JUDGMENT 1. The Suit, out of which this appeal arises, is one for contribution. The facts are that the Defendant No. 2 borrowed a certain sum of money and mortgaged the properties Nos. 1 to 4 for this debt. The mortgagee sued on his mortgage and obtained a decree dated the 27th May 1898. By this decree it was ordered that the properties Nos. 341--9 and 7 should be sold first, and that if any balance remained due after the sale of these properties it should be realized by the sale of the remaining properties. The Plaintiff purchased a share in Estate No. 341--9 on the 25th March 1899. The property No. 341--9 was put up to auction in execution of the mortgage decree on the 4th April 1899, and the Plaintiff paid off the mortgage decree, which was for a sum of Rs. 9,300 and now sues the purchasers of the remaining properties for contribution. The Subordinate Judge has dismissed the suit holding that the Plaintiff is not entitled to contribution. The Plaintiff appeals and on his behalf it has been contended that he is entitled to contribution. It has been urged that the Plaintiff is entitled to have the properties valued and a decree passed against each of the purchasers for a proportionate amount of the sum paid by the Plaintiff to satisfy the mortgage decree. In support of his argument the learned pleader for the Appellants has cited the cases of Jagat Narain v. Qutub Husain I. L. R. 2 All. 807 (1880) and Chagandas v. Gansing I. L. R. 20 Bom. 615 (1895). We are of opinion that the judgment of the Subordinate Judge is right, and that the Plaintiff is not entitled to contribution for the following reasons :-- From sec. 82 of the Transfer of Property Act it is clear that mortgaged properties are only liable to contribute ratably to a mortgage debt "in the absence of a contract to the contrary;" so in Storey's Equity Jurisprudence, para. 498, it is said : "Although the general rule is that there shall be contributions between sureties by the rule of equality, that may be modified by the terms of such contract in giving or refusing contribution." Again In re Dunlop 21 Ch. Div. 498, it is said : "Although the general rule is that there shall be contributions between sureties by the rule of equality, that may be modified by the terms of such contract in giving or refusing contribution." Again In re Dunlop 21 Ch. Div. 583 (1882) it has been pointed out "that in order that a right to contribution may exist the two properties must be equally liable." Now in this case, although all the properties may have originally been equally liable for the mortgage debt, this was altered by the mortgage decree by which the incidence of the debt was thrown primarily on properties Nos. 341--9 and 7, and the other properties were only liable, if the debt was not realised by their sale. This arrangement was made by the parties to the mortgage decree. The mortgagee's vakil, the then Plaintiff, expressly gave his consent to it. Now the Plaintiff purchased the share of the property No. 341--9 subsequently to this decree. He therefore bought it, as he bought only a share of an estate, subject to the mortgage and to this arrangement with regard to it; and whatever may have been his right if such a decree had not been passed, he cannot now call upon the purchasers of the other properties to contribute except as provided in that decree. 2. Furthermore, as pointed out by the Subordinate Judge, the Plaintiff himself stopped the sale by paying off the mortgage decree. He should have let the property No. 341--9 be sold and should have bought it in. Had he done so, the other properties might have been sold in the manner provided in the decree but he cannot, by paying off the decree, make them liable for the mortgage debt, when it was arranged between the parties to the mortgage suit and the mortgagee that it was only in certain circumstances, which have not arisen, that the properties other than 341 would be liable. 3. The facts of the two cases cited by the learned pleader for the Appellant are totally different from those of the present case. In neither of them was there any arrangement between the parties to the mortgage suit altering the incidence of the mortgage debt and casting it primarily on some only of the mortgaged properties. 3. The facts of the two cases cited by the learned pleader for the Appellant are totally different from those of the present case. In neither of them was there any arrangement between the parties to the mortgage suit altering the incidence of the mortgage debt and casting it primarily on some only of the mortgaged properties. In this case it is to be noted the property No. 341--9 was to be sold first and then No. 7, and only in case of the amount realized by the sale of these two properties in their numerical order being insufficient to satisfy the debt, were the other properties to be proceeded against. In these circumstances we must affirm the decree of the lower Court and dismiss this appeal, which we accordingly do with costs to the Defendants who have appeared, in proportion to the amounts claimed against them.