JUDGMENT 1. We think that this rule must be made absolute. In a proceeding under sec. 145, C.Cr.P., with respect to certain property which had been purchased by the Petitioner at an execution sale and of which possession had been given to him by the Civil Court, a question was raised by the opposite party who claim to be members of a joint Hindu family subject to the Mitakshara law with the person whose property was sold. The Honorary Magistrate has dealt with the matter in this way. He says, that the opposite party were not parties to the suit as the result of which this property was sold, and were therefore not bound by the decision; as there were 4 members of the undivided family, the share of the person who was the judgment-debtor in the case would amount to 1/4, therefore it must be taken that the property of which possession was given to the Petitioner by the Civil Court was only a 1/4 share of the property in question. He has accordingly declared possession to the Petitioner in respect of that 1/4 share; and since, as he states himself, he was unable to find who was in possession of the remaining 3/4 share, he has attached that share under sec. 146 of the Code, and appointed a Receiver. We think that the case has been dealt with on a wrong basis. In the first place it would be impossible under the Mitakshara law to make such a division as the Honorary Magistrate has made, except by partition. Then we have had the writ of possession read to us, and it would appear on the face of it that the whole of the property in question, and not merely a share in it, was delivered to the Petitioner. That being so, it is not open to a Criminal Court acting under sec. 145 to adjudicate upon the rights of the second party in the manner in which the Honorary Magistrate has done, and to decide that their shares in the property, whatever they may have been, could not have been included in the delivery of possession, because they were not parties to the civil suit. 145 to adjudicate upon the rights of the second party in the manner in which the Honorary Magistrate has done, and to decide that their shares in the property, whatever they may have been, could not have been included in the delivery of possession, because they were not parties to the civil suit. Whether or not they are bound by the decree in the civil suit is a question which can be determined only by a Civil Court on materials to be put before it for the purpose of such decision. For the purposes of a proceeding under sec. 145, it is sufficient that delivery of possession has in fact been made by the Civil Court of the whole property to the Petitioner whether rightly or wrongly. 2. We therefore set aside the order made by the Honorary Magistrate as one which it was not within his jurisdiction to make; and in lieu thereof, direct that the Petitioner first party remain in possession of the disputed property until evicted therefrom by due course of law.