JUDGMENT 1. The question which we have to decide in this appeal is whether or not any offerings which may in future be made to a Hindu idol may be attached in execution of a decree for money against the idol. The Courts below have both held that such offerings are attachable--the Court of first instance, probably merely on the ground that similar attachments had been made before--the lower Appellate Court, on the ground that the right to receive offerings is a saleable property attaching to the temple, and the judgment-debtor has a disposing power over the profits accruing. 2. The fact that similar attachments had been made before is, of course, nothing to the purpose. The real question is whether the attachment is legal with reference to the provisions of sec. 266, C.C.P. The offerings in question are, it appears, entirely voluntary; and therefore, entirely uncertain; although it may be, as the lower Appellate Court says, that an estimate may be made of the average income derivable from that source. It seems to us very difficult to say that there is, properly speaking, a right to receive these offerings where there is no corresponding obligation to make them. It is difficult to see therefore how there can be any such right as could constitute a saleable property within the meaning of sec. 266, C.C.P. The fact that there is a disposing power in the idol, as represented by the High Priest, over the offerings when once received, does not necessarily imply a disposing power over what is called the right of receiving them. We think that the attachment in the present case was not an attachment which could be made under the provisions of sec. 266, C.P.C., and that we must therefore decree the appeal with costs, the hearing fee being assessed at 3 gold mohurs.