JUDGMENT 1. The facts of this case are briefly as follows :--During the Plaintiff's minority, her father, the Defendant No. 2, executed in favour of Defendant No. 1 without title to do so, a mokurari lease of 5 cottahs of garden land belonging to the Plaintiff and subsequently gave him a verbal lease of one cottah more. The lessee proceeded to erect a building on the land. Some time prior to the execution of the lease the Plaintiff's father-in-law, Defendant No. 3, was appointed her guardian under Act VIII of 1890, and on his application the District Judge had given him permission to grant mokurari leases and recorded his opinion that this would be advantageous to the minor. The guardian, instead of confirming Defendant No. 1's mokurari lease or granting a fresh lease, proceeded to sue him for ejectment. That suit was compromised, and the petition of compromise was embodied in the decree which purports to confirm the mokurari pattah of 6 cottahs at a fixed rental of Rs. 21. Although the suit was brought on the minor's behalf, no order of the Court was obtained sanctioning the compromise. Subsequently a decree for rent was obtained against the Defendant on the basis of the solenamah decree and the decretal amount was paid by the Defendant to Plaintiff's pleader. The present suit was brought by the Plaintiff on attaining majority to eject Defendant No. 1 on the ground that Plaintiff is not bound by the solenamah decree and that the Defendant holds under no valid title. The Munsif found that the compromise is invalid because it was entered into without leave of the Court, but that the Defendant had been recognized as a tenant by the Defendant No. 3 and could not be evicted without notice. He accordingly dismissed the suit. The Plaintiff appealed and the Defendant filed a cross appeal. The learned District Judge agreed with the first Court that the Plaintiff was entitled to avoid the compromise, but holding that Plaintiff was not bound by her guardian's recognition of Defendant as a tenant, he decreed the suit for ejectment. 2. In appeal before us the following grounds were taken by Mr. The learned District Judge agreed with the first Court that the Plaintiff was entitled to avoid the compromise, but holding that Plaintiff was not bound by her guardian's recognition of Defendant as a tenant, he decreed the suit for ejectment. 2. In appeal before us the following grounds were taken by Mr. Pugh on behalf of Defendant No 1 : (1) Sec. 462, C. C. P., does not apply to the case of a certificated guardian; (2) that section refers to agreements out of Court and not to compromise decrees ; (3) that section cannot derogate from the guardian's legal right to grant permanent leases which have been sanctioned by the District Judge ; (4) leave to compromise was given by implication ; (5) the Defendant is not a trespasser but has a subsisting tenancy which the Plaintiff's guardian had recognized, and therefore Defendant could not be ejected without notice. 3. As regards the first point it is clear that the suit was instituted in the minor's name by her certificated guardian as next friend within the provisions of sec. 440. Sec. 462 says that "no next friend or guardian for the suit shall, without the leave of the Court, enter into any agreement or compromise on behalf of a minor with reference to the suit in which he acts as next friend or guardian." No exception is made in the case of a certificated guardian. On the other hand, he is expressly referred to in sec. 440. 4. That sec. 462 refers only to agreements out of Court is manifestly erroneous. "Any agreement or compromise with reference to the suit" obviously includes a compromise finally determining the suit. The policy is to protect minors from being taken at a disadvantage by their guardians, and a minor's interests would generally be quite as much in jeopardy by the final decree as by an agreement at some earlier stage of the suit. That a minor may impeach a decree founded upon a compromise which had not recorded the Court's sanction was the view adopted in the case of Raja Gopal Takkaya v. Mattupalem Chetti I. L. R. 3 Mad. 103 (1881) and in Karmali Rahimbhoy v. Rahimbhoy Habibbhoy I. L. R. 13 Bom. 137 see p. 146 (1883). That a minor may impeach a decree founded upon a compromise which had not recorded the Court's sanction was the view adopted in the case of Raja Gopal Takkaya v. Mattupalem Chetti I. L. R. 3 Mad. 103 (1881) and in Karmali Rahimbhoy v. Rahimbhoy Habibbhoy I. L. R. 13 Bom. 137 see p. 146 (1883). As regards the third plea it is sufficient to say that the guardian's right to grant a permanent lease, if duly sanctioned, is not denied. Unfortunately the guardian did not exercise the power by means of a registered instrument as the law requires. A decree which the minor, under the express authority of the law, has sought to avoid cannot be invoked by the Defendant as a substitute for a duly-registered and valid lease. Fourthly, it is contended that inasmuch as the Court passed a decree in terms of the compromise, leave was thereby granted by implication. This contention is not tenable. In order that a compromise may be binding upon a minor, the leave of the Court must be express, and it must be arrived at upon the exercise of a judicial discretion as to the propriety of the compromise in the interests of the minor. This was the view taken in Kalavati v. Chedi Lal I. L. R. 17 All. 631 (1895) and in Sharat Chunder Ghose v. Kartik Chunder Mitter I. L. R. 9 Cal. 810 (1883). The final ground taken by Defendant's counsel is perfectly valid. The Defendant is in no sense a trespasser. His induction into the and by Plaintiff's father was bond fide so far as the Defendant was concerned, and he was subsequently recognized as a tenant by Plaintiff's guardian who sued him for arrears of rent and accepted the sum decreed. The guardian was fully justified in law in placing tenants on the land and in accepting rent from tenants whom he found already in occupation of the land. The invalidity of the original lease and of the compromise decree does not convert the Defendant into a trespasser. He is an acknowledged tenant and cannot be lawfully evicted without notice. We accordingly set aside the decree of the lower Appellate Court and restore that of the First Court with costs throughout.