It is ordered and decreed that this appeal be dismissed, and the respondents costs of this appeal, amounting to Rs.412 only, as noted below, are to be paid by Nawab Kasim Ali Khan and Raja Tassadduq Rasul Khan, appellants, to Babu Manik Chand, respondent." It is, however, argued by Mr. De Gruyther, on behalf of the appellants, that that is an erroneous reading and interpretation of the 596th section that the interpretation put upon that section by the learned judges is the correct one. The words of the section are these "And where the decree appealed from affirms the decision of the Court immediately below the Court passing such decree, the appeal must involve some substantial question of law." Mr. De Gruyther says, and it appears from the learned judges judgment that they took the same point, that " decision " does not mean the decision of the Court, or the decree made by the Court, but means the reasons given by the Court for their decree, although the decision in each case may be different. If the reasons are not the same in respect of some matter of fact, say the learned judges, and, says Mr. De Gruyther, the decree appealed from does not affirm the decision of the Court immediately below. The facts of this case as stated by the learned judges are these. They say the Court of first instance found that a certain contract of sale was proved, and that a certain draft conveyance put forward by the plaintiffs was also proved. De Gruyther, the decree appealed from does not affirm the decision of the Court immediately below. The facts of this case as stated by the learned judges are these. They say the Court of first instance found that a certain contract of sale was proved, and that a certain draft conveyance put forward by the plaintiffs was also proved. Then they say it was found by the Appellate Court that the contract was established, but " that the alleged approved draft conveyance put forward by the plaintiff was not proved, that that approved draft was not an essential portion of the plaintiffs case, and that under the plaintiffs claim for general relief he could obtain a decree for specific performance by the execution of any sufficient conveyance." They therefore dismissed the appeal, and affirmed the decree and the decision of the suit by the Court below. Now there is no definition of the word " decision " in the Civil Procedure Code, but there is a definition of the word "decree." It "says decree means the formal expression of an adjudication upon any right claimed or defence set up in a civil Court when such adjudication, so far as regards the Court expressing it, decides the suit or appeal." Then " judgment" is defined as meaning " the statement given by the judge of the grounds of a decree or order." Therefore their Lordships have two things they have a decree which decides the suit, and they have the word "judgment," meaning the statement of the grounds upon which the learned judge or the Court proceeds to make the decree. Mr. De Gruyther appears to wish to give the word " decision " the same meaning as the word "judgment," and he says that it is necessary that the Appellate Court should not only affirm the decree made by the Court below, but should also affirm the grounds of fact upon which that judgment was passed. Their Lordships cannot come to that conclusion. They think that the natural, obvious, and prima facie meaning of the word "decision" is decision of the suit by the Court, and that that meaning should be given to it in the section. Their Lordships cannot come to that conclusion. They think that the natural, obvious, and prima facie meaning of the word "decision" is decision of the suit by the Court, and that that meaning should be given to it in the section. It was said that there was some practice in India which puts a different meaning on the section; but their Lordships are not satisfied that that is so; they feel themselves free to decide in the way that has been mentioned. They will therefore hold that this certificate, understood and interpreted by the light of the judgment given by the judges, does not comply with s. 596, because it appears that the decree appealed from does affirm the decision of the Court below, and the certificate does not find that the appeal involved any substantial question of law. It was suggested by Mr. De Gruyther that he might amend the certificate in that respect, and he stated to the Court what were the questions of law which in his opinion arose. Their Lordships think that that course would be irregular, and that the proper course would have been, if the parties intended to appeal on that ground, to have obtained a certificate from the Court of the Judicial Commissioner that there was some substantial question of law. Their Lordships, therefore, think that the preliminary objection succeeds, and that the appeal ought to be dismissed, and they will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly. The appellant must pay the costs of the appeal. Note.—On the conclusion of the judgment their Lordships intimated that they would withhold their report to His Majesty for three months, to enable the appellant to apply to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner for a certificate that the appeal involved a substantial question of law. The appellant having failed to obtain such certificate, their Lordships, on November 12, 1902, intimated that their report would be submitted to His Majesty at the next meeting of the Privy Council.