JUDGMENT Pratt and Mitra, JJ. - This is an appeal in an action for recovery of mortgage-money due on a simple mortgage for Rs. 950 dated the 1st December 1888. The money was repayable on or before the 11th March 1889 with interest at 1 per cent, per mensem. It was, however, stipulated that "if the amount be not repaid within the time fixed, the interest on the amount of loan from after the expiration of the fixed time should be charged at the rate of 5 per cent, per mensem up to the date of ultimate recovery." The Defendant paid from time to time Rs. 1,567 and the suit was for Rs. 610-10-6 as principal and Rs. 2,553-10-0 as interest. The Subordinate Judge gave the Plaintiff a decree for Rs. 1,399-6-3, overruling all the contentions of the Defendant except as to interest after the due date. Both parties Appealed, with the result that the Plaintiff's claim was decreed in full by the District Judge. 2. The only point that requires our consideration refers to the rate of interest after the 11th March 1889. The contention of the Defendant, as set forth in his written statement and pressed before us, is that the stipulation as to interest at 5 per cent, after the expiry of the due date was a penal provision, not intended to be enforced and the Plaintiff was entitled to have interest at only a reasonable rate. 3. It has been held in Mackintosh v. Crow ILR (1882) Cal. 689, Sajaji Panhaji v. Maruti ILR (1889) Bom. 274, Nanjappa v. Nanjappa ILR (1888) Mad. 161, Kala Chand Kyal v. Shib Chunder Roy ILR (1891) Cal. 392 and Rameswar Prosad Singh v. Rai Sham Kishen ILR (1901) Cal. 43 that a provision in a bond, for payment of interest at an increased rate from the date of the bond, on failure of the debtor to pay the principal with interest on the due date, always amounts to a provision for a penalty and Section 74 of the Contract Act applies to the claim for interest at an increased rate from the date of the bond until realization. If, however, the increased rate of interest is stipulated to have operation only after the date of default, the provision has not generally been regarded as a penalty. If, however, the increased rate of interest is stipulated to have operation only after the date of default, the provision has not generally been regarded as a penalty. We may refer to Deno Nath Santh v. Nibaran Chandra Chuckerbutty ILR (1901) Cal. 43, Ramendra Roy Chowdhury v. Serajuddin Ahamed (1898) 2 C.W.N. 234 and Manoo Bepari v. Durga Churn Saha (1898) 2 C.W.N. 333 as illustrating the distinction between the two classes of cases. 4. In Umar Khan v. Sale Khan ILR (1892) Bom. 106, which came before a Full Bench of the High Court at Bombay, all the previous cases were reviewed and the Court came to the conclusion that "a proviso for retrospective enchancement of interest is generally a penalty which should be relieved against, but that a proviso for enhanced interest in the future cannot be considered as a penalty, unless the enhanced rate be such as to lead to the conclusion that it could not have been intended to' be a part of the primary contract between the parties." 5. The covenant as to interest in the bond in Pardhan Bhukhan Lal v. Narsing Dyal ILR (1898) Calc. 300, 310 was very similar to that in the present suit and Rampini J. in that case observed: "The stipulation for increased rate of interest contained in the bond now sued on may be a penalty, but is not necessarily so merely because the increased rate is an exorbitant one. Whether it is a penalty or noWia rather a question of fact than one of law." The case was remanded for the determination of the question, whether, in the circumstances of the case, the stipulation to pay increased rate of interest was not really a penalty against which a Court of Equity ought to grant relief. 6. In Deno Nath Santh v. Nibaran Chandra Chuckerbutty ILR (1899) Cal. 421 the contract was to pay Rs. 20 annually as interest and in default, to pay interest on the consolidated amount of the principal and Rs. 20 as interest, at the rate of Rs. 3-2 per cent, per mensem. It was urged for the debtor that, having regard to the nature of the contract, the Court should hold on equitable principles that it was not enforceable and that the Plaintiff mortgagee was entitled only to reasonable compensation and Pardhan Bhukhan Lal v. Narsing Dyal ILR (1898) Cal. 3-2 per cent, per mensem. It was urged for the debtor that, having regard to the nature of the contract, the Court should hold on equitable principles that it was not enforceable and that the Plaintiff mortgagee was entitled only to reasonable compensation and Pardhan Bhukhan Lal v. Narsing Dyal ILR (1898) Cal. 300, 310 was relied on. Banerjee J., in dealing with the question, said: "Although it is in the power of the Court, if a proper case is made out, to refuse to enforce a clause in a contract quite independently of Section 74 of the Contract Act, no such case has been made out." Such a view is opposed to the opinion of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Umar Khan v. Sale Khan ILR (1892) Bom. 106 and of Rampini J. in Pardhan Bhukhan Lal v. Narsing Dyal ILR (1898) Cal. 300, 310. The Indian Legislature has accepted in Act VI of 1899 the view of the Bombay High Court and that of Rampini J. The Explanation to Section 74 of the Contract Act, as amended by Act VI of 1899, is "A stipulation for increased interest from the date of default may be a stipulation by way of penalty," and illustration (d) runs thus: - "A gives B a bond for the repayment of Rs. 1,000 with interest at 12 per cent, at the end of six months, with a stipulation that, in case of default, interest shall be payable at the rate of 75 per cent, from the date of default. This is a stipulation by way of penalty and B is only entitled to recover from A such compensation as the Court considers reasonable." The increase from 12 to 75 per cent, is in itself sufficient, according to the illustration, for a finding that the stipulation is penal within Section 74 of the Act. 7. The present case is not governed by Act VI of 1899, but we are inclined to agree with the views expressed by the Judges of the High Court at Bombay and by Rampini J. It is not very material, however, whether relief be granted to the debtor on equitable considerations or by the application of Section 74 of the Contract Act. In Pardhan Bhukhan Lal v. Narsing Dyal ILR (1898) Cal. In Pardhan Bhukhan Lal v. Narsing Dyal ILR (1898) Cal. 300, the learned Judges agreed in remanding the case, Ghose J. directing the Court below to consider the stipulation as to interest from an equitable point of view and Rampini J. to consider the facts and circumstances of the case, with a view to determine whether the stipulation was penal within the Statute. 8. In the present case, not only is the increased rate of interest very high, but there is some evidence to show that the stipulation was inserted to ensure prompt payment by the debtor. The Courts below have not considered the case from the point of view that provisions as to increased interest might be penal or that relief might be granted on equitable grounds. If it be not strictly enforceable, reasonable compensation should be granted to the Plaintiff. 9. We accordingly remit the case for retrial on the question of interest after due date. As the Appellant has been partly unsuccessful, we make no order as to costs. 10. There is a cross appeal on behalf of the Respondent as to interest from the date of the decree. We need only draw the attention of the Courts below to Rameswar Prasad Singh v. Rai Sham Kishen ILR (1901) Cal. 43. Interest should be awarded according to the rule therein laid down.