JUDGMENT Harington, J. - The Appellants in this case have been convicted of abetment of forgery of a valuable security, and have been sentenced under sec. 467 read with sec. 116 of the Indian Penal Code to rigorous imprisonment for two years, and to a fine of five hundred rupees each, and in default to undergo a further period of rigorous imprisonment for six months; and the first Appellant has in addition been convicted of having in his possession a valuable security knowing it to be forged, and has been punished under sec. 474 with rigorous imprisonment for one year in addition to that passed on his conviction under the other sections. The facts of the case are, that the two accused went to the house of one Nityanund Das, and they saw there a school' boy named Dinabandhu. Kailas, the first Appellant, produced two documents, one of which was a duly registered deed. The two Appellants requested Dinabandhu to copy the registration endorsement on the duly registered deed on to the other document. The boy refused, but gave information to his relatives and told them of the request which the accused had made to him. Subsequently, the two accused again came to Dinabundhu, and brought the two documents, the pens and red ink and again requested him to copy the registration endorsement. A signal was given by the boy to his father and to other villagers who had been told what had passed between the boy and the accused. The father and the villagers came in and found the accused, the boy, the papers and ink all ready for the copying of this registration endorsement. The accused were at once taken into custody. No explanation of the circumstances were given, but the accused begged to be let off. On those facts they were subsequently prosecuted and convicted under the sections to which we have referred before the Sessions Judge of Midnapore. 2. Now, to justify a conviction under sec. 467 of the Indian Penal Code, the prosecution have to establish inter alia that the document in question has been forged by the accused, and a reference to secs. 463 and 464 indicates what elements it is necessary to establish before it can be said that the document has been forged. Under sec. Now, to justify a conviction under sec. 467 of the Indian Penal Code, the prosecution have to establish inter alia that the document in question has been forged by the accused, and a reference to secs. 463 and 464 indicates what elements it is necessary to establish before it can be said that the document has been forged. Under sec. 463 which defines the offence of forgery the accused has to be shown to have "made a false document," and under sec. 464 a person is said to "make a false document, who dishonestly or fraudulently makes, signs or seals or executes a document or part of a document." For the purposes of the present case it is unnecessary to go further into the definition given by that section ; but it is an essential ingredient to the making of a false document that it should be made dishonestly or fraudulently ; and when a document is made dishonestly or fraudulently it is forgery under sec. 463, if it is made with intent to cause damage or injury to the public or to any person or to support any claim or title or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed. To support therefore the conviction in the present case it must be shown that the copy of the registration endorsement which the accused requested the school-boy to make oh the document they produced was to be made for a dishonest or fraudulent purpose, and if made dishonestly or fraudulently was made with one of the intents set out in sec. 463. 3. Now, the documents which were produced by the accused were two. The duly registered document was a conveyance of certain property made by one Aukur Das in favour of the wife of the first Appellant, Kailas. The second document which bore a date much later than the first purported to be a conveyance of the same property by the same Aukur Das executed in favour of Kailas himself. That document in fact has never been executed by Aukur Das. It had never been registered and it was on to that document that the accused desired to have the registration endorsement which appeared on the genuine deed, copied. 4. That document in fact has never been executed by Aukur Das. It had never been registered and it was on to that document that the accused desired to have the registration endorsement which appeared on the genuine deed, copied. 4. The points which are taken on behalf of the Appellant on the facts which we have stated are, first, that the endorsement is not shown to have been required for a dishonest or fraudulent purpose; and, secondly, that no intent set forth in sec. 463 has been proved. 5. The learned Judge who tried the case in the Court below arrives at no conclusion as to the object of the accused in endeavouring to get this endorsement copied on the deed. He suggests that it may have been for the purpose of defrauding the wife of the accused, or that it may have been for the purpose of raising money by borrowing from some money-lender on the security of this document. We have been unable to find any evidence from which either of these alternatives can be legitimately inferred. The man who conveyed the property to the wife originally, Aukur Das, has been called. He proves that he never executed the document which purported to be a conveyance in favour of the accused ; but when cross-examined as to the ownership of the property which purports to be conveyed, he says, referring to the land which was conveyed to the wife :--"Kailas is in possession of the land sold. His wife is alive. Kailas paid the money to us for the land." Prima facie therefore on that evidence the land would appear to be Kailas's and Kailas's wife has not been called for the purpose of showing that the money was paid on her behalf; or that she had any interest in the land in question. The position therefore is that on the evidence the accused appears to have endeavoured to get a document which would, on the face of it, shew that the land which had really been conveyed to him in the name of his wife--which was his and was in his possession, had been conveyed from the vendor to him in his own name instead of in that of his wife. 6. 6. It has been argued by the learned vakil who appeared for the Crown that it was sufficient if a possible intent to cause damage or injury or to support any claim or title could be inferred from the facts. We do not agree with that proposition. The prosecution must give some evidence from which the dishonesty of the transaction and some or one of the intents set out in sec. 463 can be legitimately inferred. On the evidence as it stands the property was Already in the possession of Kailas, and the purchase-money was paid by that gentleman. We think that it cannot be said that it has been shown either that the document was made fraudulently or dishonestly, or that it was made with any of the intents to which we have referred. It is perfectly susceptible of an explanation that Kailas held the property in the benami name of his wife, and that he wrongly, but not dishonestly, intended to put his own property into his own name by this transaction. 7. Under these circumstances we are of opinion that the prosecution have failed to give evidence from which the essential elements of the offences of which the accused have been convicted can be established; and in the absence of that evidence the conviction cannot stand. The appeal therefore must be allowed, the conviction and sentences set aside, and the prisoners released. The fines, if realised, must be refunded.