JUDGMENT 1. The plaint in this suit was rejected by the Subordinate Judge of Cuttack on the ground of misjoinder of causes of action and of Defendants. In appeal the District Judge, while agreeing with the Subordinate Judge that as a matter of strict law each infringement of the Plaintiff's right is a separate cause of action, was of opinion that the rule against multifariousness is in the main one of convenience, and that the Court has a considerable discretion in dealing with the matter. He observed that all the Defendants had one principal defence in common, though they might each have different minor defences, and on the balance of convenience he held that all the matters in issue should be disposed of in one suit. He accordingly reversed the Subordinate Judge's finding on the preliminary issue and remanded the case for decision on the merits. The Defendants appeal to this Court under cl. 28 of sec. 588, C. P. C. A preliminary objection is taken on behalf of the Plaintiff that no appeal lies, it being urged that while an order rejecting a plaint is expressly included within the definition of "decree" in sec. 2 of the Code, the definition does not embrace an order refusing to allow a plaint to be rejected. 2. This is, however, not a second appeal under sec. 584 against a decree but a first appeal under sec. 588 against an order passed under sec. 562. Such an appeal is expressly allowed, and that being so, this Court must consider whether or no there were valid grounds for ordering the remand. Now let us see what is the nature of the Plaintiff's case, Krishna Mohun and Gour Mohun were two brothers. The former died in 1290 or 17 years before suit. His widow, the Plaintiff, claims the ownership through her late husband of half the family property and alleges that her rights were infringed at different times and by different sets of Defendants under circumstances which are set out in the judgment of the Subordinate Judge. 3. There are four properties in suit and there are three sets of Defendants, Defendants Nos. 1 and 7 having acquired property No. 1, Defendant No. 3 through his father having acquired properties Nos. 2 and 3, and Defendants Nos. 3. There are four properties in suit and there are three sets of Defendants, Defendants Nos. 1 and 7 having acquired property No. 1, Defendant No. 3 through his father having acquired properties Nos. 2 and 3, and Defendants Nos. 4, 5 and 6 having obtained property No. 4, each at different sales in execution of different decrees brought against Gour Mohun as sole proprietor. The Defendants did not act in concert and did not combine together to dispossess the Plaintiff. It may be noted that Gour Mohun's heirs are made pro formd Defendants. 4. The lower Appellate Court having come to the conclusion that there were separate causes of action, was bound to follow the law and was not right in assuming a discretionary power based upon the convenience of parties. The learned Judge correctly states the law when he says the suit might be dismissed or at the discretion of the Court the plaint might be returned for amendment under sec. 53 of the Code. 5. It has, however, been pressed upon us that there is in this case only one cause of action and various authorities have been cited in support of this contention. 6. It may help to clear the ground if we first consider what is meant by a cause of action. A Plaintiff's cause of action is every fact which a Plaintiff must prove to support his case [see Read v. Brown 22 Q. B. D. 128 (1888) cited in Murti v. Bholaram I. L. R. 16 All. 165, 170 (1893)]. A cause of action arises when a legal right is infringed and the date and place of its accrual must be inserted in the plaint. Sec. 54 of the CPC provides that the plaint must contain, among other particulars, a plain and concise statement of the circumstances constituting the cause of action and when and where it arose. Now in this case it is alleged that the Plaintiff's right was infringed piecemeal by three different sets of Defendants at different times. Though the extent of the Defendants' title depends in each case upon the question whether Gour Mohun owned the entire property or only a moiety share, nevertheless there is no community of interest between the Defendants as regards their individual purchases. It is possible to conceive of their setting up different defences. Though the extent of the Defendants' title depends in each case upon the question whether Gour Mohun owned the entire property or only a moiety share, nevertheless there is no community of interest between the Defendants as regards their individual purchases. It is possible to conceive of their setting up different defences. One set might plead limitation and the others not, one set might plead estoppel by conduct as regards their particular purchase and so forth. Then when the question of mesne profits claimed in the plaint comes to be considered, the enquiry would have to be a separate one for each set of Defendants and would embrace different periods and different lands. No joint decree could properly be passed against all the Defendants who are admittedly not joint tortfeasors and so the execution would have to be split up into three separate cases. Judged by the definition already given of "cause of action" we must hold that there are in this case three separate causes of action against three separate sets of persons. 7. The circumstances under which the Plaintiff's alleged right was infringed are essential ingredients which cannot be dissociated from their connection with the right claimed by the Plaintiff. The right by itself furnishes no cause of action. It is the right combined with all the particulars that go to make the infringements which constitutes the cause of action. This view is in accordance with what was held in the case of Madho Misser v. Sidh Binaik I. L. R. 14 Cal. 681 (1887) where the learned Judges observed : "The Plaintiff had a distinct cause of action against each of the Defendants who set up his own title in respect of one or other of the different plots of land." So in the case of Sudhendu Mohun Roy v. Durga Dasi I. L. R. 14 Cal. 435(1887) two other learned Judges held as follows :--"The fact that plaintiff's title was acquired by auction sale and that they were unable to obtain possession of the lands which they maintain they purchased does not give them the right to join in one suit all the persons who obstruct their possession unless they can show that those persons acted in concert or under some common title." 8. The following cases are relied upon for the Respondent: Vasudeva v. Kuledi 7 Mad. The following cases are relied upon for the Respondent: Vasudeva v. Kuledi 7 Mad. H. C. R. 290 (1874) which was followed in Mahomed v. Krishnan I. L. R. 11 Mad. 106 (1887) and Ishan Chunder Hazra v. Rameswar Mondol I. L. R. 24 Cal. 831 (1897). These cases do support the view taken by the lower Appellate Court, The first one rests on the convenience of trying all such claims together in one suit. In the second and third cases the Plaintiff's unity of title was said to justify a single action. With all deference to the learned Judges who decided those cases, we think, that the title on which the Plaintiff" sues is only one of several ingredients in the cause of action and that the term includes the infringement of Plaintiff's right, together with the means employed for that purpose. Furthermore a definite provision of law cannot be evaded on the ground of convenience and the desired object may still be attained by trying the analogues suits together. 9. The case of Serajul Huq v. Abdul Rahaman I. L. R. 29 Cal. 257 (1902) is also relied upon, but we think that the facts of that case are not applicable in the present case. 10. We must hold that in the circumstances of the present case the Subordinate Judge was right in refusing to allow the trial to proceed as upon a single cause of action. We set aside the order of the lower Appellate Court, and in lieu of the first Court's order rejecting the plaint we direct that the Subordinate Judge do accept the plaint after it has been amended so as to embrace only the property valued over one thousand rupees. It will be open to the Plaintiff to institute two separate suits regarding the other properties in the Court of the Munsif having jurisdiction and therefore to obtain an order from the District Judge under sec. 25, C. P. C., to have those suits transferred for trial to the Court of the Subordinate Judge, provided the Defendants do not show good and sufficient cause to the contrary. The Plaintiff must pay the costs of this appeal, which we assess at four gold mohurs.