Judgement Appeal from a decree of the High Court (Aug. 17, 1899) affirming a decree of the District Judge of Mymensingh (Feb. 27, 1897) which reversed in appeal a decree of the Subordinate Judge of the same place (Sept. 17, 1895). The suit was brought by the appellant in 1892 for declara- tions (1.) that certain land comprised in mouzahs Tarapore, Jadabai, Garamara, and Taragunge, which the appellant claimed, was reformation on the original sites of his land, which had been " washed away and submerged under water "; and (2.) that, consequently, the assessment of such land to revenue by Government was illegal; and further claiming (3.) a refund of the revenue so illegally assessed, which had been paid by the appellant and his mother and guardian, with (4.) costs, and (5.) other relief. He claimed in his plaint to be the owner of the said mouzahs as part of a permanently settled taluq, which he held as shebait (trustee) of a deity in succession to his ancestors. The said settlement was alleged to date from the permanent settlement. He also alleged that " a portion of the lands of the said mouzahs was washed away long after the decennial (permanent) settlement by the current of the river Brahmaputra, and part of the lands so diluviated and submerged under water afterwards reformed on their original sites, and a branch of the said river flowed over the remaining part of the diluviated lands of the said mouzahs. In that state the diluviated lands, together with other lands, were thakked and measured and mapped on the occasion of the revenue survey as owned and held by the plaintiffs predecessors, " He further alleged that " at the time of the revenue survey alluded to above, the branch of the river Brahmaputra which had flowed over the diluviated lands of those mouzahs gradually receded, and its bed silted up and became dry " ; that the lands in suit reformed on their original sites, and were held by the appellant and his predecessors ; but that in 1881, during his minority, the Government survey authorities measured and marked, according to the provisions of Act IX. of 1847, in the deara survey map these lands in suit " which were under water, and over which the river flowed during the revenue survey, and which reformed on their original sites .... of 1847, in the deara survey map these lands in suit " which were under water, and over which the river flowed during the revenue survey, and which reformed on their original sites .... by the silting up of the river," as liable to assessment to revenue, and claimed, on August 31, 1882, to assess them accordingly as " surplus lands of the said mouzahs not embraced by the revenue survey," and that his mother and guardian, " finding no other means, took settlements of these lands, creating a maliki talukdari right in her favour with a view to retain possession as before." These lands, he alleged, were in fact not surplus lands, as the Government maintained, but reformations on their original sites within the ambit of the taluqs, &c, and were consequently not liable to further assessment, which he therefore sought to set aside. The respondent denied that the lands in suit were reformations on sites within the ambit of the land settled with the appellant, and pointed to the absence of any claim for abatement of revenue on the ground of diluviation as negativing the allegation of reformation made by the appellant. He alleged that at the time of the permanent settlement, and of the revenue survey which followed, "the deara blocks were covered and entirely enveloped by the deep navigable stream of the Brahmaputra; on their appearance they were found to be fresh additions and surplus accretions to the plaintiffs estate, and were rightly resumed and assessed under Act IX. of 1847 in the year 1882." And he contended that " the acceptance of a farming settlement by the mother of the appellant, after her objection was disallowed by the deara authorities, was tantamount to acquiescence on her part," and estopped the appellant "from questioning the right of the State to resume the lands for assessment"; and that the appellants predecessor had waived any right she may have had to dispute the Government title to assess the land in suit, which, he insisted, she had acknowledged by her conduct. The thak and survey maps of 1852 to 1854 were put in evidence, and shewed that at that time the Brahmaputra flowed over the land now in dispute; and that the boundaries of the villages, as there shewn, fell in part in the river; but that the portions covered by the river were separately specified in the particulars of area given in these maps. The Subordinate Judge held that the Government was not entitled to assess the land in dispute to revenue; and that the assessment was illegal on the ground that the appellants witnesses had proved that the land in dispute was " originally terra firma, i.e., before the revenue survey they were asli " (originally part of the estate), "and subsequently they were washed away and reformed." The District Judge held that the finding of the Subordinate Judge, " that at the time of the thakbust and revenue surveys the land in dispute was " asli land of these villages," was inconsistent with the case of both the parties, which agreed in placing the land at that time in the bed of the river. With regard to the thakbust and survey maps, which, he said, take " us as far back as 1852, when these lands, we must now take it, were in the bed of the river," he held that there was no sufficient evidence to shew "that, previous to 1852, these lands were not in the bed of the river," or that the river had altered its course since the permanent settlement; and that there was " no evidence that the bed of the Brahmaputra river was settled as part of the estates in question." He said "The facts that the river passed through some of these estates in 1852, and that the area of the water was calculated and the whole shewn in the one survey map of the village, are. not, as far as I am aware, any admission by the defendant that the river was part of the estate. not, as far as I am aware, any admission by the defendant that the river was part of the estate. It was shewn together with the estate, and the two areas were calculated together, or rather in the same map, purely for statistical purposes and for convenience." The High Court in affirming this judgment said "The con tention before us is that the District Judge has committed an error of law in misconstruing the maps and in refusing to give them their legal effect." They referred to the case made by the appellant, and said that it was " not his case that the bed of the Brahmaputra river formed part of his permanent estate. He makes no such allegation. His case is that the land is land of his estate, which was washed away by the river and has reformed on its old site. Of this there is no proof at all; but it is common ground that the river flowed over this land at the time of the survey in 1854, and that the land has since reformed. For all we know to the contrary, the river may never have changed its course in this particular locality prior to 1854." With regard to the thakbust and survey maps, which, it was contended, furnished " in themselves sufficient proof of the plaintiffs case," they said " The judge has not refused to accept the maps as evidence, nor has he omitted to take into consideration the circumstances referred to ; but he says the statements in the map do not amount to an admission by the Government that the river bed is part of the estate, and the circumstances are not sufficient in his judgment to prove that it was. In so dealing with them we cannot say that the judge has committed an error of law. He is certainly right in saying that there is no admission on the part of the Government of the fact which it was necessary for the plaintiff to prove. The maps may be evidence against the Government to the same extent that they would be evidence against the proprietor of an adjoining estate." And they concluded by saying, "Unless we are prepared to hold that these maps are in themselves sufficient to prove the plaintiffs case, the appeal must fail. The maps may be evidence against the Government to the same extent that they would be evidence against the proprietor of an adjoining estate." And they concluded by saying, "Unless we are prepared to hold that these maps are in themselves sufficient to prove the plaintiffs case, the appeal must fail. We are not prepared to hold that, and we dismiss the appeal with costs." Sir W. Rattigan, K.C., and C. W. Arathoon, for the appellant, contended that the decrees of the High Court and the District Judge were wrong, and that the decree of the Subordinate Judge should be restored. The deara survey authorities in coducting the thakbust and revenue survey proceedings, and in demarcating this portion of the river as part of the appellants mehal, must have satisfied themselves that it was included in the permanently settled estate. The whole area of land within the thakbust and survey maps was included as forming the land of a permanently settled estate, whether that land was dry land or land covered with water. The presumption was in favour of the appellant that the bed of the river was permanently settled. The boundary lines of his mouzahs as given in the maps, and their areas also, having distinctly covered the site of the lands in suit, over part of which the river was running in 1852, it was for the respondent to have proved to the contrary. Otherwise the maps operated as an admission by the Government that the site in suit was part of the permanently settled estates, although it was under the flowing water of the river at the time. There was no sufficient evidence that any lands had been added to the estate, as it was depicted in the survey map, within the meaning of S. 6 of Act IX. of 1817. The cases of Dewan Ramjewan Singh v. Collector of Shahabad (( 1872) 18 Suth. W. R. 64.) and Ram Jewun Singh v. Collector of Shahabad (( 1873) 19 Suth. W. R. 127.) were referred to. [Lord Macnaghten referred to Secretary of State for India v. Srimati Fahamidunnissa Begum. (( 1889) L. R. 17 Ind. Ap. 40.)] With regard to rules for the preparation of maps, see Satcowri Ghosh Mondal v. Secretary of State for India (( 1894) Ind. L. R. 22 Calc. W. R. 127.) were referred to. [Lord Macnaghten referred to Secretary of State for India v. Srimati Fahamidunnissa Begum. (( 1889) L. R. 17 Ind. Ap. 40.)] With regard to rules for the preparation of maps, see Satcowri Ghosh Mondal v. Secretary of State for India (( 1894) Ind. L. R. 22 Calc. 252,257.); and as to their effect and force as evidence, see Syama Sunderi Dassya v. Jogobundhu Sootar (( 1888) Ind. L. R. 16 Calc. 186,188.); as to the inference to be drawn as to the position of the boundaries, it is sufficient to produce the map immediately preceding the state of things to be proved. It was contended that the map shewed that the Government was not entitled to assess the land in suit. Phillips, for the respondent, contended that under s. 584 of the Civil Procedure Code the District Judges decree was final, for it was not open to any of the objections therein specified. The appellant had failed to make any case for relief even if that judgment were set aside. He had failed to shew that the land in suit had been reformed on any land of his. There was nothing to shew that the lands in suit had been permanently settled with the appellant. None of the maps shew it. The case in 22 Calc. 252 has no bearing on the question whether the maps shew that this land was included in the appellants permanently settled estate see on that point s. 83 of Act I. of 1872. Sir W. Rattigan, K.C., replied. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD LINDLEY. The question which their Lordships have to decide in this appeal is whether certain pieces of land, which were in the year 1881 assessed with Government revenue as fresh additions and surplus accretions to the appellants taluq (estate) under the provisions of Act IX. of 1847, were or were not lands which were included in his permanently settled estate. This estate included four mouzahs—Tarapore, Jadabai, Garamara, and Taragunge. The Brahmaputra, which is a public navigable river, ran through these mouzahs. The bed of the river presumably was and is Government property. The bed is not the property of the appellant, and was not the property of his predecessors in title in 1793. This estate included four mouzahs—Tarapore, Jadabai, Garamara, and Taragunge. The Brahmaputra, which is a public navigable river, ran through these mouzahs. The bed of the river presumably was and is Government property. The bed is not the property of the appellant, and was not the property of his predecessors in title in 1793. Where the river then flowed is not shewn by the evidence in these proceedings; but there is evidence to shew that in 1838 it was in the same situation as in 1851 and 1853. After that time, and before 1881, the river had shifted its course, and its former bed had become dry land, and it has so remained. This dry land is the land in dispute. Locally it is situate in the appellants mouzahs. In the year 1881 the deara survey authorities, on behalf of the Government, purporting to act in accordance with the provisions of Act IX. of 1847, surveyed and marked out the pieces of land in question as surplus accretions and additions to the appellants said four villages, and assessed the same accordingly. The appellant was then a minor under the guardianship of his mother, who disputed the assessment on the ground that the aforesaid mouzahs were included in the permanent settlement of 1793, and that the lands in question were part of them. The assessment authorities however considered that the lands in question were new accretions to these mouzahs, and as such were properly assessable under s. 6 of the Act of 1847; and they assessed them accordingly. The appellants mother did not contest the matter further, but accepted a settlement of these lands for twelve years, which expired in 1893. In the Courts below it was contended that the appellant was precluded by these proceed ings and by lapse of time from disputing the validity of the assessment so made; but this contention did not prevail, and was not renewed before this Board. It will not, therefore, be further alluded to. The appellant, having come of age, instituted the present suit on October 24, 1892, for the purpose of having it declared that the assessment of 1881 was illegal, and for a return of the assessments paid under it. It will not, therefore, be further alluded to. The appellant, having come of age, instituted the present suit on October 24, 1892, for the purpose of having it declared that the assessment of 1881 was illegal, and for a return of the assessments paid under it. The Secretary of State filed an answer to the plaint, and stated that, both at the period of the permanent settlement and the revenue survey that followed, the deara blocks were covered and entirely enveloped by the deep navigable stream of the Brahmaputra, and on their appearance they were proved to be fresh additions and surplus accretions to the plaintiffs estate. Six issues were settled, but the only one now of any importance is the third issue, which runs as follows " Is it true that the disputed lands are the reformed lands appertaining to the permanently settled taluq of the plaintiff, or are they fresh additions or surplus accretions to the taluq as contended on behalf of Government ? " A local inquiry was directed, and a Commissioner (Amin) was appointed to conduct it and to report the result. The thak and survey maps of 1851-53 and of 1881 were before him; he took evidence, and examined the locality and made a map and report. This map shews that the lands in question were dry in 1881 and since, but that they formed the bed of the river Brahmaputra in 1851-53, and that in those years the river flowed through the appellants property, and that this property was included in the permanent settlement of 1793. Further, the Amin ascertained and gave the acreage of this property, and included the bed of the river in that acreage. He did not, however, find where the river was, nor how the bed of the river was dealt with, when the permanent settlement was fixed in 1793. Upon this map and report the Court of first instance decided the above issue in favour of the appellant, and ordered Rs.1218 to be refunded to him. The District Judge reversed this decision, and dismissed the appellants suit with costs. The appellant then appealed to the High Court; and that Court, although differing from the District Judge on some points, held that he had not committed any error in law affecting the third issue, and the appellants appeal was dismissed accordingly. The District Judge reversed this decision, and dismissed the appellants suit with costs. The appellant then appealed to the High Court; and that Court, although differing from the District Judge on some points, held that he had not committed any error in law affecting the third issue, and the appellants appeal was dismissed accordingly. The appellant then applied to the High Court for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council, and such leave was granted on the ground that " the question involved appears to be one of very general importance, namely, as to the true effect of the survey maps having regard to ss. 5 and 6 of Act IX. of 1847." This appeal has accordingly been brought and argued. The only questions of law which arise are the construction of s. 6 of Act IX. of 1847, and the legal effect of that section when applied to the facts of the present case. It has already been decided by this Board, and it is plain from the language of the Act of 1847, that the Act has no application to lands included in the permanent settlement of 1793, and the assessment of which lands was then fixed for ever. No new assessments of such lands can be lawfully made see Secretary of State for India in Council v. Srimati Fahamidunnissa Begum. (L. R. 17 Ind. Ap. 40.) In that case the lands in dispute were dry in 1793; they afterwards became submerged, and then again became dry. It was held that they ought not to have been reassessed. In every case the question what lands were included in the permanent settlement is a question of fact and not of law. This question may or may not be satisfactorily proved by subsequent survey maps. The onus of proving that any particular lands were included in the permanent settlement of 1793, in other words, the onus of proving that the Government revenue then fixed was assessed upon any particular lands, is clearly on those who affirm that such was the case. This question may or may not be satisfactorily proved by subsequent survey maps. The onus of proving that any particular lands were included in the permanent settlement of 1793, in other words, the onus of proving that the Government revenue then fixed was assessed upon any particular lands, is clearly on those who affirm that such was the case. But their Lordships are not prepared to say as a matter of law that the appellants counsel were right in contending that the burden of proof was shifted on to the respondent by the thak and survey maps of 1851-53, and that those maps ought to have been held sufficient proof that what was part of the bed of the Brahmaputra in those years was included in the permanent settlement of 1793. The Brahmaputra was then, as it is now, a public navigable river, and if the lands in question were then part of its bed, as they were in 1851 and apparently also in 1838, it is difficult to suppose, and it ought not to be assumed, that those lands were included in the lands permanently assessed in 1793. No Court can properly act on the assumption that in 1793 a state of things existed different from what appears from any evidence before the Court. Their Lordships are, therefore, of opinion that the District Judge did not commit any error of law in dismissing the appellants suit, and that the High Court were right in dismissing the appeal from his decision. Their Lordships were, however, referred by counsel to numerous authorities on the effect of thak and survey maps and of the application of the Act IX. of 1847 to them; and, having regard to the grounds on which leave to appeal was given in this case, their Lordships will express their views on the principles applicable to these points so far as they arise in the present appeal. Maps and surveys made in India for revenue purposes are official documents prepared by competent persons, and with such publicity and notice to persons interested as to be admissible and valuable evidence of the state of things at the time they are made. They are not conclusive, and may be shewn to be wrong; but in the absence of evidence to the contrary they may be properly judicially received in evidence as correct when made. They are not conclusive, and may be shewn to be wrong; but in the absence of evidence to the contrary they may be properly judicially received in evidence as correct when made. This is in accordance with the cases reported in Ind. L. R. 22 Calc. 252; Ind. L. R. 16 Calc. 186; Ind. L. R. 11 Calc. 784; 18 Suth. W. R. 64; and 19 Suth. W. R. 127. Assuming lands not to be within the permanent settlement of 1793, then their Lordships agree with the contention of the appellants counsel that the last survey made under s. 3 of the Act IX. of 1847 is to be taken as the starting-point for deciding, when the next survey is made, whether lands are within ss. 5 and 6 of that Act. But when the question arises whether lands shewn on a particular thak or survey map made since 1793 were or were not included in the lands charged with the assessment permanently fixed in 1793, the inquiry is at once enlarged, and it would not be right in point of law to direct the judge of first instance that he ought in all cases to act on the last thak or survey map, and to treat it as decisive in the absence of evidence to the contrary. In Sarat Sundari Dabi and Others v. Secretary of State for India in Council (Ind. L. R. 11 Calc. 784.) it is not clear whether the reformed lands were or were not assessed when the permanent settlement was fixed; but if they were, the case went too far and is not consistent with the case in L. E, 17 Ind. Ap. 40. Indeed, it was distinctly disapproved in India in Ind. L. R. 14 Calc. 67 (see p. 92), and afterwards affirmed in L. R. 17 Ind. Ap. 40. In the case reported in Ind. L. R. 22 Calc. 252, the question was sent back for further inquiry; and in the case before their Lordships the same course might have been taken. But no error in point of law was committed in deciding on the evidence as it stood; and on that evidence the decision of the District Judge was right. L. R. 22 Calc. 252, the question was sent back for further inquiry; and in the case before their Lordships the same course might have been taken. But no error in point of law was committed in deciding on the evidence as it stood; and on that evidence the decision of the District Judge was right. It certainly cannot be assumed that the lands in question were dry land in 1793, or that the land forming the bed of a public navigable river was included in the assessment then permanently fixed. Their Lordships will, therefore, humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be dismissed. The appellant must pay the costs.