JUDGMENT Stevens and Harington, JJ. - We think that the Rule issued on the Municipal Magistrate and the Chairman of the Corporation of Calcutta to show cause why the order made by the former on the 3rd March last, directing that a certain quantity of rice be destroyed, should not be set aside, must be made absolute. 2. The facts of the case are that a man named Chundra Coomar Biswas purchased some damaged rice over the side of a ship. A fire had broken out on board the ship and a part of the cargo, which consisted of rice, had been damaged by both fire and water. This was sold over the ship's side for what it would fetch and was purchased by the Petitioner. Out of the 5,000 maunds which he purchased, he took a small quantity away to dry and left the remainder in the Kidderpore Docks. On the 1st March (the sale having taken place on the 27th February), a sample of this rice was taken and an order was made by the Magistrate prohibiting the Petitioner from dealing with the rice. Subsequently, the case was tried before the Magistrate under the Calcutta Municipal Act of 1899 and under the provisions of Section 505 of that Act the Magistrate made an order for the destruction of, the rice in question and that is the order which the Petitioner now seeks to set aside. 3. In order to justify an order u/s 505 the Magistrate has to be satisfied that the article directed to be destroyed comes within the provisions of Section 502 of the Municipal Act. He is to be satisfied that the article is either exposed or hawked about for sale or deposited in or brought to any place for the purpose of sale or of preparation for sale and is intended for human food. We think that it is, to say the least of it, extremely doubtful on the facts of this case whether the Magistrate could have held that the rice in question was deposited in or brought to any place for the purpose of sale or of preparation for sale and was intended for human food. We think that it is, to say the least of it, extremely doubtful on the facts of this case whether the Magistrate could have held that the rice in question was deposited in or brought to any place for the purpose of sale or of preparation for sale and was intended for human food. The learned Counsel who has appeared to show cause against the Rule falls back on the latter part of the section and argues that the onus of showing that the article was not deposited or brought for any such purpose, or was not intended for human food, is placed upon the party charged and that the Magistrate was justified in coming to the conclusion that this rice was so brought and intended for sale for human food. But the evidence on the record is that the Petitioner stated that the rice was intended for sale as food for pigs and he proved that he had entered into a contract with the owner of a large piggery for the sale of the rice in question to him. In our opinion, even assuming that the contentions of the learned Counsel were correct and that the Magistrate could have found on the evidence that the case fell u/s 502, this evidence is amply sufficient to discharge any onus which may have rested on the shoulders of the party charged. 4. The contract in question was made on the 2nd March. It is argued that that is a circumstance which indicates that it was made for the purpose of manufacturing evidence. In our view it is equally open to the construction that it indicates the bona fides of the Petitioner in making an arrangement to get rid of the rice for a perfectly legitimate purpose at the earliest possible opportunity. As the case stands, there is no evidence that this rice was ever intended for human consumption. There is evidence and evidence which appears to us to be satisfactory that it was intended for the consumption of pigs. 5. There is a further difficulty which stands in the way of the Magistrate's order and that is that his judgment contains no finding that the rice was brought for the purpose of sale, or that it was intended for human food. 5. There is a further difficulty which stands in the way of the Magistrate's order and that is that his judgment contains no finding that the rice was brought for the purpose of sale, or that it was intended for human food. Before he could have made the order that he has made, he would have been obliged to find these facts affirmatively. He does not find them and he does not, as far as can be ascertained from the judgment, disbelieve the case set up on behalf of the Petitioner. His finding is that there is always a risk, that is to say, the rice may be sold for human consumption to poorer classes, or may be used in a flour mill worked by unscrupulous persons. The fact that this danger exists does not justify the order which has been made. If any attempt is made to sell this rice for consumption by the poorer classes, then it would be the duty of the Corporation to step in and stop such a sale. But until some such attempt is made the Corporation, in our opinion, is not justified in destroying the property of a man who is disposing of that property in a way which is perfectly legitimate. 6. The result, therefore, is that we make the rule absolute, setting aside the order of the Municipal Magistrate dated the 3rd March last.