JUDGMENT 1. In our opinion this rule must be made absolute. The rule was granted for the purpose of considering the legality of an order passed by the Munsif of Alipur under sec. 310A, C. P. C. The facts of the case are as follows :--In execution of a decree against one Johoruddi Mollah, the decree-holder, on the 12th of December 1901, brought to sale the judgment, debtor's property and it was bought by one Arjan Mollah. Prior to the attachment of this property, namely, in February 1900, the judgment-debtor had sold it to one Kefatullah Mondol. During the course of the proceedings in execution, this person preferred a claim to the property under sec. 278, C. P. C., but his claim was disallowed. On the 9th of December 1901, that is to say, three days before the sale in execution of the decree, he instituted a suit to establish his title to the property. On the 10th of December, he obtained an ad interim injunction staying the sale of the property notwithstanding which, as I have mentioned, the sate took place on the 12th of December. The fact that an injunction had been issued was apparently overlooked by the Court conducting the sale, which, however, it may be observed, was the Court which issued the injunction. Afterwards Kefatullah applied to the Court under the provisions of sec. 310A of the Code, and, on that application, the Court set aside the sale on his making the deposit required by that section. It is for the consideration of this order setting aside the sale that the present rule was granted. Now, all that we have to consider strictly is whether Kefatullah was "a person whose immoveable property" had, in the sense of sec. 310A, been sold under Ch. XIX of the Code. If he was not, the Munsif, obviously, had no authority to set aside the sale at his instance : and, upon that question, we think that the case of Ram Chandra Dhondo v. Rakhma Bai is conclusive against the rights of Kefatullah. The case really proceeds upon and applies the principle which was laid down in a Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Asmutunnissa Begum v. Ashruff Ali I. L. R. 15 Cal. The case really proceeds upon and applies the principle which was laid down in a Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Asmutunnissa Begum v. Ashruff Ali I. L. R. 15 Cal. 488 (1888) Were we now to hold that Kefatullah was, in the sense of the section, a person entitled to have the sale set aside as being one whose immoveable property had been sold under Ch. XIX of the Code, we think we should be going counter to the principle laid down in the last-mentioned case. We think, therefore, that the Munsif was wrong in holding that Kefatullah who, it may be further observed, claimed not even as a person whose title to the property was undisputed but as one who had merely raised a claim to the property, which was then pending decision in a Court of law, was entitled to come in under sec. 310A to set aside the sale. This, indeed, was hardly disputed by the learned vakil for the opposite party. He laid the stress of his argument upon what he placed before us as certain equitable considerations in favour of his client; and he further contended that it was, at all events the duty of the Munsif who had directed the sale to take place, notwithstanding the issue of the injunction two days previously, to restore the status quo ante. 2. So far as any equity in favour of Kefatullah is concerned, however, we are unable to perceive that he will be damnified in any way if the sale stands or that his equities are in any sense higher than those of the auction-purchaser. If he succeeds in his suit to have his title to the property declared, he will be in a position to recover the property from any one who may be in possession of it. If, on the other hand, he fails in that litigation, then it will have been established that he was a mere intruder in these sale proceedings and had no pretence of right to come in to Court for the purpose of interfering with the sale. The rights of the auction-purchaser must also be considered. If, on the other hand, he fails in that litigation, then it will have been established that he was a mere intruder in these sale proceedings and had no pretence of right to come in to Court for the purpose of interfering with the sale. The rights of the auction-purchaser must also be considered. If in the result, it should be found that Kefatullah had no title to the property then if the sale were to be set aside on the present application, the auction-purchaser would be deprived of property which is rightfully his. And as regards the duty lying upon the Court to set aside the sale in order to repair, as it was suggested, the injury done to Kefatullah by an error in its procedure, we think such an argument cannot lie in the mouth of Kefatullah who came into Court without any right to put in force the provisions of sec. 310A. The rule, consequently, will be made absolute and the order of the Munsif reversed with costs. We assess the hearing fee at two gold mohurs.