JUDGMENT 1. In this case the Sessions Judge has ordered the commitment of the Petitioners who had been discharged under sec. 209, Cr. P. C., by the Magistrate who held the enquiry. The Sessions Judge's order which is of some length does not consider the case on its merits, that is, whether on the merits the order of the Magistrate discharging the accused is an improper order. He seems to think that where there is any evidence at all regarding the commitment of an offence triable by the Court of Sessions, it is not for the Magistrate to consider whether that evidence is reliable or worthy of credit, but that the Magistrate is bound to commit the case so as to leave the matter for determination by a superior Court. No doubt, the Magistrate in taking upon himself to determine the value of the evidence assumes a great responsibility, but it seems to us that it is a responsibility imposed upon him by the law, for, while sec. 209 declares that the Magistrate, at the conclusion of an enquiry shall, if he finds that there are not sufficient grounds for committing the accused person for trial, record his reasons and discharge him, sec. 210, on the other hand, declares that if the Magistrate is satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for committing the accused for trial, he shall frame a charge and so forth. It is, therefore, the duty of the Magistrate to consider whether there are sufficient grounds for committing the accused and, amongst those grounds, it seems to us, may properly be placed the consideration whether, on the evidence before him, it is probable that a conviction will be arrived at. The Sessions Judge has refrained from considering the evidence of the witnesses whom the Magistrate considers to be unreliable because, as he says, he could hardly deal with all those questions "without prejudging the case and without making it difficult for him to hear it with a jury" and, in the next place, "such a proceeding would be wholly infructuous for, it would simply be holding another mock-trial like the mock-trial before the Assistant Magistrate." We cannot understand the use of the expression "mock-trial." The proceedings held by the Magistrate were formal judicial proceedings and they cannot properly be so characterized. In regard to the duty of the Sessions Judge in considering the evidence before he directs further inquiry, we would refer to sec. 436 which requires that, before he directs further proceedings to be taken, he must be of opinion that the accused person has been improperly discharged. These terms appear to us to refer to sec. 209, that is, where the Magistrate has exercised a wrong discretion on the evidence on the record in discharging the accused. We cannot understand how the Sessions Judge can consider that he would prejudge the case if he considers the evidence on the record for if the case were committed for trial in the Sessions Court it would be his duty to take the evidence de novo and to try the case on that evidence. If as in the present case the Sessions Judge orders a commitment to be made without considering the evidence merely because there is some evidence on the record, it may be that that evidence is manifestly false or unreliable and such that no judicial officer would believe and yet he would subject the accused to the harassment and expense of a Sessions trial where no case could be explained on that evidence. We have no doubt that it is the duty of a Sessions Judge in considering whether an accused person has been "improperly discharged" within the terms of sec. 436 so as to require him to be committed to the Sessions Court is bound to consider all the grounds upon which such order of discharge has been passed including a consideration of the evidence which has not been believed or held to be sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Without doing so, it would be impossible for the Sessions Judge to find that the order of discharge was improper. We cannot understand the second ground upon which the Sessions Judge has refused to act. It seems to us, therefore, that the Sessions Judge's order directing the commitment of the accused is bad inasmuch as it has not been made on full consideration of the merits of the case as disclosed by the evidence taken before the Magistrate. We accordingly set it aside and leave it to the Sessions Judge to consider whether, on perusal of the evidence on the record, he should take further action in the manner directed by law.