JUDGMENT 1. These three appeals arise out of three suits instituted in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Pubna for setting aside a sale held for arrears of revenue on the 27th June 1895. The property sold was described in the notification of sale which was issued and in the certificate of sale granted to the purchaser at the sale as mahal Bauchram Dass bearing Touzi No 1490 and a sudder jama of Rs. 8-10. The arrear for which it was sold was the small sum of Re. 1-10 being the arrear left unpaid on the 28th March 1895, the latest day of payment as fixed under sec. 3, Act XI of 1859. The suit, out of which the first-mentioned appeal arises, was instituted by some of the proprietors and a putnidar of the property and the suit to which appeal No. 207 relates was by some of the putnidars while the suit from which the last-mentioned appeal No. 210 arises was by some of the proprietors. 2. It appears that on the 18th May 1895 the Collector of Pubna ordered the notification required to be published under secs. 6 and 7 of the Revenue Sale Law (Act XI of 1859) to issue and directed the Nazir to have them served and according to the return made by the Collectorate peon the notice was affixed in the Collectorate on the 27th May 1895. The sale was held on the 27th June 1895, and the property was purchased by one Madhusudan Mitter, agent of two of the Defendants in these suits, for Rs. 2,650. 3. Three appeals were then preferred to the Commissioner of Revenue on behalf of some of the proprietors, and on behalf of some of the putnidars ; but they were dismissed on the 21st November 1895. Thereupon the present suits were instituted in October and November 1896. 4. The grounds upon which the suits were brought are, first, that the notifications under sec. 6 of the Revenue Sale Law were not legally and properly served, and in proper time ; second, that the notices under sec. 7 were not posted in conspicuous and proper places ; third, that the notices under sec. 4. The grounds upon which the suits were brought are, first, that the notifications under sec. 6 of the Revenue Sale Law were not legally and properly served, and in proper time ; second, that the notices under sec. 7 were not posted in conspicuous and proper places ; third, that the notices under sec. 7 were affixed, according to the return of the peon, in Diar, there being no mouzah of that name, the property sold being known as Bhatiadiar ; fourth, that in consequence of the illegalities and irregularities in the service and publication of the sale notices there was a paucity of bidders, and so property worth a lakh of rupees was sold for such a small price as Rs. 2,650. 5. These allegations were however denied by the Defendants, and they raised certain objections to the maintenance of the suits. 6. The issues in these suits--there being one and the same set of issues applicable to all,--were laid down by the Subordinate Judge on the 7th April 1897. Subsequently on the 20th May, and 7th June respectively, three petitions by the three sets of Plaintiffs were presented to the Subordinate Judge, stating that in the plaints a reference to sec. 5 of Act XI of 1859 was omitted by mistake, and asking that the plaints might be allowed to be amended so as to show that the sale was in violation of the provisions of the said section ; and it was subsequently represented that the mistake was due to the pleader who drafted the plaints. But the Subordinate Judge did not accept these statements, and so the amendment asked for was disallowed. 7. It then appears that on the 13th December 1897 before the trial commenced, the Plaintiffs proposed to give evidence showing that there was no proper service and posting of the notices under secs. 6 and 7 of the Sale Law. The Subordinate Judge, however, refused to receive this evidence being of opinion that the certificate of sale granted to the purchaser was conclusive as to the due service and posting of the said notices under sec. 8 of Act VII (B. C.) of 1868, and that therefore no such evidence could be adduced. The offer was repeated by formal petitions subsequently presented on the 16th December 1897 and the 2nd February 1898. 8 of Act VII (B. C.) of 1868, and that therefore no such evidence could be adduced. The offer was repeated by formal petitions subsequently presented on the 16th December 1897 and the 2nd February 1898. In one of these petitions it was represented that the returns of the serving peon would show that the notice under sec. 6 had not been served in the Collectorate thirty days before the sale, and that these returns could not be trusted. The Subordinate Judge, however, declined to receive the evidence offered. 8. The suits were all tried together by consent of parties. The Subordinate Judge answered some of the questions raised in favour of the Plaintiffs, but dismissed the suits upon the main ground that there was no illegality or irregularity affecting the sale. 9. The first matter that has been before us is whether some of the Plaintiffs in these suits having served no notice upon the Secretary of State under sec. 424 of the CPC they could maintain the action. The Subordinate Judge has held that they could not. But as to this matter, we need only refer to the case of Balkishen Das v. Simpson I. L. R. 25 Cal. 833 (1898), decided by the Privy Council, and the case of Bal Mokoond Lall v. Jirjudhun Roy I. L. R. 9 Cal. 271 (1882) where it has been held that the Secretary of State is not a necessary party to an action like this. It is obvious therefore that the objection raised on this score cannot be sustained. The next matter which has been discussed in these appeals is whether the putnidar Plaintiffs are entitled to sue. As to this also we are against the contention of the Defendants. The question at issue was settled by the Judicial Committee in the case of Robert Watson v. Sreemunt Lal Khan 5 Moores I. A. 447 (1854) and though that case was under the old sale law, Regulation XI of 1822, it may well be applied to a case under Act XI of 1859. The wording of sec. 33 of the law is not restrictive so as to debar a person who has a substantial interest in the property sold which is liable to be affected by the sale from instituting a suit to set aside the sale. The wording of sec. 33 of the law is not restrictive so as to debar a person who has a substantial interest in the property sold which is liable to be affected by the sale from instituting a suit to set aside the sale. And this was the view which was substantially affirmed by this Court in the case Gobind Lal Roy v. Biprodas Roy I. L. R. 17 Cal. 398 (1889). 10. We then come to deal with the question whether the Subordinate Judge was right in disallowing the amendment of the plaints with reference to sec. 5 of the Sale Law. That officer we may here mention, has held that a portion of the arrear (Re. 1-10) was attributable to the official year 1893-94. The portion which, in his opinion, was so attributable is ans. 9 ; and the other portion (Re. 1-1) to the year 1894-95 ; and in this view, he has held that a special notice under sec. 5of the Sale Law was necessary with regard to the arrear of ans. 9 ; but he has, at the same time, held having regard to the provisions of sec. 8 of Act VII of 1868 (B. C.), that the omission to serve such a notice does not vitiate the sale, especially because there was an arrear due for the March kist of 1895. We have had a good deal of argument upon the question whether any portion of the arrear was attributable to the year 1893-94, and what do the words "current year" as mentioned in sec. 5 of the Sale Law, refer to, whether they refer to the year in which the sale actually takes place, or when the kist falls due. 11. So far as the first-mentioned question is concerned, we agree with the Subordinate Judge ; but the other question is not altogether free from difficulty. Sec. 2 of the Revenue Sale Law lays down, what is an arrear of revenue : it says that if the whole or any portion of the kist of any month of the era according to which the settlement has been made be unpaid on the 1st of the following month, it shall be considered to be an arrear of revenue. Sec. 3 enjoins upon the Board of Revenue to determine, upon what dates all arrears of Revenue shall be paid in each district, in default of which payment the estate in arrear shall be sold at public auction to the highest bidder. Sec. 4 refers to Sylhet and may be omitted from consideration. Sec. 5 lays down :-- "Provided always that no estate and no share or interest in any estate shall be sold for the recovery of arrears or demands of the description mentioned below otherwise than after a notification in the language of the District, specifying the nature and amount of the arrear or demand, and the latest date on which payment thereof shall be received, shall have been affixed for a period of not less than fifteen clear days preceding the date fixed for payment according to sec. 3 of this Act in the office of the Collector," &c., &c. Then follows the descriptions : "First--Arrears other than these of the current year, or of the year immediately preceding." We are not concerned with the other descriptions in this case. 12. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the Appellant that the "current year" specified in the first description must be taken in this case to be the financial year 1895-96, in the month of June of which year the property in question was sold, and that the arrear of Re. 1-10 being not only of the year immediately preceding, namely, 1894-95, but also of the year antecedent thereto, namely, 1893-94, a special notice was required by sec. 5 to be published before the property could be brought to sale and that this was at least if nothing more, an irregularity. 13. The argument of the learned counsel, as just indicated, is that the expression "current year" is referable to the sale, or, in other words, to the year in which the sale takes place ; and it has been contended that this is the true construction of the section. If sec. 5 were not a proviso, as it expressly is, upon secs. 2 and 3, the construction relied upon by the learned counsel would perhaps prevail. If sec. 5 were not a proviso, as it expressly is, upon secs. 2 and 3, the construction relied upon by the learned counsel would perhaps prevail. But it will be observed that what the section directs is that in the event of an arrear existing, other than those of the current year or of the year immediately preceding, the Collector is to affix a notice not less than 15 clear days preceding the date fixed for payment according to sec. 3. This notice could only be with respect to the arrear then due, and could have no reference to the arrear that might become due on the date, when in the event of the defaulter not paying in his arrears, the property is brought to sale. So that the expression "current year" could have relation only to the time when the said notice is to be affixed. And referring in this connection to sec. 6, it will be seen that so soon as the latest date of payment fixed under sec. 3 of the Act has expired, the Collector is to issue a notification for the sale of the property ; and referring also to the form of the certificate of sale, as given in Sch. A of the Act, the sale takes effect from the date following that fixed for the latest date of payment. So that reading secs. 2, 3, 5, and 6 together, it would seem that the latest date of payment as mentioned in sec. 3 is the turning point and all the machinery of the Act for sales seems to hinge on that. It will farther be observed that upon the date on which the Collector, under sec. 5 of the Act, has to give special notice, he could not possibly know whether the arrear would be paid or not on the latest kist day following, and therefore it is obvious that in a case where the arrear then due was an arrear either of the current year or of the year immediately preceding, and not of any other antecedent year, he would not be required to give such special notice. But according to the argument of the Appellant, because the defaulter does not pay on the latest kist day and because the sale happens to be fixed as in this case in the year succeeding that kist day therefore the Collector could not bring the property to sale without the special notice required by sec. 5. In a case where the sale takes place in the same financial year as the latest date of payment the objection could not possibly apply. And is it reasonable to hold that it would apply where the sale fixed happens to be in a year other than the year for which the arrear was due? We think that the expression "current year" must be taken to refer to the year in which the latest date for payment falls as fixed under 6ec. 3. It is only when that day arrives and passes that it can be ascertained whether any demand of the current year or of the preceding year is still in arrear. 14. In this view of the matter, we are of opinion that no special notice under sec. 5 was required in this case. 15. Next comes the question whether the Subordinate Judge was right in refusing to receive the evidence that was offered by the Plaintiffs with a view to show that the notice under sec. 6 was not served in the Collectorate 30 days before the day of sale. So far as they asked that that evidence might be received for the purpose of proving that the notices under secs. 6 and 7 were not duly served and posted, we agree with him in holding, having regard to the provisions of sec. 8 of Act VII of 1868, that such evidence could not be received. 16. But the matter is different so far as it was proposed to be shown (and that is the way we understood one of the petitions referred to) that the date of sale as mentioned in the notification of sale under sec. 6 was less than 30 clear days from the date of affixing the notification in the office of the Collector. A matter like this is not covered by the provisions of sec. 8 of Act VII of 1868 because it is not a matter which relates to the serving or posting of the notification of sale. 6 was less than 30 clear days from the date of affixing the notification in the office of the Collector. A matter like this is not covered by the provisions of sec. 8 of Act VII of 1868 because it is not a matter which relates to the serving or posting of the notification of sale. This question was fully discussed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bal Mokoond Lall v. Jirjudhun Roy I. L. R. 9 Cal. 271 (1882) where Mitter, J., expressed himself as follows :-- The effect of obtaining that certificate under Act VII is in my opinion simply this : That the Court will be bound to presume conclusively that any notice or notification required to be posted or served under Act XI of 1859 and Bengal Act VII of 1868 was duly served and posted. This section does not mean that the Court is bound to presume that the notification was affixed in the places mentioned in sec. 6, thirty days before the date fixed in notification as the date of sale. This view is further confirmed by the latter part of the section itself, which says :--And the title of any person who may have obtained any such certificate shall not be impeached or affected by reason of any omission, informality or irregularity as regards the serving or posting of any notice in the proceedings under which the sale was held, at which such person may have purchased. This shows that any omission, Informality or irregularity as regards the serving or posting of the notification would not be a ground for setting aside the sale, but it does not lay down that an omission to fix the date of sale in accordance with the provisions of sec. 6, Act XI of 1859, would not affect the title of the purchase. 17. The same view was substantially affirmed in the case of Lola Mobaruk Lal v. The Secretary of State I. L. R. 11 Cal. 200 (1885) by a Full Bench of this Court. We are accordingly of opinion that the ground on which the Subordinate Judge refused to receive the evidence offered by the Plaintiffs cannot be sustained. 18. But then sec. 200 (1885) by a Full Bench of this Court. We are accordingly of opinion that the ground on which the Subordinate Judge refused to receive the evidence offered by the Plaintiffs cannot be sustained. 18. But then sec. 33 of the Sale Law provides that no sale shall be annulled "except upon the ground of its having been made contrary to the provisions of this Act, and then only on proof that the Plaintiff has sustained substantial injury by reason of the irregularity complained of : and no such sale shall be annulled upon such ground, unless such ground shall have been declared and specified in an appeal made to the Commissioner under sec. 25 of this Act." The question here arises whether the ground now taken, namely, that the date of sale mentioned in the notification of sale under sec. 6 of the Act was less than 30 clear days from the date of affixing the said notification in the Collectorate, was declared and specified in any one of the appeals that were presented to the Commissioner. We have examined the petitions of appeal, but we are unable to say that this ground was taken before the Commissioner. No doubt, the ground was taken that the notices under secs. 6 and 7 of the Act had not been duly published but that is a very different ground from the ground with which we are now concerned and this is made more clear by a reference to the judgment of the Commissioner in which he deals with the various grounds that were before him. 19. In this connection we may refer to the case of Gobind Lal Roy v. Ramjanam Misser I. L. R. 21 Cal. 70 (1893) where the Judicial Committee among other matters observed as follows :-- Their Lordships desire to add that in their opinion it would have been most unfortunate if they had been compelled to adopt the construction placed upon the Act by the Courts in India. Sales for arrears of revenue are of constant occurrence ; anything which impairs the security of purchasers at those sales tends to lower the price of the estates put up for sale. Sales for arrears of revenue are of constant occurrence ; anything which impairs the security of purchasers at those sales tends to lower the price of the estates put up for sale. It is therefore of the utmost importance in the interest of the revenue-paying properties of India that all questions that can arise as to the validity of a sale for arrears of revenue should be determined speedily, and that when the sale has once been confirmed by the Commissioner, the purchaser should not be exposed to the danger of having his sale set aside on new grounds. 20. And in an earlier passage they said :--"Giving however full weight to these considerations their Lordships having regard to the scheme of the Act and the express direction contained in sec. 33 are of opinion that in every case where a sale for arrears of revenue is impeached as being contrary to the provisions of Act XI of 1859, no grounds of objection are open to the Plaintiff which have not been declared and specified in an appeal to the Commissioner." 21. Having regard to the observations of the Judicial Committee and the express directions of sec. 33 of the Revenue Sale Law, we are unable, notwithstanding the error committed by the Subordinate Judge, to give effect to the contention of the Appellants. 22. The learned counsel for the Appellants has further contended that by reason of the property having been advertised as Diar, and not as Bhotiar Diar, very few people knew of the sale that was coming on, and so there was a paucity of bidders. As to this matter, all that we need say is that the law does not require the name of the mouzah to be given in the notification of sate and as a matter of fact, the notification did not mention the mouzah. 23. These are the only matters of irregularity, which have been argued before us by the learned counsel for the Appellants, but we are unable to say that there was any such irregularity as would justify us to set aside the sale. 24. There is only one other matter to which we need refer and that is as regards the question of substantial injury. In the view that we have already expressed upon the other question raised in these appeals this matter becomes immaterial. 24. There is only one other matter to which we need refer and that is as regards the question of substantial injury. In the view that we have already expressed upon the other question raised in these appeals this matter becomes immaterial. But we might as well state that the Subordinate Judge has found that the price fetched at the sale was inadequate. He has so held having regard merely to the profit which the proprietors make from the putni ; but in this respect we think he was wrong. He should have taken into account what the true value of the property was and if the evidence of the true value is considered, it will be found that the price fetched at the sale is indeed very inadequate. 25. But however that may be, for the reasons already stated, the sale cannot be set aside. The result is that these three appeals will be dismissed with costs, one-fourth of these costs being awarded to the Respondent, the Secretary of State, and three-fourths to the other Respondents who appeared in these appeals.