Judgement Appeal from a decree of the High Court (July 30, 1897) reversing a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Monghyr (Aug. 17, 1895). The respondents, on June 28, 1894, brought their suit under the circumstances stated in their Lordships judgment against the appellants, who were in possession of the land in suit, and claimed to hold the same as ryots, and to have acquired by lapse of time a right of occupancy therein. They alleged that the appellants had failed to get their alleged jote right recorded in the settlement proceedings, and contended that they were precluded thereby from setting up any jote right in the said land. They prayed that it might be declared that the appellants were in possession of the said land as tenure-holders under their lease of November 7, 1881, until April, 1893, and had no ryot right in the said land, or, if they had a ryot right in all or any part of the said land, it might be declared that they had no occupancy rights, and might be ejected from the said land, and that they, the respondents, might recover possession of the said land, together with mesne profits and interest. The appellants separately answered that the said lease was a ryot or cultivating lease, obtained with the view of cultivating the said land ; that the settlement proceedings did not decide, so as to bind them, the question of whether or not they were ryots of the said land, and contended that they had by effluxion of time acquired a right of occupancy in respect of the said land, and could not be ejected therefrom; and, further, that the respondents had acknowledged the appellant Gokul Mandar to be a ryot by receiving rents from him and giving him receipts for the same in that character. Upon the issue whether the appellants were ticcadars or ryots with a right of occupancy, the Subordinate Judge held (1.) that the first appellant had shewn that he had tilled part of the land in suit himself and had sub-let other parts. (2.) That the lease described the lessee as a ryot, and was in form such as was usually granted to ryots or cultivators who had not acquired a right of occupancy. (2.) That the lease described the lessee as a ryot, and was in form such as was usually granted to ryots or cultivators who had not acquired a right of occupancy. (3.) That the receipts granted to the appellant were such as were granted to ryots, and not such as would be granted to ticcadars or intermediate holders. (4.) That the fact that the first appellant had after getting his lease sub-let part of the lands would not destroy his status of a ryot, which was clearly established by his lease, which described him as a ryot, and by the receipts granted to him, which described the rent as paid for his jote or cultivation. (5.) That the word translated as taluq in the foot-note to the kabulyat did not mean that the document granted a taluqdari interest, but merely meant "a holding." He therefore held that the appellants were not tenure-holders, but ryots. The High Court reversed the holding, and decreed that the appellants were tenure-holders and not ryots, on the grounds— "(1.) That under the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885 the presumption was that any person holding more than 100 bigahs of land was a tenure-holder and not a ryot." (2.) That the land in suit lay in the southern part of the reformation. (3.) That the first appellant had 800 bighas of jote, and had 100 tenants under him. "(4.) That the pottah or lease granted by the Government contained both the terms ryot and, in the foot-note, taluq it might therefore be held to refer either to a ryot tenure, or to a tenure in the nature of a taluq." They added that although the respondents agent had, so late as 1892, granted a receipt describing the first appellant as "ryot," yet as the respondents had, immediately before the granting of this receipt, treated the first appellant as a tenure-holder, and called upon him to quit the land, the appellants could not rely upon the terms of the said receipt. Phillips and De Gruyther, for the appellants, contended that the High Court ought to have held that the appellants were ryots and had acquired rights of occupancy under s. 178 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, and that they could not be ejected except under s. 25. Phillips and De Gruyther, for the appellants, contended that the High Court ought to have held that the appellants were ryots and had acquired rights of occupancy under s. 178 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, and that they could not be ejected except under s. 25. They relied upon the terms of the lease which was in 1881, and must not be construed by the light of the Act of 1885, s. 5, sub-s. 5, but under s. 2 of Bengal Act (VIII. of 1869), in force in 1881. It was to the appellants as cultivators. They also relied on the conduct of the lessees, who had in fact acted as cultivators, cultivating partly by themselves and partly on partnership terms with other cultivators. The land was let to the tenants as ryots, and the extent of area leased had nothing to do with the question. They referred to Durga Prosonno Ghose v. Kali Das Butt (9 C. L. R. 449.); Laidley v. Gour Gobind Sarkar. (( 1885) Ind. L. R. 11 Calc. 501.) They also relied upon a long series of receipts given formerly by the Government, and afterwards by the respondents, to the first appellant, in all of which his holding v/as described as his jote, and which were in the form usually granted to ryots. The plea of res judicata could not be used against them, the settlement officer having no jurisdiction to decide as to the appellants status see s. 13 Civil Procedure Code. He was not competent to try the present suit, and the second appellant was not a party to the proceeding before him see the Act of 1885, ss. 144 and 152, Gokhul Sahu v. Jodu Mundun Roy (( 1890) Ind. L. R. 17 Calc. 721.), Har Char an Singh v. Har Shankar Singh (( 1894) Ind. L. R. 16 Allah. 464), Misir Raghobardial v. Sheo Baksh Singh (( 1882) L. R. 9 Ind. Ap. 197. 203), and Durga Churn Law v. Hateen Mandal. (( 1901) Ind. L. R. 29 Calc. 252.) Mayne and C. W. Arathoon, for the respondents, were heard only on the point as to res judicata. L. R. 16 Allah. 464), Misir Raghobardial v. Sheo Baksh Singh (( 1882) L. R. 9 Ind. Ap. 197. 203), and Durga Churn Law v. Hateen Mandal. (( 1901) Ind. L. R. 29 Calc. 252.) Mayne and C. W. Arathoon, for the respondents, were heard only on the point as to res judicata. The question whether the first appellant was a tenure-holder or a ryot was directly in issue between the parties to the settlement proceedings, and decided by the assistant settlement officer in accordance with the presumption directed by s. 5, sub-s. 5, of the Act of 1885, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary. That Act intended that the settlement officer should decide all questions arising under Chapter X. of that Act see ss, 101,102, and 111. The record of rights framed by him was intended to be conclusive in all Courts see s. 109 of Bengal Act (III. of 1898), which amends the Act of 1885, and makes the decision of the settlement officer final and free from revision in subsequent proceedings in the Civil Courts. Sect. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code, therefore, barred this suit. Phillips replied, citing Pearymohun Mukerji v. Ali Sheikh (( 1892) Ind. L. R. 20 Calc. 249, 251.); Pandit Sardar v. Meajan Mirdha (( 1893) Ind. L. R. 21 Calc. 378.); Secretary of State for India v. Nitye Singh. (( 1893) Ind. L. R, 21 Calc. 38.) The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD DAVEY. This is an appeal against a decree of the High Court of Calcutta dated July 30, 1897, reversing the decree of the Subordinate Judge of Monghyr dated August 17, 1895. The subject-matter of the litigation is a tract of land measuring 1174 bighas, situate in the village of Patpar Madhopore, of which the respondents (plaintiffs of the first part) are proprietors. The other respondents (plaintiffs of the second part) are persons in whose favour a tenure of some sort has recently been created by the proprietors. The real and only question on this appeal is whether the appellant Gokul Mandar became a "tenure-holder" only, or a "ryot having a right of occupancy" in the land in question within the meaning of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885. The facts of the case may be shortly stated. The real and only question on this appeal is whether the appellant Gokul Mandar became a "tenure-holder" only, or a "ryot having a right of occupancy" in the land in question within the meaning of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885. The facts of the case may be shortly stated. In and prior to 1881 the Government claimed to be proprietors of the lands in question, with other lands adjacent thereto, as an accretion after diluvion to the Government Khas Mehal Bindadiara; and on November 7, 1881, the Government granted to the appellant Gokul Mandar 3668 odd bighas, including the lands in question, at a rent of five annas a bigha until April, 1893. The kabulyat executed by the said appellant was on a printed form in which it was described as "Form of kabulyat for those cultivators who have not been recognised as having occupancy right" ; but on the other hand the holding was described in a note as a " taluq." On September 3, 1885, the Government, on the recommendation of the Commissioner of the Bhagulpore Division, released the 1174 bighas to the predecessors in title of the first respondents as part of the Raj Baneli and Srinugger estates, and (it is agreed) the appellant Gokul Mandar thereupon became tenant thereof to the Raja on the terms mentioned in the kabulyat. In 1888 proceedings were commenced under Chapter X. of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, for a survey and record of rights in the village Patpar Madhopore, and in the course of those proceedings a question arose as to the status of the appellant Gokul Mandar in respect of the 1174 bighas. The assistant settlement officer directed the appellants name to be entered as a tenure-holder, and his decision was affirmed on appeal by the District Judge of Bhagulpore acting as the special judge under the Act, and again by the High Court. The first respondents served the appellant Gokul Mandar with a notice to quit on the expiry of his term at the end of April, 1893. After that date there were the usual disputes as to possession before the magistrate, and ultimately the present suit was commenced by the respondents against the appellants, the second appellant being joint in property with Gokul Mandar. After that date there were the usual disputes as to possession before the magistrate, and ultimately the present suit was commenced by the respondents against the appellants, the second appellant being joint in property with Gokul Mandar. By their plaint they asked for judgment (1.) that the decision passed by the Settlement Department had become final; (2.) alternatively for a decision that the appellants had no occupancy right in the land; and (3.) for possession. The Subordinate Judge held that the settlement officers award, although it had the effect of a Civil Court decree, could not be used as res judicata in an original suit cognizable by that Court alone, and he found on the evidence before him that the appellant Gokul Mandar was a ryot with a right of occupancy. The suit was therefore dismissed with costs. The learned judges in the High Court disagreed with the Subordinate Judge, and held that the evidence shewed that the defendant Gokul Mandar was a tenure-holder and not a ryot, and the defendant should therefore be ejected. They added 11 It is not necessary for us to give any opinion on the other points raised." Their Lordships agree with the decision of the High Court and with the reasons given for it by the learned judges. They do not attach any importance to the mere form of the kabulyat, or to the use in it either of the word "cultivator" or of the word "taluq." It is only another instance of the usual mistake of using a printed form for a purpose to which it was not adapted. Nor does the receipt for rent given by the Raja on November 30, 1893, in which the appellant Gokul Mandar is described as "ryot," carry the matter any further. Prior to that date, as pointed out by the judges, the Raja had served a notice to quit treating the appellant as tenure-holder. It is a question of substance, not of form. Bys. 5, sub-s. 5, of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, it is enacted that where the area held by the tenant exceeds 100 standard bighas the tenant shall be presumed to be a tenure-holder until the contrary is shewn. In this case the grant to the tenant was of 3688 odd bighas, and, adopting the view of the evidence expressed by the High Court, their Lordships think the contrary has not been shewn. In this case the grant to the tenant was of 3688 odd bighas, and, adopting the view of the evidence expressed by the High Court, their Lordships think the contrary has not been shewn. The appeal, therefore, fails on the merits, and it is not necessary for their Lordships to decide whether the decision of the revenue officer can be pleaded as res judicata on the issue as to Gokul Mandars status. They will only observe in reference to arguments addressed to them that, under s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code, a decree in a previous suit cannot be pleaded as res judicata in a subsequent suit unless the judge by whom it was made had jurisdiction to try and decide, not only the particular matter in issue, but also the subsequent suit itself in which the issue is subsequently raised. In this respect the enactment goes beyond s. 13 of the previous Act X. of 1877, and also, as appears to their Lordships, beyond the law laid down by the judges in the Duchess of Kingstons Case, ((1776) 2 Sm. L. C. 10th ed. p. 713.) They will further observe that the essence of a Code is to be exhaustive on the matters in respect of which it declares the law, and it is not the province of a judge to disregard or go outside the letter of the enactment according to its true construction. They will, therefore, humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal be dismissed, and the appellants will pay the costs of the respondents who have appeared.