JUDGMENT 1. The dispute in this case is about the succession to the office of the Mahanth of a religious institution or Asthal, known as the Barhampore-Paita Asthal belonging to a sect of Vaishnavas of the Ramanandi class. The Plaintiff and the Defendant each claims to be the only chela or spiritual disciple of the former Mahanth Alak Dass who died on the 15th July 1897. The case of the Plaintiff is that the former Mahanth Alak Dass initiated him and made him a chela on the Ramnaumi day of 1303, F. S., 22nd March 1896, and that at that time Alak Das had no other chela. He had before that day been a novice at the Asthal for about eighteen months. After his initiation be continued to be at the Asthal serving his preceptor and on his death he stepped into the office of Mahanth as be was entitled to do. He was confirmed in the office by a deed dated the 27th July 1897, executed by Mahanth Ram Charan Dass, the superior of the Mirzapur Asthal, another religious institution of the same order of Vaishnavas, and was installed by the said Mahanth and other Mahanths of the same order in the neighbourhood. The Plaintiff alleges that the Barhampore-Paita Asthal is subordinate to the Mirzapur Asthal, they being both Asthals of the ascetics of the Lashkari order of the Ramanandi sect, and that thus the appointment to the office of the Mahanth of the former rests with the Mahanth of the latter. The Plaintiff denies that the Defendant was an ascetic and asserted that he was never a chela of Mahanth Alak Dass, and that he had no right to succeed to the office of the Mahanth of the Barhampore-Paita Asthal. 2. The Defendant, on the other hand, says that the Plaintiff was never an ascetic and a chela of Mahanth Alak Dass and had no right to succeed him. His case is that he was the only chela of Mahanth Alak Dass having been initiated by him on the Janamastami day in 1283, F. S., and that he was installed by him as Mahanth a few days before his death, according to the custom and practice of the institution. He further says that he was a sister's son of Alak Dass and has been an ascetic since he arrived at the age of discretion and has never married. He further says that he was a sister's son of Alak Dass and has been an ascetic since he arrived at the age of discretion and has never married. He denies that the Barhampore-Paita Asthal is subordinate to the Mirzapur Asthal and asserts that his Asthal belongs to the Baihrami order of the Ramanandi sect and not the Lashkari. 3. The right of succession to the property left by the deceased head of a religious institution depends upon custom and practice which must be proved by evidence in each case Greedharee Doss v. Nundo Kissore Doss 11 M. I. A. 405(1867), Genda Puri v. Chatar Puri I. L. R. 9 All. 1 (1886) Ramalingam Pillai v. Vythilingam Pillai I. L. R. 16 Mad 490 (1893). But no issue was raised in this case as to the custom and practice applicable to this particular institution. It seems to have been taken for granted that the Plaintiff in order to Succeed must make out that he was an ascetic (bairagi) and a chela of the former Mahanth. That a chela is primarily entitled to succeed a Mahanth of the sanyasi sect who has to follow a life of celibacy is borne out by the authorities, the text of the sages as well as the commentators and the numerous decided cases on the point. It was so held as early as 1807 by the Sudder Diwani Adalat at Calcutta in Ganes Gir v. Umroo Gir 1 S. D. A. 291 (1807). This view of the law on the ordinary custom and practice was supported by the Pandits on the authority of the texts referred to by them in the case of Mahanth Rammoy Dass v. Mahanth Debraj Dass 6 S. D. A. 262 and has ever since been followed (see also Mohunt Sheo Prokash Doss v. Mohunt Joyram Doss 5 W. R. Mis. 57 (1866), Genda Puri v. Chatar Puri I. L. R. 9 All. 1 (1886), Janoki Debi v. Gopal Acharjia Goswami I. L. R. 9 Cal. 766 (1882). Plaintiff's witness Mahanth Ram Dass says : "No other person can become a Mahanth while a chela exists." 4. Where there are more chelas than one custom and practice intervene. The guru or last incumbent may in some cases nominate his successor from amongst his chelas, and in other the eldest chela may succeed. 766 (1882). Plaintiff's witness Mahanth Ram Dass says : "No other person can become a Mahanth while a chela exists." 4. Where there are more chelas than one custom and practice intervene. The guru or last incumbent may in some cases nominate his successor from amongst his chelas, and in other the eldest chela may succeed. In some Asthal the succession depends upon election from amongst the chelas by the superiors of other similar Asthals. The reigning king has occasionally the right to elect from amongst the chelas of the last Mahanth. Other consideration arise when the last Mahanth dies without leaving any chela. 5. In the present case the parties do not allege that Mahanth Alak Dass left him surviving more than one chela. Each asserts that he was the only chela. The first and the more important issue in the case therefore is, whether the Plaintiff was chela of Mahanth Alak Dass. The Plaintiff must make out a primd facie case that he was a chela and the only chela. This is the main question argued before us. 6. Mahanth Alak Dass was the chela of Mahanth Jaggernath Dass who died on the 13th September 1875. Jaggernath Dass had incumbered the property of the religious institution of which he was the head with some debts, and they had to be paid up ; and some money had also to be borrowed by Alak Dass for the performance of the bhandara or funeral ceremony of his preceptor. Having succeeded to the office of Mahanth, Alak Dass executed for the advances made and to be made by Lachhuman Dass, the then Mahanth of Mirzapur Asthal, an ekrarnama dated the 17th September 1875, in favor of the latter agreeing inter alia, "that the Barhampore-Paita Asthal should be under the superintendence of the Mahanths of the Mirzapur Asthal and that on his (Alak Dass's) death the Mahanth of the. Mirzapur Asthal would appoint any person he pleased to be the Gaddinashin Mahanth of the Barhampore-Paita Asthal whether he was a chela or not." It also appears that Lachhuman Dass actually satisfied the debts covered by the bonds dated the 5th Jeyt 1281, 14th Jeyt 1281 and 9th October 1874, shortly after the execution of the aforesaid ekrarnama. 7. Mirzapur Asthal would appoint any person he pleased to be the Gaddinashin Mahanth of the Barhampore-Paita Asthal whether he was a chela or not." It also appears that Lachhuman Dass actually satisfied the debts covered by the bonds dated the 5th Jeyt 1281, 14th Jeyt 1281 and 9th October 1874, shortly after the execution of the aforesaid ekrarnama. 7. On the death of Alak Dass, which, as we have seen, took place on the 15th July 1897, Mahanth Ram Charan Dass, the then Mahanth of Mirzapur Asthal, stepped in, and in exercise of the power conferred by the ekrarnama executed a deed dated the 27th July 1897, appointing thereby the Plaintiff who is therein described as chela of Alak Dass, the Mahanth of the Barhampore-Paita Asthal. The second question raised in the case refers to the validity of this ekrarnama of the 17th September 1875 and of the appointment of the Plaintiff in the exercise of the power conferred by it to the Mahanth of the Mirzapur Asthal. But it seems to us that the Plaintiff cannot rely upon this appointment. The ekrarnama of the 17th September 1875 shows that Alak Dass had been a chela of Mahanth Jaggernath Dass and that Jaggernath Dass had invested him with the chader, kanthi and tilak of Mahanthship thereby nominating and installing him as his successor. This mode of appointing a successor from out of the chelas is well known and indicates the custom and practice of the Barhampore-Paita Asthal. Mahanth Alak Dass had no power to ignore this custom and practice of election and give to the Mahanth of Mirzapur the right of naming or appointing his own successor. The contract was so far ultra vires. There is not the slightest evidence to show that according to the custom of the Asthal it was within the power of any Mahanth to give such a power to a stranger. In fact it is conceded, as it must be, that none but a chela of the former Mahanth could be elected his successor. It is now well established law that an ascetic, a mere life-tenant, cannot alter the succession to the trust by an act of his own in connection with the status under which he originally acquired the trust [Mohunt Rumun Dass v. Mohunt Ashbul Dass 1 W. R. 160 (1864), Rup Narain Singh v. Junko Bye 3 C. L. R. 112(1878)]. It is now well established law that an ascetic, a mere life-tenant, cannot alter the succession to the trust by an act of his own in connection with the status under which he originally acquired the trust [Mohunt Rumun Dass v. Mohunt Ashbul Dass 1 W. R. 160 (1864), Rup Narain Singh v. Junko Bye 3 C. L. R. 112(1878)]. We therefore think that the Plaintiff cannot rely upon his appointment by Mahanth Ram Charan Dass. It is incumbent upon the Plaintiff to begin his case by proving that he was duly adopted as a chela by Mahanth Alak Dass and his case must fail on his failure to do so. 8. The evidence as to the Plaintiff's adopting, at the tender age of ten or eleven, the order of ascetics and of his initiation as a chela by Mahanth Alak Dass within a year or two is very unsatisfactory. According to the evidence adduced on his behalf, he was at the time of the trial of this case in the Court below at least 14 years old. He had given his evidence about two years before in a case before the Joint Magistrate of Madhubani. But now he has not been produced in Court to state facts which, if they were true, were peculiarly within his own knowledge. If, on the other hand, he had not arrived at the age of discretion at the time that the suit was being tried by the Subordinate Judge, the entire fabric of his case would fall to the ground. We cannot believe that he was initiated if at all at an age when he did not understand the duties and responsibilities of an ascetic and a Mahanth, that he had not attained the age of discretion in 1896. His minority is no ground for his not being examined in this case. His guardian Mahanth Ram Charan Dass has not also tendered his own evidence. He was present in Court at least on one occasion after the trial had commenced; the pleader engaged by him took time to produce him as witness but he failed. No reason has been given of his absence from the witness-box. His guardian Mahanth Ram Charan Dass has not also tendered his own evidence. He was present in Court at least on one occasion after the trial had commenced; the pleader engaged by him took time to produce him as witness but he failed. No reason has been given of his absence from the witness-box. It appears that at the trial of the case under Act VII of 1889 between himself and the Defendant, before the Munsif of Madhubani, for a certificate to collect the debts of the deceased, Ram Charan Dass had given his own testimony, but now it has been withheld without any explanation. The Plaintiff and his guardian were the best persons to speak to his parentage, place of birth, age, the fact of his adopting asceticism and when he did so, and his initiation as chela by Alak Dass. 9. Witness No. 1, Ram Lall Misser, is a man of no position. He says he was present at the Paita Asthal on the night of the Plaintiff's initiation. But he admits that he made no enquiries either then or at any time about the antecedents or the parentage of the boy. He admits that the important ceremony of initiation was performed in the absence of any other Mahanth, Vaishnavas, Sadhu, Sanyasi or Fakir or oven the zemindar's servants, and he makes statements as to the Defendant Lachhu Dass which are quite unworthy of belief. Neither this witness nor any other examined on behalf of the Plaintiff would disclose his parentage and his previous connection with Mahanth Ram Charan Dass. 10. Witness No. 10, Ishur Jha, is a resident of a different village, Barhampord. He also makes statements similar to Ram Lall Misser. He had gone to the Asthal without any previous intimation as to the ceremony that was to take place. Witness No. 12, Siri Lall Jha, is a resident of Sajoalia, lying at a distance of a mile from Paita. He was also not there for the purpose of being present at this important ceremony. He had gone there for the Ramnaumi festival and the ceremony of initiation was to him accidental. The evidence of Gopi Misser who deposes that he was the purohit is equally unsatisfactory. One Doman Jha is said to have been present there but he has not been called. He had gone there for the Ramnaumi festival and the ceremony of initiation was to him accidental. The evidence of Gopi Misser who deposes that he was the purohit is equally unsatisfactory. One Doman Jha is said to have been present there but he has not been called. There is nothing in the record to show how the Plaintiff got into the Asthal, what the nature of his connection with it was before the Ramnaumi day of 1303, F. S. ; and what part, if any, the Mahanth of Mirzapur took in making him a chela. The Defendant alleged he was a school-boy and a relation of Mahanth Ram Charan Dass and came in with him after the death of Alak Dass. No attempt was made to prove the contrary. 11. These witnesses as well as Nathsani, Darbari Jha, Jokhan Jha, Bikram Lal Dass and Ram Lall Jha, say that they had seen the Plaintiff at the Asthal for periods varying from six to eighteen months before the alleged initiation. The evidence, however, is utterly unworthy of credit. Assuming that the Plaintiff was to be seen at the Barhampore-Paita Asthal, the fact is of little importance as proof of his asceticism or initiation. 12. Considerable reliance is placed by the learned Advocate-General, who has argued the case on behalf of the Plaintiff on the recital in a document, dated the 25th Pous 1304, corresponding to the 14th January 1897, executed by Darbari Jha, about six months before the death of Alak Dass. It is a mortgage for Rs. 98 in favour of the Plaintiff and in it the Plaintiff Ramji Dass is described as the chela of Mahanth Alak Dass. The description of the mortgagee in this deed has not much evidentiary value. Alak Das is no party in the instrument and is not even a witness. But if we believe the mortgagor Darbari Jha, and the attesting witnesses Sunder Jha and Jokhan Jha, that Alak Dass was the real mortgagee and the Plaintiff was his benamdar, the recital may be evidence against Alak Dass and his successor. Darbari, however, had never before borrowed money from Alak Dass; the lands mortgaged are not in Paita, and it is difficult to believe the bold statement of these witnesses that the money advanced came from Alak Das's tehebil. Darbari, however, had never before borrowed money from Alak Dass; the lands mortgaged are not in Paita, and it is difficult to believe the bold statement of these witnesses that the money advanced came from Alak Das's tehebil. They are not of Paita and none of them had any particular connection with the Asthal. Jokhan Jha lived 3 miles off and Sunder Jha 16 miles off, they came to be witnesses to the document most opportunely. There is nothing besides the evidence of these men to connect the document with Alak Dass, and we are not prepared to believe them. The Plaintiffs case is that the books of account and the documents relating to the Asthal properties were with the Defendant, but no explanation has been given as to how the Plaintiff could lay hold of this mortgage and produce it in Court. Darbari Jha and the witnesses make statements as to the stamp, the dates of execution and registration which contradict the document itself. There is no evidence to show who made the draft whether the Mahanth read the draft or the document itself or heard what the contents were. The Plaintiff is said to have brought the money from the tehebil under the Mahanth's order, but he, as we have seen, has not come forward to depose. No enquiry was made as to title or the value of the properties by the Mahanth or any body on his behalf. On the whole we cannot but agree with the Court below in holding that no reliance can be placed on this document as any proof of the Plaintiff's having been a chela of Alak Dass. The document might have been fabricated by the Mahanth of Mirzapur for the purpose of creating evidence. It might, as suggested by the Court below, be a sham transaction. 13. The evidence of the Plaintiff's performing the bhandara ceremony of Alak Dass may be true. But this ceremony took place after the dispute had commenced. The Police had then been informed of the likelihood of a breach of the peace, on account of the dispute between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. We think that both parties had performed the bhandara ceremony. But that fact does not further the case of either. 14. There might also have been the ceremonies for making the Plaintiff as well as the Defendant Guddinashin by the partisans of each. We think that both parties had performed the bhandara ceremony. But that fact does not further the case of either. 14. There might also have been the ceremonies for making the Plaintiff as well as the Defendant Guddinashin by the partisans of each. The Plaintiff was supported by Mahanth Ram Charan Dass, and the latter had come to Paita to assert his right under the ekranama of the 17th September 1875. He had his friends at or near Paita, some of whom have been examined in this case and they might have gone through the sham ceremony of making the Plaintiff Guddinashin Mahanth of the Paita Asthal on the 27th July 1897, the day on which Ram Charan Dass executed the deed of appointment of the Plaintiff. It is doubtful, however, whether they had access into the Asthal. A similar ceremony was most probably performed by the Defendant's party as well. 15. The Plaintiff's case is that he had possession for more than a year and was dispossessed after the decision of the case under Act VII of 1889 to which we have already referred. In that case the Munsif of Madhubani on the 21st February 1898 and the District Judge of Tirhoot on the 28th April. 1898 came to the conclusion that Mahanth Ram Charan Dass, the applicant for certificate to collect the debts, had failed to make out that the Plaintiff was a chela of Mahanth Alak Dass. The evidence as to Plaintiff's possession is very vague and extremely meagre. 16. There is also no evidence to show how the Plaintiff came to be dispossessed notwithstanding that he was backed by the Mahanth of Mirzapur. The truth seems to be that he had never possession and was never dispossessed. He failed to obtain possession of the Asthal and its property at any time before the institution of this suit. 17. In the view we take of the Plaintiff's case, it is not necessary for us to go into the Defendant's evidence or the other issues raised. It is quite immaterial whether the Barhampore-Paita Asthal belong to the Lashkari or the Badhrami sects of the Ramanandi Vaishnavas and whether it is subordinate to the Mirzapur or the Sirsia. Asthal. The Defendant is backed by Mahanth Surjoog Dass of the Sirsia Asthal and it may be that his case as to subordination to Sirsia is unfounded. It is quite immaterial whether the Barhampore-Paita Asthal belong to the Lashkari or the Badhrami sects of the Ramanandi Vaishnavas and whether it is subordinate to the Mirzapur or the Sirsia. Asthal. The Defendant is backed by Mahanth Surjoog Dass of the Sirsia Asthal and it may be that his case as to subordination to Sirsia is unfounded. It is also true that the evidence in proof of Defendant's case is far from being strong. But he has led a bachelor's life for a long time being now over thirty years of age, he is a sister's son of Mahanth Alak Dass and he is old enough to be a Guddinashin Mahanth. The people of Paita are mostly on his side and he is in actual possession. But after all, the infirmity of the title of the Defendant who is in possession cannot help the Plaintiff in a case in which each party has a distinct state of facts to prove. The Plaintiff has failed to make out a primd facie case of his having been made a chela. A boy Mahanth, a superior of a religious institution of ascetics, who has not attained even his sixteenth year, the age of majority, according to the Hindu law, is a sight of unusual occurrence. On the whole, therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Subordinate Judge, and dismiss the appeal with costs.