JUDGMENT 1. Two questions are raised in this appeal. First, did the Plaintiff acquire under the partition deed (exhibit A) any interest in the land partitioned? Secondly, if she did, what was the nature of that interest? The Court of First Instance held that the effect of the deed was to create a joint tenancy in the Plaintiff and her husband in the lands in question and that on the death of the husband she became solely entitled to them by right of survivorship. The District Judge took the view that the Plaintiff acquired no estate or interest in the lands in question under the deed on the grounds that as the Plaintiff was not a co-parcener, she was not entitled to any share in the family estate and that the sons had no power to stipulate that their father should enjoy his share jointly with his wife. The general rule of law is no doubt correctly stated by the learned Judge, viz., that in the construction of gifts by Hindus in favour of their wives the rule is that the wife should not be deemed to take an absolute estate unless it is dear that this was the intention of the donor. On the construction of the document in the present case, we think the parties intended that the Plaintiff should acquire an estate in the lands in question. The fact that the Plaintiff was not a co-parcener (assuming she was not) is immaterial. It was competent for the coparceners who were entitled to participate in the partition to agree that the share of one of the co-parceners should be held jointly or in common with a party who otherwise would not have been entitled to participate in the partition. If the agreement to divide among the co-parcener had been contained in one document and a subsequent deed of gift had been executed by one of the parties in respect of his share the transaction could not have been impeached by his former co-parceners. It makes no difference that the transaction was carried out by means of one document instead of two. It makes no difference that the transaction was carried out by means of one document instead of two. The recital in the document that the three sons of Subbaraya Ayyar were sons by his senior wife and that the Plaintiff (the junior wife) had no issue up to date goes to show that it was the intention of the parties that special provision should be made for the Plaintiff in substitution for, or in addition to, her rights as a widow under the Hindu law. Mr. Sundara Ayyar, on behalf of the Respondents, argued that the object of the instrument, so far as the Plaintiff was concerned, was merely to show that she was not to have a right of maintenance as against her stepchildren. We are asked, on behalf of the Respondents, to construe the document so as to give no effect to the words "and his junior wife." We do not think the document ought to be so construed. The words used with reference to the Plaintiff are the words which admittedly create an estate of inheritance in favour of the father and the three sons and we think they ought to be construed as having the same effect with reference to the Plaintiff as they have with reference to the parties to the deed. The decision of the Privy Council in the case of Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ram Chandra Dutt I.L.R. Cal. 670 is a strong authority in support of this view. The operative words of the document are clear and unambiguous, and the fact that, in later parts of the instrument, the husbands share is referred to without mention of the wife is not enough to warrant the deed being construed in such a way as to render the words and his junior wife entirely ineffective. 2. We think the case of Seshayya v. Narasamma I.L.R. Mad. 357 is clearly distinguishable from the present case In Seshayya v. Narasamma I.L.R. Mad. 357 a Hindu testator dealt with his residuary estate in these words "my daughter-in-law and grand-daughter shall receive half of my whole estate, and my wife and my adopted son shall receive the other half." It was held that the wife was not intended to take an absolute estate, or any other estate than she would have taken if there had been an intestacy. As regards the adopted son and the wife there was held to be an intestacy on the ground that a Hindu testator would not contemplate an intestacy as to a portion of his property or omit mention of the persons upon whom he wished it to devolve and that he would be obliged as he would think to name at least his adopted son, and the association of the wife with the son would be only natural. Assuming such an obligation would exist in the mind of a testator who was dealing with his property by will we fail to see why such an obligation should be present to the minds of the co-parceners who, in the present case, were dealing with the family estate by way of partition. Further, in Senhayya v. Narasamma I.L.R. Mad. 357 beyond the words "my wife and my adopted son shall receive the other half," there was nothing to indicate an intention on the part of the testator to create an estate of inheritance in favour of the wife and son. In the present case the deed in express terms gives powers of alienation to the parties mentioned in the deed. This, in itself, as it seems to us, is enough to negative the supposition that the parties to the deed intended to act in accordance with the "ordinary notions and wishes of Hindus regarding the devolution and enjoyment of family property." 3. In the present case one of the sons was a minor at the time the deed was executed, and the deed was executed by his father as his guardian. We think it was competent to the father as guardian to do this so as to bind the son. The minors quantum of interest in the estate is not affected by the fact that the father agreed to divide his own share with his wife. 4. As regards the second question, does the Plaintiff take jointly with her husband with a right of survivorship or as a tenant in common without a right of survivorship, we think the point is concluded by authority. We are unable to distinguish the terms of the instrument in the present case from the terms of the bequest in the Privy Council case of Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ram Chandra Dutt I.L.R. Cal. 670 where it was held, in effect over-ruling Vydinada v. Nagammal I.L.R. Mad. We are unable to distinguish the terms of the instrument in the present case from the terms of the bequest in the Privy Council case of Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ram Chandra Dutt I.L.R. Cal. 670 where it was held, in effect over-ruling Vydinada v. Nagammal I.L.R. Mad. 258, that the estate created was a tenancy in common and not a joint tenancy with a right of survivorship. The principle of this Privy Council decision has been applied in Siva Rau v. Vitla Bhatta I.L.R. Mad. 425, Kanthu Punja v. Vittamma I.L.R. Mad. 385 and Bai Diwali v. Patel Bechardas I.L.R. 26 Bom. 445. On principle it may not be easy to distinguish the judgment of the Privy Council in Narpat Singh v. Mahomed Ali Hussain Khan I.L.R. Mad. 385 from that in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ram Chandra Dutt I.L.R. Cal. 670, but we are bound by the later decision. The question involved in the recent decision of the Privy Council in Venkayyamma Garu v. Venkataramanayyamma Bahadur Garu I.L.R. Mad. 678 was one of the right of inheritance not of the construction of a document. The decision had reference to the nature of the estate which devolves upon members of a joint family who succeed to self-acquired property. There is nothing in the judgment which is in any way in conflict with the judgment in the case of Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ram Chandra Dutt I.L.R. Cal. 670. 5. We are of opinion that under the deed (exhibit A) the Plaintiff became tenant in common with her husband and that she is now entitled to a moiety of the lands in question with mesne profits thereof. Subject to this modification we restore the decree of the Munsiff and allow the appeal. The parties will pay and receive proportionate Costs throughout. The question of the amount of mesne profits and the question as to which of the Defendants is liable will be determined in execution.