Judgement Appeal from a decree of the above Court (May 6, 1899) reversing in second appeal a decree of the District Judge of Rai Bareli (Oct. 26, 1898), which had affirmed a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Partabgarh (Sept. 27, 1897). Upon the merits, the dispute between the appellant and respondent was whether the former was bound by a lease dated May 23, 1865, to which he was a party lessor. The lease was in these terms "Executed by Sri Maharaj Kumar Raja Rampal Singh Bahadur Jeo, taluqdar of Pergunnah Rampur Kaithaula Sarkar Manikpur. Further, I have made over Mouzah Bijlipur Bangawa as a zemindari village to Sheoamber Singh Jeo .... the jama of it is Rs.553 of the current Queens coin. Having arrived at this item in respect of the pergunnah, I have given a lease. He make take possession of the village, cause to plough and sow, settle and cause to settle, keep the tenants satisfied. It must be carried out according to the writing. There will be no variation. This document bears the seals of Raja Rampal Singh and of Raja Hanwant Singh, and an indorsement in the handwriting of the latter, Palta correct, jama to vary according to pergunnah custom. He may obtain Rs.200 nankar. " Their Lordships agreed with the judgment appealed from, that this document created a perpetual under-proprietary right in the village named therein—a construction which disposed of the suit adversely to the appellant. But it appeared that, leave to appeal having been refused on the ground that the construction of the lease was not of public interest, the appellant obtained special leave to appeal to His Majesty on two representations—(1.) that a question of law of considerable importance was involved, namely, a question of constructive knowledge by the appellant of this lease in 1883 ; (2.) that the second Judicial Commissioner sitting alone had exceeded his jurisdiction in that he had subverted findings of fact arrived at by the Court in first appeal. The appellant contended that special leave should not have been given, and that the suit could not be entertained both on the ground of limitation and of want of jurisdiction. The action on June 4, 1894, was in ejectment, the plaint alleging that the lease was invalid, or if valid did not confer an estate of inheritance, but only for the life of the defendants father. The action on June 4, 1894, was in ejectment, the plaint alleging that the lease was invalid, or if valid did not confer an estate of inheritance, but only for the life of the defendants father. It was also stated that the plaintiff first came to know of the said lease on June 24, 1891, in certain mutation proceed ings. An alternative prayer was for a declaration that the defendant could be ejected by an ordinary notice of ejectment in the Rent Court. The defendant pleaded that the lease was valid and operative and conveyed an estate of inheritance. Further, it was urged that the plaintiff was aware of the adverse title set up under the said lease at the latest in the year 1883, and the suit was therefore barred by limitation. Finally, it was pleaded that the Bent Court alone could eject the defendant. The Subordinate Judge found that the lease was invalid, and that, there being no proof of the plaintiffs knowledge of the lease anterior to June 24, 1891, the suit was not barred by limitation. He rejected as evidence of knowledge the knowledge of the plaintiffs agent, Jamna Pershad, as shewn in the mutation proceedings in 1883, on the ground that the said proceedings were in law not admissible in evidence without summoning Jamna Pershad as a witness. He further held that the Civil Court could not decree the ejectment of a tenant or award mesne profits, and, therefore, by his decree declared that the defendant has no rights in the village better than those of a common lessee in a village, and that he is liable to be ejected by a notice of ejectment through the Rent Court. The District Court having affirmed this decree, the Judicial Commissioners Court found that the lease was valid, and conveyed an estate of inheritance. The material passage of his judgment on this point was as follows— "Applying the Hindu law to the case, I hold that the grant conveyed an estate of inheritance. Even if the Hindu law is not strictly applicable to the case under clause (6), s. 3, Act XVIII. of 1876, and if justice, equity, and good conscience do not require the application of that law under clause (g) of that section, I am of opinion that under the general law the plaintiff cannot succeed. Even if the Hindu law is not strictly applicable to the case under clause (6), s. 3, Act XVIII. of 1876, and if justice, equity, and good conscience do not require the application of that law under clause (g) of that section, I am of opinion that under the general law the plaintiff cannot succeed. Construing the words of the grant according to their ordinary and primary meaning, the grantor gave and constituted the village of Bijlipur Bangadwa as the zemindari property of Sheoamber Singh. "The word zemindari is well understood to convey an estate of inheritance, and that is the interpretation that should be placed on the word in this instrument. There is nothing in the context or surrounding circumstances to negative this construction. The grant of a deduction of Rs.200 nankar strongly confirms it. I hold that on a proper construction of the grant of May 3, 1865, Raja Hanwant Singh granted an estate of inheritance, and that Raja Rampal Singh covenanted in 1871 to ratify and confirm that grant." He held that it became known to the appellants recognised agent in the said 1883 proceedings that a claim to hold in perpetuity had been made by respondent, and therefore appellant had at that time " constructive knowledge " of the claim; consequently the suit was barred under art. 120 of the Indian Limitation Act. He also held that the Civil Courts were not competent to declare that the respondent had no right in the village other than that of a lessee, and could not decree a liability to be ejected by notice. He referred to s. 56 Oudh Rent Act (XXII. of 1886). C. W. Arathoon, for the appellant. De Gruyther, for the respondent, applied that the order granting leave to appeal should be rescinded, for there were no questions raised of general public importance, and there was no question of excess of jurisdiction, since the question of notice in this case was one of law, and did not involve overruling a finding of fact by an appellate Court see Sheo Singh Rai v. Mussumat Dakho (( 1878) L. R. 5 Ind. Ap. 87.) as to obtaining special leave to appeal on one ground and maintaining it on another which may be different from and inconsistent with the purpose for which leave was given. Ap. 87.) as to obtaining special leave to appeal on one ground and maintaining it on another which may be different from and inconsistent with the purpose for which leave was given. Their Lordships thought that at this stage the appeal must be allowed to proceed. C. W. Arathoon, for the appellant, contended that there was no proof that the appellants agent, Jamna Pershad, had notice of the fact that the respondents fathers claim in 1883 was to a perpetual interest in the village in suit. His recorded admission shewed that he understood the then claim to be in the character of a thekadar (lessee) and not of an under-proprietor see Act XXII. of 1886 for a definition of thekadar. And, assuming that the agent knew that the claim was to an under-proprietary right, the decision was erroneous that the appellant had constructive notice that the respondents father had denied the right now claimed by the appellant. Accordingly, the suit was not barred by limitation. Being for ejectment, it came under art. 139 of the Limitation Act. The lease of 1865 purported to be granted by the appellant; in reality it was given by Han want Singh, whose authority to do so on the appellants behalf was not proved. His own interest was only a life interest. It was not intended by the lease to convey an estate of inheritance. He referred to Maharani Beni Pershad Koeri v. Dudh Nath Roy. (( 1899) L. R. 26 Ind. Ap. 216.) De Gruyther, for the respondent, contended that the lease had been rightly construed to convey an estate of inheritance. The expressions used therein fixed the permanent character of the grant. It conveyed a zemindari title, which was equivalent to a fee simple. It referred to nankar, which is the subsistence allowance made to a zemindar. In Oudh it is the proprietors share of the profits. The Government letters scheduled to Act I. of 1869 shew that a zemindar is to be considered proprietor. The plaintiff was bound by the lease in consequence of the compromise and decree of September, 1871; and had ratified it by his conduct, and in particular by receipt of rent thereunder. In Oudh it is the proprietors share of the profits. The Government letters scheduled to Act I. of 1869 shew that a zemindar is to be considered proprietor. The plaintiff was bound by the lease in consequence of the compromise and decree of September, 1871; and had ratified it by his conduct, and in particular by receipt of rent thereunder. The suit wase barred by limitation, for the Judicial Commissioner had rightly held that the plaintiff had notice through his agent of the defendants title as far back as 1883; and that being a question of law, was competent to be entertained and decided in second appeal. He referred to art. 144 of the Limitation Act, or if no other applies, then to art. 120. The suit was not cognizable by the Civil Court, for under the Oudh Rent Act of 1886 it had no jurisdiction to grant the relief prayed. Arathoon replied, citing Sykes Taluqdari Law, p. 168, with regard to the meaning of nankar. The Raja must be shewn to have been a zemindar within the meaning of the Government letters, or they are inapplicable. As to construction, see Baboo Lekraj Roy v. Kunhya Singh (( 1877) L. R. 4 Ind. Ap. 223, 227.); Toolshi Pershad Singh v. Rajah Ram Narain Singh (( 1885) L. R. 12 Ind. Ap. 205.); Thakur Rohan Singh v. Thakur Surat Singh. (( 1884) L. R. 12 Ind. Ap. 52, 62.) As to limitation, a suit for ejectment does not fall under art. 120. It comes under art. 139 see Oudh Rent Act (XXII. of 1886), s. 108. July 9. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD DAVEY. In this case special leave was granted by Her late Majesty to appeal from a decree of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh, dated May 6, 1899, overruling the previous decree of the District Judge on first appeal, which confirmed the original decree of the Subordinate Judge. A preliminary objection was made by counsel for the respondents that leave to appeal had been granted under a misconception, and that the appeal ought not to be heard on its merits. A preliminary objection was made by counsel for the respondents that leave to appeal had been granted under a misconception, and that the appeal ought not to be heard on its merits. Their Lordships found it impossible to appreciate the weight or validity of the objection until they were in possession of the facts of the case, and they accordingly allowed the appeal to proceed, reserving to the respondent the benefit of his objection if it proved to be well founded. The property which is the subject of this litigation is a village called indifferently Bijlipur Bangadwa and Bangarwa, comprised in the taluqdari estate of Rampur Kaithoula. Prior to and in the year 1859, Raja Hanwant Singh was taluqdar of this estate, and his name was also entered in Lists 1 and 2 in the Appendices to the Oudh Estates Act, 1869, in respect thereof. The Raja had two sons, the elder of whom died some time before the year 1859 leaving an only son, Rampal Singh, who is the present appellant. The old Raja purported in the year 1859 to divest himself of his talook in favour of his grandson, and afterwards took proceedings to resume or set aside his grant, which resulted in a compromise. It is unnecessary, however, for their Lordships to follow the details of the complicated story of the relations between the old Baja and his grandson. It is sufficient for the present purpose to say that on the death of his grandfather on June 29, 1881, the appellant became the undisputed proprietor of the talook. On December 9, 1882, Sheoamber Singh, who was sisters son of the old Baja, commenced proceedings in the Revenue Department for mutation of names in respect of the disputed village. In his application he claimed to be entitled as transferee from the appellant himself of the entire village for a perpetual lease. And in his affirmation in support of his application he stated that the appellant gave him zemindari of the entire village in 1271 Fasli (corresponding with the Christian year 1865) under a perpetual lease on payment of a rent of Rs.553, and that from that year, or from before that time, he had been in possession of the village. And in his affirmation in support of his application he stated that the appellant gave him zemindari of the entire village in 1271 Fasli (corresponding with the Christian year 1865) under a perpetual lease on payment of a rent of Rs.553, and that from that year, or from before that time, he had been in possession of the village. It is stated that the appellant was at that time in England; but one Jamna Pershad, his mookhtar, appeared for him, and obtained an adjournment of the case in order to enable him to communicate with the appellant. On a subsequent day he stated that he had received permission from the appellant, and at his suggestion an order was made that Sheoamber Singh be summoned with the lease concerned for July 14, and Jamna Pershad was also ordered to present himself. Neither party, however, attended on the day fixed, and the case was ordered to be kept with other cases of perpetual leases for future decision. On June 29, 1891, the appellant commenced proceedings in the Revenue Department against the present respondent (the son of Sheoamber Singh, who had died in the interval) to recover possession of the village in suit. The respondent thereupon produced a document bearing a native date corresponding with May 23, 1865, and purporting to be sealed with the seals of Raja Han want Singh and of the appellant, and to be signed by the old Raja. On being shewn the document, the appellant stated as follows — "Answer.—I see the lease. It bears the signature of Raja Hanwant Singh. It bears his and my seals as well. This lease was executed by Raja Hanwant Singh on my behalf, which I have now come to know. This village was given to me by Raja Hanwant Singh along with the estate. Subsequently Raja Hanwant Singh executed this deed in favour of Sheoamber Singh, the father of Balbhaddar Singh, to do which he (Hanwant Singh) had no power, and he affixed my seal also to the deed. At the time of its execution I was a minor. This deed being produced, I have no hope of success in a Revenue Court." The respondents objection was thereupon maintained, and the appellants claim for ejectment cancelled. At the time of its execution I was a minor. This deed being produced, I have no hope of success in a Revenue Court." The respondents objection was thereupon maintained, and the appellants claim for ejectment cancelled. The respondent does not now contend that the document of May 23, 1865, was the deed of the appellant, and it has been assumed by both sides that his seal was affixed to it by his grandfather during his minority; but he relies on it as Hanwant Singhs deed, which he says has been confirmed in his favour by the appellant as part of the compromise. The construction of the document, however, has been the subject of much argument. Their Lordships agree with the opinion of the Judicial Commissioner that the document created a perpetual under-proprietary right in the village, and with the reasons he has given for his opinion. In the circumstances of the present case it is unnecessary for them to say more. On June 4, 1894, the plaintiff commenced the present action in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Partabgarh. The relief sought by the plaint was (1.) possession of the village; (2.) mesne profits; (3.) (alternatively) a declaration that the defendant had no right in the disputed village beyond that of a lessee having no right (which sounds a little tautological), and that he was liable to be ejected by an ordinary notice of ejectment; (4.) further relief. The respondent by his written statement relied (amongst other defences) on limitation. It is admitted by counsel on both sides that, having regard to the provisions of the Oudh Rent Act of 1886, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction either to decree possession of the village, or to make a declaration in the form prayed by the plaint. Their Lordships think that in substance the object of the suit was to get rid of the blot or cloud on the appellants title occasioned by the respondents claim under the instrument of May 23, 1865, either by cancellation of the instrument, or by a declaration that it was not the appellants deed, and had not by any act of his become binding upon him or his estate, or by a decision that, according to its true construction, it had no operation beyond the life of the old Raja, or, alternatively, of Sheoamber Singh. And their Lordships think that the suit can only be maintained (if at all) as one for those objects, notwithstanding that for obvious reasons it is in the plaint made to look as much like a suit for recovery of land as possible, and an order for ejectment in the Revenue Court might be consequential on a decree in the plaintiffs favour. No doubt the ultimate object of the appellant was recovery of possession; but that relief could not be given in this suit. It is different, therefore, from a case in which the substantial relief sought is recovery of land, and the setting aside an instrument is merely ancillary or incidental to that relief. In the present case the cancellation of the instrument, or a declaration of its invalidity as against the appellant, was the substantial relief sought, and the only relief which the Court had jurisdiction to give. The suit is therefore, in the opinion of their Lordships, one which would come within s. 39 or s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act. And the relevant article in the schedule to the Limitation Act would be either 91, " to cancel or set aside an instrument not otherwise provided for," for which the period is three years only from the date when the facts became known to the plain tiff, or (as the Judicial Commissioner thought) the general art. 120, which gives six years from the date when the right to sue accrued. In the present case the right to sue accrued prima facie on the death of Raja Hanwant Singh on June 29, 1881. The appellant, however, says that time did not begin to run against him until Sheoambers or the respondents possession became adverse, or until he knew the facts which entitled him to sue, and he fixes that date at June 24, 1891, the date of his appearance before the revenue officer in the proceedings of that year, when (he says) he first became aware of the instrument of May 23, 1865. The Judicial Commissioner has, however, held that the appellant had notice through his mookhtar that Sheoamber claimed a perpetual proprietary tenure in the village under an instrument purporting to be the appellants deed in the proceedings for mutation of names in the year 1883. The Judicial Commissioner has, however, held that the appellant had notice through his mookhtar that Sheoamber claimed a perpetual proprietary tenure in the village under an instrument purporting to be the appellants deed in the proceedings for mutation of names in the year 1883. And this is the principal point on which the appellant in his petition for special leave to appeal relied as an excess of jurisdiction by the Commissioner. The Courts of first instance and of first appeal both held that the appellant came to know of the existence of the instrument of May 23, 1865, only on June 24, 1891, and it is contended that such finding was one of fact which the Commissioner on second appeal had no jurisdiction to reverse. Their Lordships, however, think that the learned Commissioner in holding that the appellant had notice through his mookhtar did not reverse any finding of fact by the Courts below, but merely applied a well-known and universal rule of law to the facts before him. By s. 229 of the Indian Con tract Act it is enacted that any notice given to or information obtained by an agent in the course of his business transacted by him for the principal shall as between the principal and third parties have the same legal consequence as if it had been given to or obtained by the principal. And the same is repeated in s. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. It may be that these enactments are not directly applicable to the matter now in dispute, but they are only declaratory of a general principle of law. That principle is in an especial sense applicable to legal proceedings which are usually conducted through an agent, and it would be impossible to conduct such business, and it would lead to grave inconvenience and injustice, if it were required to prove afterwards that the client had personal knowledge of the contents of the pleadings, or of some document in suit, or of the general nature of the claim made against him. It is not a mere question of constructive notice or inference of fact, but a rule of law which imputes the knowledge of the agent to the principal, or (in other words) the agency extends to receiving notice on behalf of his principal of whatever is material to be stated in the course of the proceedings. It is not a mere question of constructive notice or inference of fact, but a rule of law which imputes the knowledge of the agent to the principal, or (in other words) the agency extends to receiving notice on behalf of his principal of whatever is material to be stated in the course of the proceedings. Now, what did the appellants mookhtar know from the written statements in the proceedings? He knew that Sheo-amber Singh claimed a perpetual proprietary tenure in the village under an instrument purporting to be executed by the appellant himself in the year 1271 Fasli. It is true that the instrument itself was not produced, but its production was ordered, and might have been enforced by the appellants mookhtar if he had been so minded. He did not do so perhaps because he was too well acquainted with the contents of the document, and he took no further steps in the matter. In a Court of law the appellant must be held to have received in 1883 all the information which the proceedings of that year conveyed, and Sheoambers possession became adverse to the appellant from that date. Their Lordships are, therefore, of opinion that the Judicial Commissioner took a correct view, and that the suit is barred by limitation whether it comes under art. 91 or art. 120, and it is immaterial to consider whether time began to run against the appellant from Hanwant Singhs death or from the proceedings of 1883. The only other point on which the appellant relied as an excess of jurisdiction in the Judicial Commissioner was an expression of opinion in his judgment that there was no reason to doubt the genuineness of a certain letter said to have been written in 1857 by Raja Hanwant Singh to Sheoamber Singh, which had been admitted in evidence, but which both Courts below had treated as a forgery. This point, however, turns out to be absolutely immaterial. No reliance was or could be placed on the letter by the respondents counsel, and it is a matter for surprise that anybody should have thought it worth while to forge such a letter, or that anybody should have conceived it to be relevant evidence on any issue in the case. This point, however, turns out to be absolutely immaterial. No reliance was or could be placed on the letter by the respondents counsel, and it is a matter for surprise that anybody should have thought it worth while to forge such a letter, or that anybody should have conceived it to be relevant evidence on any issue in the case. Undoubtedly, if their Lordships had found that leave to appeal had been obtained by misrepresentation or concealment of material facts, they would have dismissed the appeal at once without considering the merits. But they acquit the appellant of any intention of that kind. They must, however, add that, if it had been possible when the leave was applied for to appreciate the points in the case as well as they are now in a position to do, they doubt whether any leave to appeal would have been given. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal be dismissed, and the appellant will pay the costs of it.