JUDGMENT 1. In showing cause against an order under sec. 133, Cr. P. C., to remove an obstruction from a public pathway, the Petitioners stated that there had never been the public way claimed but that the land on which it stood was in their exclusive possession and was their own private property. Under such circumstances it was necessary for the Magistrate to find whether the objection thus raised was a bond fide objection or a mere pretext to oust the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. The law is clearly expressed in the case of Luckhee Naraian Banerjee v. Ram Kumar Mukherjee I. L. R. 15 Cal. 564 (1888) and it is there pointed out that, under the code as it was altered by the Act of 1883, the Magistrate had no jurisdiction as he previously had to try matters of this description unless, as stated in sec. 147 in its modified form, the dispute was likely to cause a breach of the peace. The case just mentioned has been followed in numerous decisions of this Court and has never been questioned. In the present case the Magistrate has come to no express finding on the issue which should properly arise, that is, whether the objection raised by the person called upon to show cause was a bond fide objection. He has taken upon himself at once to decide whether there was or was not a public way. That is a matter which, as pointed out in the case of Luckhee Naraian Banerjee v. Ram Kumar Mukherjee I. L. R. 15 Cal. 564 (1888) the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to determine. Having found that there was a public way which had been obstructed, the Magistrate then found that the objection made was totally false. Necessarily that would follow from such a finding, but that was not the manner in which a matter of this description should have been dealt with, as was explained in the case of Luckhee Naraian Banerjee v. Ram Kumar Mukherjee I. L. R. 15 Cal. 564 (1888). The finding of the Magistrate, therefore, is not a proper finding in this case, and we may observe that there are no reasons given for coming to that conclusion. We may point to that portion of the judgment in Luckhee Naraian Banerjee's case I. L. R. 15 Cal. 564 (1888). The finding of the Magistrate, therefore, is not a proper finding in this case, and we may observe that there are no reasons given for coming to that conclusion. We may point to that portion of the judgment in Luckhee Naraian Banerjee's case I. L. R. 15 Cal. 564 (1888) which deals with the merits of the case then before the Court as an instance in which the Court might hold that an objection, as is raised in the present case, was not a bond fide objection inasmuch as it was contrary to all the patent facts shown relating to the matter in dispute. But that is not the case before us. The rule is, therefore, made absolute and the order of the Magistrate is set aside.