JUDGMENT 1. This rule was issued to show cause why the order of the Deputy Magistrate, passed under sec. 148, Cr. P. C., should not be set aside upon the ground that on the view ascertained by the Deputy Magistrate that the second party have title and possession in an undivided share of the land in dispute, it was not competent to him to pass such an order. In the explanation which the Deputy Magistrate has submitted he has stated that he did not hold that the second party were in possession of an undivided share in the land, but that neither party could be held to have been in uninterrupted possession of the laud for any length of time since the dispute began and that each party was trying to exclude the other from exclusive possession. He says that the second party would seem to have been asserting a claim to every parcel of the entire disputed land as included in the undivided share which they claim, while the first party claims the entire land by virtue of the original decree of the Civil Court and the delivery of possession which follows it. It appears that the first party obtained a decree against the mother of the second party in a suit in which the second party were also Defendants. The property in question was put up for sale in execution of the decree. It was purchased by the first party and he was put in possession thereof by the Civil Court on the 4th of March 1901. At some subsequent time the second party sought to get rid of the execution proceedings and to have it declared that they were not bound by them, on the ground that they were not judgment-debtors in the decree. The Subordinate Judge directed that the sale certificate should be amended to the extent of striking out the names of the second party; and that is all that was apparently done. The Deputy Magistrate was, however, of opinion that the order of the Subordinate Judge opened the question as to the shares of the second party in the property in question and left it undecided. 2. The Deputy Magistrate was, however, of opinion that the order of the Subordinate Judge opened the question as to the shares of the second party in the property in question and left it undecided. 2. We do not understand the basis of the decision of the Deputy Magistrate as set forth in the following passage in his original order:--" It should be noted that the lauds were never divided and the second party's claim from the beginning has been restricted to an undivided share in the lands. This claim has been recognised by the Civil Court; but it has not been decided yet to what shares, divided or undivided, the parties are respectively entitled. So far it is clear : that the respective rights still remain to be decided by the Civil Court." So far as we can see from the written statement the second party asserted a claim to the undivided possession of the land in question, and we have not been able to find any ground for the view of the Deputy Magistrate that they claimed only an undivided share. If their claim was to an undivided share, the order of the Deputy Magistrate was bad in view of the ruling in the case of Tarujan Bibee v. Asamuddi Bapari 4 C. W. N. 426 (1900) in which it was held that sec. 145, Cr. P. C., contemplates "a dispute between two parties, each of which asserts the right to hold actual possession of the property as against the other and not a dispute between parties claiming to hold joint possession and neither contesting such right." It was pointed out that in the latter case if a breach of the peace is likely to take place, the Magistrate is competent to take other measures to prevent it, leaving the contending parties to settle their disputes in the Civil Court if they cannot settle them amicably. 3. Taking it, however, that there is a claim on each side to exclusive possession of the entire land, this case is governed by that of S. Gordon Sims v. Johurry Lal 5 C. W. N. 563 (1901). 3. Taking it, however, that there is a claim on each side to exclusive possession of the entire land, this case is governed by that of S. Gordon Sims v. Johurry Lal 5 C. W. N. 563 (1901). In the present case there was, as the Deputy Magistrate sets forth in his order, a sale of the property by the Civil Court to the first party; and the first party was actually put in possession of the property by the Court as the result of that sale. In that case it would be the duty of the Criminal Courts to uphold the status of the first party as established by the Civil Court. The order made by the Subordinate Judge to which we have referred could not operate to set aside the sale or the putting in possession which had already taken place. If any person were wrongfully dispossessed as the result of the execution proceedings, he would have an opportunity to make an application in proper form to have the matter dealt with by the Civil Court. 4. The result is that whether we adopt the view that the claim of the second party was to hold joint possession, or that it was to hold exclusive possession, the order of the Deputy Magistrate would be bad and must be set aside. The rule is accordingly made absolute and the order of the Deputy Magistrate purporting to be made under sec. 146, Cr. P. C., is set aside.