JUDGMENT 1. This appeal arises out of an execution case. On the 19th of April 1897 the decree-holder's application for execution was registered and an order was passed to issue notice on the judgment-debtor under sec. 248, C. P. C. The judgment-debtor applied for time to file objections on the 10th May; and on the same day the decree-holder withdrew his application for execution. Subsequently, on the 30th April 1900 the decree-holder filed the present, application for execution. The judgment-debtor objected that execution was barred by limitation. The Munsif gave effect to this objection holding that time began to run from the 19th of April 1897, the date on which notice was ordered to be issued. In appeal the learned Subordinate Judge held that time should be reckoned from the date that the notice was actually served upon the judgment-debtor; and he remanded the case for enquiry as to when the service was made. 2. The judgment-debtor appeals to this Court and contends that the view of the Munsif is correct. The pleader who appears for him desired to cite two cases from unauthorized reports of the Allahabad High Court. This we did not permit him to do. He also cited the case of Hari Ganesh v. Yamunabai I. L. R. 23 Bom. 35 (1897) where the learned Judges held that: "If no notice is issued, time cannot be counted from the date of the order of the Court; though it may be that where a notice has been issued the date of its issue would be the date on which the Court ordered its issue." In that case no notice was actually issued : so that the ruling, so far as it favours the learned pleader's argument, is obiter dictum. Moreover, the opinion is expressed with hesitation. The words of Art. 179 of the second Schedule of the Limitation Act which apply to this case are that limitation begins to run, where a notice under sec. 248, C. P. C., has been issued from the date of issuing the notice. In the present case the record shows that the notice was actually issued by the Court on the 30th April 1897. So that the application which was made on the 30th April 1900 was just in time upon the natural reading of the words we have quoted. In the present case the record shows that the notice was actually issued by the Court on the 30th April 1897. So that the application which was made on the 30th April 1900 was just in time upon the natural reading of the words we have quoted. We know of no authority for holding that the words mean the date when the Court passed the order for issuing the notice. Such an interpretation would be contrary to the plain language of the article and would curtail the rights of the decree-holder. It is unnecessary for us to determine whether the view taken by the lower Appellate Court is correct, that the article may be read so as to refer to a date subsequent to the date of issue of the notice, namely, the date when the notice was actually served. 3. On the facts in this case it is sufficient for us to say that the application was made within three years of the date when the notice was issued and is therefore in time. The order remanding the case to the first Court was therefore unnecessary and the ground upon which the case was remanded to the first Court is irrelevant. We direct that order be set aside and that the first Court do proceed to execute the decree subject, of course, to any other objections which the judgment-debtors may make. Under the circumstances we direct that each party do bear his costs.