JUDGMENT Harington, J. - The Appellant in the present case obtained a decree against a man named Tekait Ram Chandra Singh, who died before the Appellant's decree was executed, leaving two sons, Tekait Braja Behari Singh, who is of age, and Foudmoni Singh, who is a minor. The decree-holder sought to execute his decree against the property of the deceased Defendant in the hands of his sons, and it was held by the learned Subordinate Judge of Deogarh that those two sons were the legal representatives of the deceased Defendant, and he ordered the property to be attached. The elder of the two sons appealed against this order. It should be observed that the order against which he appealed contained no grounds, but stated that the reasons for the conclusion arrived at had been given in full in another execution case. That case is not before us and we are unaware what the reasons were which led the learned Subordinate Judge to the conclusion to which he came. On appeal the learned Deputy Commissioner and Judge of Dumka held that as the family was under Mitakshara law the son took by survivorship, and that the objection to the execution of the decree against the deceased father's property was a sound one. He therefore reversed the order of the Court below, and remanded the case for an inquiry as to whether any of the properties against which it was proposed to proceed were self-acquired property. Against that judgment the present appeal is brought. 2. The learned Judge is correct in his proposition of law so far as it goes, but he appears to have overlooked the fact that it was stated by the Respondent Tekait Braja Behari Singh that the custom of primogeniture prevailed in his family. In his petition of objection the Tekait stated that the interest which his father had in this property ceased at his death; that it had come to his hands by his own right under the Mitakshara law; and that as the law of primogeniture prevailed in his family, he alone had become malik of all the ancestral properties. That was the position taken up by the eldest son of the deceased judgment-debtor. The minor brother was not a party to the proceedings before the learned Judge, and did not allege that the property had come to his brother otherwise than by right of primogeniture. That was the position taken up by the eldest son of the deceased judgment-debtor. The minor brother was not a party to the proceedings before the learned Judge, and did not allege that the property had come to his brother otherwise than by right of primogeniture. The existence of this right of primogeniture makes the proposition laid down by the learned Judge inapplicable to this particular case. Where the right of primogeniture exists it has been held that the son who takes by virtue of that right does not become a co-sharer with his father in the estate and does not take by survivorship and that such an estate is not prima facie inalienable. The nature of such inheritance was considered by the Privy Council in the case of Sri Raja Rao Venkata Surya Mahipati Rama Krishna Rao Bahadur v. Court of Wards and Venkata Kumari Mahipati Surya Rao 3 C.W.N. 415 : s.c. L.R. 28 IndAp 83 (1899), and in that case, referring with approval to another case, their Lordships said :--"Where the Plaintiff alleged that the descent of the estate was governed by Mitakshara law, that the estate was impartible and descendible according to the law of primogeniture to the male heirs of the original grantee, and it was held that the estate was not on the case stated shown to be inalienable. They then held this to be the correct view, and that where the Mitakshara law prevails and there is the custom of primogeniture the eldest son does not become a co-sharer with his father in the estate, the inalienability of the estate depends upon custom which must be proved or, it may be, in some cases upon the nature of the tenure." In the present case it is stated by the objector that he has become malik of the whole estate owing to the right of primogeniture. He has therefore taken the estate by descent from his father, and it is an estate which is not shown to be inalienable. That which he has taken therefore from his father, he has taken with the burden of the decree which was obtained against his father, and it is liable therefore to be proceeded against in execution. It is unnecessary to remand the case for any inquiry as to whether any other property is or is not self-acquired. That which he has taken therefore from his father, he has taken with the burden of the decree which was obtained against his father, and it is liable therefore to be proceeded against in execution. It is unnecessary to remand the case for any inquiry as to whether any other property is or is not self-acquired. If any of it is, it is not contended that the self-acquired property of the deceased father cannot be held liable to execution, and any property which was not self-acquired but descended by the right of primogeniture would, on the authority of the case to which we have referred, remain liable to execution. The result therefore is that we allow this appeal. The Appellant will be entitled to his costs. We assess the hearing fee at two gold mohurs.