JUDGMENT 1. In this case the Deputy Magistrate, by one and the same proceeding, instituted proceedings under sec. 107 and sec. 145, C. Cr. P. In his final order he made no order under Sec. 145, but he bound down both parties under sec. 118 of the Code on the ground that there was an apprehension of a breach of the peace if either side went to exercise the right of possession on the disputed land. We think that the Deputy Magistrate was clearly wrong in the procedure which he adopted. The nature of an enquiry under sec. 145, as provided in that section, differs materially from the nature of an enquiry under sec. 107. It is obvious that the present case was, on the showing of the Deputy Magistrate in his order, one which should have been dealt with under sec. 145, and the finding which we have noticed would justify action under that section, although it did not justify the passing of an order under sec. 118 with regard to the provisions of sec. 107, sub-sec. (1). According to the Deputy Magistrate, the apprehension of a breach of the peace was contingent upon the attempt on either side to exercise acts of possession in the disputed land. That would have been very good ground for establishing the possession of one party or the other, if it could be established, and forbidding disturbance of such possession, or for attaching the property in dispute under sec. 146, if it could not be decided that either of the parties was in possession, or if the Magistrate was unable to satisfy himself as to which of them was in possession. 2. We think that the rule must be made absolute, and the order made by the Deputy Magistrate, under sec. 118, Cr. P. C., set aside. It will of course be open to the Deputy Magistrate to take such fresh proceedings according to law, if any, as he may find it necessary to take for the preservation of the public peace.