JUDGMENT 1. We should have been very unwilling to interfere in this matter if we could have seen our way to refraining from doing so; but unfortunately the Joint Magistrate has put himself in the wrong in such a manner as to render irremediable his initial order under sub-sec. (1), sec. 145, Cr.P.C. It has been many times held by this Court that the recording of a proper order under that provision of law is essential to give the Magistrate jurisdiction to take proceedings under the section. In the present case, it appears, proceedings under sec. 145 were originally started on a police-report, dated the 29th July 1901. On the 14th September following, an order was recorded to the following effect--"Parties absent, case is filed." It is obvious that having regard to the nature of the proceedings under sec. 145, such an order was altogether improper; the proceedings ought to have been carried to a termination in one or other of the ways contemplated by law. We understand that the intention of the order was to put an end to the proceedings which were then before the Court. On the 25th November following there appears an order on the same order-sheet to the effect "the mukhtear of the first party says that the dispute still exists, that the last jute crop is in deposit with the Police. Proceedings under sec. 145, C.Cr.P., are here necessary. Draw a fresh proceeding against both parties as before, for 11th December 1901. Police to report on that date whether there are any other persons who should be made parties, and whether there is still the risk of a breach of the peace. In the meantime Police to see no breach occur." The formal order under sub-sec. (1), sec. 145, was drawn up on that date, and mentions no other information than that contained in the police-report of the 20th July 1901. Proceedings followed, which terminated on the 18th January 1902, in an order maintaining the possession of the first party, and forbidding disturbance of such possession until the eviction of the first party according to law. In the explanation which the Joint Magistrate has submitted he says he assumed that that state of friction and likelihood of a breach of the peace reported by the Police on the 20th July 1901 still existed, and he ordered proceedings under sec. In the explanation which the Joint Magistrate has submitted he says he assumed that that state of friction and likelihood of a breach of the peace reported by the Police on the 20th July 1901 still existed, and he ordered proceedings under sec. 145 to be drawn up accordingly. He adds that at the same time he directed the Police to report whether there was still risk of a breach of the peace; and the police-report, dated the 3rd December 1901, was in the affirmative. 2. It appears to us that the case of Tarini Churn Chowdhry v. Amulya Ratan Roy ILR 20 Cal. 867 (1893) is to a great extent in point. In that case the learned Judges remarked that the decisions of this Court have frequently emphasised the necessity of the proceeding which forms the basis of sec. 145, stating the information upon which the Magistrate has reason to suppose that a breach of the peace is probable or imminent; and it was held that where an order has been made striking off a case under sec. 145, it is necessary to set forth new materials to enable the Magistrate to take fresh proceedings. We have seen that in the present case the formal proceeding itself sets forth no fresh information, and it is useless to refer to a report called for at the time of drawing up the new proceeding and furnished after it was drawn up. The proper course for the Joint Magistrate, if he was satisfied to take further proceedings on the representation of the mukhtear, was to embody the substance of that representation in the proceeding. If, as appears to have been the case, he considered that further information from the Police was necessary in order to justify the renewal of proceedings under sec. 145, he ought to have obtained that information before drawing up the proceeding, and should have set forth the same in the proceeding. Had this been done, the present difficulty would not have occurred. As it is, looking to the case that we have referred to, we think that we must hold that the formal proceeding drawn up on the 19th December 1901 was not, as it stands, a sufficient proceeding to give the Joint Magistrate jurisdiction to act. 3. Had this been done, the present difficulty would not have occurred. As it is, looking to the case that we have referred to, we think that we must hold that the formal proceeding drawn up on the 19th December 1901 was not, as it stands, a sufficient proceeding to give the Joint Magistrate jurisdiction to act. 3. We therefore make the rule absolute, and set aside the final order made by the Joint Magistrate on the 18th January 1902. It is, of course, understood that there will be nothing to prevent the taking of further proceedings according to law upon information justifying such proceedings, if it be found necessary to do so.