JUDGMENT 1. The Appellants sued the Respondents for possession of a certain revenue-paying estate, and during the trial of that suit they paid the Government revenue which was due from that estate and had not been paid by the Respondents so as to save the estate from sale. They were accordingly put into possession under sec. 501, C. P. C., while the suit was under trial. The suit was dismissed in the Court of first instance and on appeal. No order was however passed in the decree under the latter part of sec. 501 to enable the Defendant-Respondent to recover what he had lost while he was out of possession. The Appellants have voluntarily restored possession to the Respondents who in proceedings purporting to be in execution of the decree now seek to obtain the money due to them, in consequence of the order under sec. 501, by settlement of account with the Appellants. Objection was taken in the lower Court which has been repeated in this appeal that the Respondents could obtain an account only by a separate suit and not in execution of the decree which only dismissed the suit and only declared them to be entitled to the property under litigation but did not otherwise give the Respondents any order to obtain "restitution." Sec. 501 declares that in a suit in which possession has been given to a Defendant by an order passed under it, "the Court in its decree may (1) award against the defaulter the amount so paid with interest thereupon, at such a rate as the Court thinks fit or (2) may charge the amount so paid with interest thereupon at such rate as the Court orders in any adjustment of accounts which may be directed in the decree passed in the suit." An order in the terms of the latter part of this section should have been passed, but it was not passed apparently through an oversight. Obviously the matters arising out of that suit could not otherwise be properly and completely dealt with, but the decree did not contain such an order. If the decree had been so expressed in the terms of the last part of sec. 501 there can be no doubt that the adjustment of account contemplated by that section would have been made without objection in execution of the decree. If the decree had been so expressed in the terms of the last part of sec. 501 there can be no doubt that the adjustment of account contemplated by that section would have been made without objection in execution of the decree. Such an adjustment was necessary to put the parties in the position that they would have occupied but for the order under sec. 501 putting the Plaintiffs in the suit (the Appellants before us) into possession. It would be of the nature of a restitution which under other circumstances is specially-provided for by sec. 583. The question raised is really whether when a decree does not expressly direct an adjustment of accounts in the terms of sec. 501, such adjustment can be ordered in execution, if it be shown that from the nature of the decree that it could and should have contained such an order and is imperfect without it. In other words does the omission of such a direction which cannot be regarded otherwise than as accidental, prevent the action of the Court in dealing with the decrees as if it had contained the order so omitted. 2. We have been referred to several cases in which the Courts have assumed jurisdiction to act in execution of decrees beyond the express terms of such decrees where it was found that the decrees as passed must be held to include the order which was being carried out. Sec. 583 of the present Code did not appear in the Code of 1859. That Code did not expressly provide for restitution to a Defendant who had been put out of possession in execution of a decree of the Court of first instance which had been reversed on appeal so as to enable an Appellate Court in execution of its decree to restore the parties to the position that they held before the suit, which by its order was dismissed in reversal of the decree of the first Court and proceedings taken in execution of that decree, The question then arose what was the proper course to be taken to do justice between the parties so as to put them into the same position that they would have held, but for the erroneous order of the Court which had been set aside on appeal. In Ununt Ram Hazrah v. Kuralee Pershad Mistree 23 W. R. 441 (1875) it was held under the Code of 1859 that where by an order of the High Court setting aside a decree under which Plaintiffs had obtained possession of certain lands, the Defendants were entitled in execution of decree to obtain mesne profits for the period during which they have been out of possession, a regular suit for this purpose was unnecessary as the effect of the decree of the High Court was to replace the parties in statu quo. The learned Judges referred to Huro Chandra Roy v. Sooradhini Debia B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 985 : S. C. 9 W. R. 402 (1868), remarking that though this question was not perhaps referred to the Full Bench, all the Judges appear to have concurred in holding that a decree for reversal necessarily curried with it the right to restitution of all that had been taken in the erroneous decree in the same manner as an ordinary decree carried with it a right, to have it executed. Pfacock, C. J. 3. in the case before the Full Bench quoted with approbation a passage from 'Domat's Civil Law, Ch. XII, sec. 17, p. 88, which seems to be appropriate to the case now before us, "it is the duty of the Judges to apply the law not only to what appears to be regulated by their express dispositions but to all cases where a fresh application of them may be made and which appear to be comprehended either within the express sense of the law, or within the consequences that may be gathered from it." 4. The same rule was laid down in Lati Kooer v. Sobadra Kooer I. L. R. 3 Cal. 721 (1878). 5. We may also refer to Mookoond Lal Pal v. Mahomed Sami Meah I. L. R. 14 Cal. 484 (1877), Raja Singh v. Kooldip Singh I. L. R. 21 Cal. 989 (1894). The principle on which the Courts have proceeded is that when there has been a wrong done by an order of a Court passed which has been set aside on appeal, the Court executing the final decree, without express authority of law, is competent to put the parties into the position that they occupied before that order. 989 (1894). The principle on which the Courts have proceeded is that when there has been a wrong done by an order of a Court passed which has been set aside on appeal, the Court executing the final decree, without express authority of law, is competent to put the parties into the position that they occupied before that order. No doubt, it would have been more regular if an order for adjustment of account between the parties had been expressly passed, but this omission cannot properly affect the right of the party who has suffered, and it seems to us that it is the duty of the Court to take action to do complete justice in the matter brought to its notice. It has, no doubt, been held that notwithstanding sec. 583 a separate suit can be brought to obtain restitution within the terms of that section, but we are not aware that it has ever been held either before or after sec. 583 became law, that restitution cannot be obtained in execution of the final decree of the Appellate Court. The same rule should be applied to a matter under sec. 501 that is in the case now before us. The order of the Subordinate Judge is just and proper, and the appeal is therefore dismissed with costs 10 gold mohurs.