JUDGMENT Ameer Ali and Pratt, JJ. - The Defendants, Kartick Nath Pandey and Prem Lal Pandey, mortgaged certain properties to the Plaintiffs, decree-holders, Respondents before us, who brought a suit upon their mortgage, making not only the mortgagors, but also their sons, the Appellants in this Court, besides other people, who had become interested in the mortgaged properties, parties to the action. On the 6th of February 1880, a settlement was arrived at between the Plaintiffs in that suit and the principal Defendants and Luchmiput Singh, the 4th party Defendant. Upon the basis of that settlement a decree was made on the 26th of February, which is marked as exhibit 3 in these proceedings and the question involved in this appeal turns upon the construction of certain passages contained therein. In the ordering part of the decree, the Plaintiffs are declared entitled to recover, by instalments, Rs. 55,000, with interest in accordance with the compromise; in default, there was to be the usual mortgage decree. The property in the hands of the Defendant 4th party, Luchmiput Singh, was entirely exempted from the mortgagee's lien. The decree then went on to add that "the other Defendants be exempted." Apparently default was made in the payment of the instalments and the mortgage decree was put in execution and partially satisfied by the sale of the mortgaged premises. For the balance the decree-holders took out execution against certain other properties, which they alleged to be separately acquired properties of their mortgagors. The sons of the latter thereupon put in an objection before the Subordinate Judge of Bhagalpur, alleging that the properties attached were ancestral properties which they held jointly with the judgment-debtors and as the decree had been made only as against their fathers, their shares should be released from attachment. 2. The learned Subordinate Judge on the 12th June 1900 held that as no satisfactory evidence had been given in support of the allegation that the properties against which execution had been taken out were joint ancestral properties of the family, of which the present Appellants were members, their objection was untenable. He also found that Kartic Nath Pandey and Prem Lal Pandey had acquired the properties in question from the fund of their separate karbar and on that ground also the decree-holders were entitled to proceed against them. It is unnecessary to refer to the third ground taken by him. He also found that Kartic Nath Pandey and Prem Lal Pandey had acquired the properties in question from the fund of their separate karbar and on that ground also the decree-holders were entitled to proceed against them. It is unnecessary to refer to the third ground taken by him. In the result, he disallowed the claim with costs. 3. The sons of the judgment-debtors have now appealed to this Court. A preliminary objection was taken on behalf of the decree-holders that as the matter in dispute fell within the provisions of Section 278 of the CPC and inasmuch as the question was not between the parties to the suit within the meaning of Section 244, no appeal lay to this Court. 4. There seems to be some conflict of opinion between the different High Courts regarding the meaning to be attached to the words of Clause (c), Section 244, which runs as follows: Any other questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree or to the stay of execution thereof. 5. The Madras High Court has gone so far as to hold that, if a person was a party to an action, although he may have ceased to have any connection with the suit before the decree was passed, he would still come under Clause (c) of Section 244. That is how we understand the case of Ramaswami Sastrulu v. Kameswaramma ILR (1899) Mad. 361. In that case it appeared that a suit was brought against two persons; subsequently the action was dismissed against one and a decree made against the other. In execution of this decree some property belonging to the Defendant, who had been exonerated as above, was attached and sold. It was held by the Madras High Court that the party against whom the action had been dismissed was not entitled to maintain a suit for recovery of possession of the property, on the ground that the question fell within Section 244. In support of this view, the learned Judges relied upon a previous case of their Court, Sankaravadivammal v. Kumarasamya ILR (1885) Mad. 473 and a Bombay case, Gowri v. Vigneshvar ILR (1892) Bom. 49. In support of this view, the learned Judges relied upon a previous case of their Court, Sankaravadivammal v. Kumarasamya ILR (1885) Mad. 473 and a Bombay case, Gowri v. Vigneshvar ILR (1892) Bom. 49. In this latter case it is suggested that as the words used in the section are "parties to the suit," and not "parties to the decree," it would not be correct, in principle, to restrict the operation of Section 244 and in support of that view the case of Chowdhry Wahed Ali v. Mussamut Jumaee (1872) 11 B.L.R. 149 was referred to, to which we shall presently advert. 6. The Allahabad High Court has taken a different view regarding the construction of the clause in question. In the case of Jangi Nath v. Phundo ILR (1888) All. 74, in which the judgment of this Court in the case of Kameshwar Pershad v. Run Bahadur Singh ILR (1886) Cal. 458 was approved of and followed, it was held that, when an action was dismissed against a Defendant, he was thenceforth a stranger to the suit and if he afterwards came forward and raised an objection to the attachment of a certain property on the ground that it was his own, his objection would fall under Sections 278 and 280 of the Code of Civil Procedure. And the remedy of the person against whom an adverse order was made, allowing or disallowing the claim, would be by a separate suit u/s 283 and not by appeal u/s 244. In Mukarrab Husain v. Hurmat-un-nissa ILR (1895) All. 52, which was no doubt the decision of a single Judge, it was held that where several persons were sued in an action and some were released from liability, they were not parties to the decree within the meaning of Section 244, Clause (c) and were therefore to be treated as strangers and their objection to the attachment would come u/s 278; and if their objection was disallowed, their only remedy was by a suit u/s 283. The principal case in this Court was decided in 1868 under the provisions of Act XXIII of 1861. The principal case in this Court was decided in 1868 under the provisions of Act XXIII of 1861. Section 11 of that Act was, in material respects, identical in its terms with Clause (c) of Section 244 and enacted as follows: Any question arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed and relating to the execution of the decree shall be determined by order of the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. 7. In the case of Gour Kishore Chowdhry v. Mahomed Hassim Chowdhry (1868) 10 W.R. 191, Mr. Justice Loch, who delivered the judgment of the Court, said as follows:--"The words of the law are 'parties to the suit,' not 'parties to the decree,' and it cannot be denied that the Plaintiff was a party to the Defendant's suit. He was, however, released from the operation of that decree and must, we think, as regards the execution of that decree, be considered a stranger to the suit in which he had no further interest or concern. Looking upon him in that light, no objection can be taken to his present action, which is to have a declaration of his title with regard to those lands, which were declared to be his by the former decree, but which title he considers hag been endangered by the act of the Ameen deputed to give possession to the Defendant of the other lands decreed to him." In 1872 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council dealing with the same section in the case of Chowdhry Wahed Ali v. Mussamut Jumaee ILR (1886) Cal. 458 held that, although they desired to give the widest meaning to the language of the section, yet what they had to see in the first place was that there was an existing decree which warranted any execution whatever against the Respondent and they went on to add that "their Lordships cannot find after the incongruous proceedings above described that there exists any decree authorizing an execution against the Respondent's estate; and consequently the question in the present suit is one not properly relating to the execution of a decree, but to a sale under orders which have not the support of any decree." These words in our opinion show distinctly what is to be borne in mind in considering the question whether the matter in dispute falls u/s 244, Clause (c) or whether it comes within Section 278 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the case of Kameshwar Pershad v. Run Bahadur Singh ILR (1886) Cal. 458 two persons were sued for a certain debt. The decree in the first Court was against both; at the appellate stage it was modified and a personal decree for money was made against the Rani, one of the Defendants and the suit was dismissed against the other, Run Bahadur Singh. That decree was affirmed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Subsequently the Plaintiff ascertained that under a certain ekrarnama executed by the Rani in favour of Run Bahadur Singh, he had made himself liable for her debts. The decree-holder thereupon proceeded to execute the decree by attachment of the property in the hands of Run Bahadur Singh. The first Court held against the claim of the decree-holder and on appeal to this Court it was contended that the question came within the terms of Clause (c), Section 244 and was one which the Court should have decided in those proceedings. With reference to that contention, the learned Judges, who dealt with the case, expressed themselves as follows: Then as regards the contention that the present case comes within Clause (c) of Section 244, because the Respondent Run Bahadur was a party to the suit, it seems to us that it is not well founded, because, although Run Bahadur was a party to the suit, no decree was passed against him. He was successful. He was successful. The claim against him was that the property in his hands was liable as having been previously hypothecated. That was the only claim brought against him in that suit; and so far as that claim was concerned, the Plaintiff's suit was dismissed and therefore, although he was a party to the suit, still the question that has arisen is not a question relating to the execution of the decree, which was passed in the suit in favour of the Plaintiff. 8. It will be noticed that in the law as it stands at present, to the words "parties to the suit in which the decree was passed" in Section 11 of Act XXIII of 1861, the words "or their representatives" have been added. And similarly after the words relating to the execution of the decree, the words "discharge or satisfaction of the decree or to the stay of execution thereof" have been added. But no change has been made in the principle and therefore, what the Court has to consider is, as already mentioned, whether there is any dispute between the parties to the suit with respect to the decree passed therein which relates to its execution, discharge or satisfaction. That is practically the test applied by the Privy Council and by this Court in the case of Kameshwar Pershad v. Run Bahadur Singh ILR (1886) Cal. 458 to determine whether the question at issue falls u/s 244. Surely it cannot be contended that a person, who has ceased to be a party to the action before the decree was passed or who has been dismissed from the suit and is then no more interested in the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, should still be considered subject to Clause (c), Section 244. What we have to see is, as has been conceded by the learned pleaders on both sides, whether the present Appellants were in any way affected by the consent decree in the mortgage suit. 9. We have already noticed the words by which the Appellants were exempted from all liability in the action; and giving our careful consideration to the terms of the decree, we are of opinion that in substance it amounted to a dismissal of the action as against the minor Defendants. 9. We have already noticed the words by which the Appellants were exempted from all liability in the action; and giving our careful consideration to the terms of the decree, we are of opinion that in substance it amounted to a dismissal of the action as against the minor Defendants. In the compromise which, was filed, it was alleged that the properties were the separate and self-acquired properties of the mortgagors and it was stated that the minors were in no way liable for the decretal money. Their liability was by the terms of the settlement limited to heirship to the mortgagors--a contingency which had not arisen. So far as the action is concerned, they were in our opinion discharged; and that being so, it seems to us that they were not parties to the suit within the meaning of Section 244, Clause (c) and that therefore no appeal lies to this Court from the order of the Subordinate Judge. We accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs.