JUDGMENT Henry T. Prinsep, Off. C.J. 1. I agree in the judgment delivered by Mr. Justice Hill. The matters under consideration have been so fully discussed in the order of reference and in his judgment that there is little to add. 2. The reported cases to which dissent has been expressed in the order of reference seem to have proceeded on the ground that proceedings u/s 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be regulated on the same principles as if the Magistrate were trying a civil suit involving a right to possession and that, unless all persons having any possible claim are made parties to those proceedings, they are bad for want of jurisdiction. That was also the argument addressed to us by Mr. Hill. But the law does not require this, nor is it the object of proceedings u/s 145 that the Magistrate should deal with the matter before him, as if he were acting as a Civil Court. The object in view is to prevent a breach of the peace by determining the actual possession of land, etc., in dispute between certain parties, who are likely on this account to break the peace. The Court has, however, recognized that a determination of actual possession between the disputing parties might affect the rights of absent parties really in possession and that such persons are entitled to be heard. That seems to me to be going beyond the letter of the law and also the object in view. It may be very desirable that such parties should be heard, so as to avoid a possible injustice by determining in their absence an issue which may affect their rights. But whether a particular person should or should not he brought in is a matter on which the Magistrate should exercise his discretion. The law nowhere declares that such person is entitled to come into the proceedings and therefore, although in refusing to hear him, the Magistrate may not be exercising his discretion properly, it cannot be said that such refusal amounts to a refusal to exercise jurisdiction under the law. The law nowhere declares that such person is entitled to come into the proceedings and therefore, although in refusing to hear him, the Magistrate may not be exercising his discretion properly, it cannot be said that such refusal amounts to a refusal to exercise jurisdiction under the law. The object in view is to prevent a breach of the peace between certain parties found to be in dispute by determining the subject-matter of that dispute, not the determination of actual possession or a right to possession in regard to all persons, who may possibly be concerned in such a matter. It is the duty of the Magistrate to avoid doing injustice to others, when holding his proceedings, so as to arrive at the final order in regard to actual possession, but his jurisdiction cannot be affected by the fact that he may not have heard one, who was not mentioned, in the information on which he has acted, as in dispute or in the order in writing on which his proceedings have been taken. The final order has effect only, until a competent Court has determined "the rights of the disputing parties thereto or the person entitled to possession thereof." By this means the probable breach of the peace is prevented. This is the paramount consideration and I may appropriately point out that this has so been regarded in respect of an order u/s 144 which may restrain a person from the exercise of his lawful rights of property, because such exercise is likely to cause a breach of the peace. There are many reported cases on this subject in which, for instance, the right to hold a hat (market) by a man on his own land has been prohibited for this reason. 3. The judgment of the Full Bench in Protap Narain Singh v. Rajendra Narain Singh ILR (1896) Cal. 55 is obsolete in consequence of the modification of the law by the enactment of Sub-section (3) for the obvious object of directing a public notification to be made, on the locality, of the order in writing. Taking proceedings u/s 145 can have been only with the intention of enabling others than those personally served with such order to come in, if they are affected by the proceedings taken. Taking proceedings u/s 145 can have been only with the intention of enabling others than those personally served with such order to come in, if they are affected by the proceedings taken. As one of the referring Judges, I would here explain that the third point put to the Full Bench proceeded only on that judgment being in force. 4. On the last point referred, I would desire to state that it is impossible to lay down any general rule in regard to proceedings of a Magistrate u/s 145 and how far they should be confined in each case to a particular plot of land claimed by one of the parties. Suppose, as in the case of Laldhari Singh v. Sukdeo Narain Singh ILR (1900) Cal. 892 a number of persons backed by their landlord are disputing with others backed by their landlord in regard to possession of lands and from the information before the Magistrate they are acting in combination. As between the zemindar landlords there would be no difficulty, but to require the Magistrate to hold separate proceedings in respect to each plot of land claimed by each of the ryots, would be to require him to undertake what would be almost impossible from the intricate character of such proceedings. The jurisdiction of the Magistrate would depend upon the nature of the information, on which he has acted. If the dispute so brought to his notice is one likely to cause a breach of the peace, it would be impossible to characterize his proceedings as without jurisdiction, because in the course of the judicial inquiry subsequently held the claims of some of the parties related only to particular plots of land out of the entire area in question. His findings should naturally be directed to possession of particular plots, but that he did not take separate proceedings in respect to each plot would not invalidate his entire proceedings. What might be the nature of a suit brought to set aside the final order passed in respect to possession proceedings by the Magistrate seems to me to be irrelevant. His findings should naturally be directed to possession of particular plots, but that he did not take separate proceedings in respect to each plot would not invalidate his entire proceedings. What might be the nature of a suit brought to set aside the final order passed in respect to possession proceedings by the Magistrate seems to me to be irrelevant. The object of the Magistrate's proceedings is to prevent a breach of the peace shown to be likely to take place from the police report or other information on which he has acted and he has sufficiently complied with the law, if he finds possession of the lands in dispute in respect to each of the claims made. It cannot be justly said that his proceedings are without jurisdiction. I would, therefore, answer the last point referred in the negative. Banerjee J. 5. These two cases were heard together. 6. Case No. 730 arises out of a proceeding u/s 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, instituted by the Sub-divisional Officer of Tangail, in which Abdul Jubbar Chowdhry and others were the first party and Brojendro Kumar Roy Chowdhry, predecessor in interest of the Petitioner before this Court, was the second party. The Magistrate having made an order for the attachment of the property in dispute u/s 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Petitioner obtained a Rule calling on the other side to show cause why the order should not be set aside on three grounds, namely: First. That the Magistrate had no authority to add parties. Second. That certain necessary parties, namely, the tenants, had not been made parties. Third. That the facts found did not authorize an order u/s 146. Case No. 834 arises out of another proceeding u/s 145. The Magistrate having passed an order in favour of the first party, the second party obtained a Rule calling upon the former to show cause why the order should not be set aside on these grounds, namely: First. That the Magistrate had no information upon the date of the institution of the proceedings that there was any likelihood of a breach of the peace. Second. That the dispute being between different persons claiming different parcels of land, the institution of one proceeding dealing with them altogether was bad. Third. That the order was based upon a local investigation, which the Magistrate was not competent to make. Second. That the dispute being between different persons claiming different parcels of land, the institution of one proceeding dealing with them altogether was bad. Third. That the order was based upon a local investigation, which the Magistrate was not competent to make. 7. The learned Judges, who heard these two Rules, being unable to agree with the view taken in certain eases, namely, Ram Chundra Das v. Monohur Roy ILR (1893) Cal. 29, Laldhari Singh v. Sukedeo Narain Singh ILR (1900) Cal. 892, Anesh Mollah v. Ejaharuddi Mollah ILR (1901) Cal. 446 and Mangal Halder v. Naimuddi Fakir (1901) 6 C.W.N. 101, on the questions how far defect of parties vitiates proceedings u/s 145 and how far a Magistrate is bound to inquire as to who the parties to the dispute are and in the case of Rajah Rameswar Persad Narain Singh v. Harbans Singh (1901) 6 C.W.N. 104 on the question whether the joinder of parties vitiates such proceedings, have referred the two cases to a Full Bench for the determination of the following points: 1. Are proceedings held u/s 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, bad for want of jurisdiction, because the Magistrate on information before him has made parties to such proceedings only those who are actually in dispute and who are likely by such dispute to cause a breach of the peace, when in the course of the proceedings so taken it is brought to his notice that some other party is interested-in the subject matter of the dispute, that is, is likely to be affected by the order to be passed in respect of the possession of the land in dispute. Is the Magistrate bound to stay such proceedings? 2. Is a Magistrate before taking proceedings u/s 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, bound to make inquiry to ascertain who have or claim to have any right to possession, either actual possession or possession through receipt of rent from tenants, claiming to cultivate the lands in dispute? 3. If he does take such proceedings on further information since acquired, are such proceedings separate and distinct, or are they in continuation of the former proceedings, so as to relate back in point of time to the date on which they were first taken? 4. 3. If he does take such proceedings on further information since acquired, are such proceedings separate and distinct, or are they in continuation of the former proceedings, so as to relate back in point of time to the date on which they were first taken? 4. Are proceedings u/s 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, bad for want of jurisdiction, because some person claiming to have possession in some way of the lands or of a portion of the lands in dispute, has not been made a party, although he was not one of the parties in dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace, so far as appeared from the information on which the Magistrate acted and even if such person has not appeared and raised any objection on this account? 5. Are proceedings u/s 145 bad for want of jurisdiction, because some of the parties are concerned only with possession of a portion of the lands in dispute? 8. Before proceeding to consider these questions, I think it necessary to determine whether the effect of Sub-section (3) of Section 435 of the present Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898) is to place orders under Sections 145 and 146 altogether out of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. For if that is so, it would be useless to discuss the questions referred to us. 9. Though Sub-section (3) of Section 435 by declaring that proceedings under Chapter XII (in which Sections 145 and 146 are included) are not proceedings within the meaning of Section 435, excludes others under Sections 145 and 146 from the revisional jurisdiction of this Court, so far as that jurisdiction is conferred by Section 435, yet it cannot be said that such orders are placed beyond this Court's power of revision u/s 15 of the High Courts Act, 24 and 25 Victoria, C., 104. The limits of this power see In the matter of Gobind Coomar Chowdhry v. Kristo Coomar Chowdhry (1867) 7 W.R. 520 Nilmoni Singh Deo v. Taranath Mukerjee (1882) and Muhammad Suleman Khan v. Fatima ILR (1886) All. The limits of this power see In the matter of Gobind Coomar Chowdhry v. Kristo Coomar Chowdhry (1867) 7 W.R. 520 Nilmoni Singh Deo v. Taranath Mukerjee (1882) and Muhammad Suleman Khan v. Fatima ILR (1886) All. 104 are no doubt narrower than those of powers conferred by Section 435, it being confined to cases of orders made by a subordinate Court declining jurisdiction vested in it by law or made without jurisdiction, a description which includes orders made by application of any form of procedure to cases to which it does not apply and also those made without complying with the material preliminary conditions required to be satisfied by the procedure prescribed. See Birj Mohun Thakur v. Rai Uma Nath Chowdhry and Gopi Mohun Mullik v. Taramoni Chowdhrani ILR (1879) Cal. 7. 10. That being the case, let us consider how far the errors in the proceedings referred to in the questions affected the jurisdiction of the Magistrate so as to make those proceedings open to revision by this Court. 11. The first question referred to this Full Bench relates to the meaning of the expression "parties concerned in such dispute" occurring in Sub-section (1) of Section 145 and to the effect of an omission to make any of such persons parties to the proceeding. On the one hand it is urged that the special jurisdiction of the Criminal Courts to deal with the question of possession being conferred only for preventing a breach of the peace, the only persons, who can be made parties to a proceeding u/s 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, are those engaged in a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace; that it would defeat the object of the section, which is to enable the Magistrate promptly to settle disputes about possession, if he were to be held bound to make an elaborate inquiry as to who are the different parties interested in the subject of the dispute; and that it being left to the discretion of the Magistrate to make such persons parties to the proceeding as he may think fit, omission to make any person a party cannot affect the validity of the proceeding, especially when it is not open to the Magistrate to add any party after the case has been commenced and in support of this contention the cases of Kunund Narain Bhoop ILR (1878) Cal. 650 and Protap Narain Singh v. Rajendra Narain Singh ILR (1896) Cal. 55 are relied upon. 12. On the other hand, it is argued that as orders under Sections 145 and 146 bind the whole world, the words "parties concerned in the dispute" must mean all persons interested in the subject-matter of the dispute likely to be affected by any order made in relation to possession thereof; that it would be contrary to first principles to make any such order in the absence of parties, who may be affected by them; and that, if a Magistrate makes an order under either of those two sections without having before him all the necessary parties, his proceedings are in contravention of the procedure prescribed and the order should be held as made without jurisdiction. And James Bagg's case 6 Coke's Rep. 93, Laldhari Singh v. Sukdeo Narain Singh ILR (1900) Cal. 882, Anesh Mollah v. Ejaharuddi Mottah ILR (1901) Cal. 446 and Mangal Haldar v. Naimuddin Fakir (1901) 6 C.W.N. 101 are cited in support of this argument. 13. The old law on the subject was discussed at some length in the course of the argument, but having regard to the observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Norendra Nath Sircar v. Kamalbasini Dasi ILR (1896) Cal. 563, I do not think it profitable to pursue that discussion when the present Code of Criminal Procedure is clear on the point. 14. 563, I do not think it profitable to pursue that discussion when the present Code of Criminal Procedure is clear on the point. 14. I am of opinion that though the jurisdiction of a Criminal Court to deal with questions of disputed possession u/s 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is of a limited character and arises only when the dispute is likely to cause a breach of the peace and though in the exercise of such jurisdiction the Magistrate must, to prevent any breach of the peace, act with all possible promptness, yet when once the existence of such a dispute is made out to the satisfaction of the Magistrate and he acquires jurisdiction to entertain the case, such jurisdiction cannot be said to be limited to calling upon the parties actually engaged in the dispute, but must extend to his calling upon all parties interested in the dispute, that is, claiming actual possession of the subject of dispute, to appear in person or by pleader and to his calling upon or allowing any such party, though not originally expressly called upon to do so, to enter appearance at any subsequent stage of the proceedings, if the facts disclosed show such appearance to be necessary and if the Magistrate refuses to make such party, a party to the proceeding, on the ground of want of power in him under the law to add any party to the proceeding and not of absence of interest in such party in the subject of dispute as a matter of fact, the Magistrate declines a jurisdiction, vested in him by law and his order may be set aside as involving an error of jurisdiction and he may be directed by this Court u/s 15 of the High Courts Act (24 and 25 Act, C. 104) to proceed according to law. 15. The view I take is in accordance as well with the letter as with the spirit of the law. 16. 15. The view I take is in accordance as well with the letter as with the spirit of the law. 16. Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure enacts in Sub-section (1) that when a Magistrate is satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land (I refer only to so much of the section as bears upon this case) he shall make an order in writing requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to enter appearance and to put in written statements of their respective claims as regards the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute. The law then requires parties concerned, that is, interested in the dispute and not merely those engaged in it, to be made parties and requires them to put in their claims as regards the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute. Every person who lays claim to actual possession of the subject of dispute is, therefore, a necessary party under Sub-section (1). 17. Passing over Sub-section (2) which does not bear on the present question, we find important changes introduced by Sub-sections (3), (5) and (7) of the present Code. Sub-section (3) requires the publication of the order at or near the subject of dispute, which is intended to serve as a general notice to all persons interested; Sub-section (5) allows any person interested other than the parties expressly required to attend, to intervene and show that there is no real dispute existing; and Sub-section (7) evidently contemplates the substitution of the legal representatives of deceased parties. These new provisions, in my opinion, make the principles laid down in the cases of Kunund Narain Bhoop ILR (1878) Cal. 650 and Protap Narain Singh v. Rajendra Narain Singh ILR (1896) Cal. 55, no longer applicable to cases u/s 145. There is a general notice to all persons concerned in the dispute now required to be published and new parties may intervene or be substituted in the course of the proceedings. 18. It is argued that when a new party is introduced, the old proceeding must be at an end and the Magistrate must be satisfied again that there is a dispute still existing likely to cause a breach of the peace. 18. It is argued that when a new party is introduced, the old proceeding must be at an end and the Magistrate must be satisfied again that there is a dispute still existing likely to cause a breach of the peace. No doubt it is easy to conceive cases where, with the substitution of new parties, the former likelihood of a breach of the peace may cease to exist; as when the old disputants die leaving minor heirs, whose properties are taken charge of by the Court of Wards. But, as a rule, the mere addition of parties to a pending proceeding u/s 145 does not imply cessation of the original likelihood of a breach of the peace and does not, therefore, require the initiation of any fresh proceeding. 19. Then as regards the delay that may be caused by the addition of parties, -who may claim to cross-examine the witnesses already examined and to adduce further evidence, the remedy is provided by the new proviso to Sub-section (4) which authorizes the Magistrate in cases of emergency to attach the subject of dispute. 20. If the letter of the law thus clearly supports the view I take, the spirit of the law is still more clearly in favour of the same view. For apart from the question whether an order u/s 145 or Section 146 is binding on the whole world--a question which I do not determine, but to which an affirmative answer is favoured by the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 145 and Sub-section (2) of Section 146--such an order must prejudicially affect a person, who claims to be in possession of the subject of the dispute, but is not made a party to the proceeding, as it will be evidence against him u/s 13 of the Evidence Act see Dinomoni Chowdhrani v. Brojo Mohini Chowdhrari ILR (1901) Cal. 187 and he will have at least to apply to the Magistrate for the withdrawal of the order; and if that is so, it is but fair and just that he should have an opportunity of defending his case before such an order is made (see James Bagg's case (1777) 11 Rep. 93, Maxwell on Statutes, 3rd Edition, p. 511). 21. This view is in accordance with the cases of Ram Chandra Dass v. Monohur Boy ILR (1893) Cal. 29, Laldhari Singh v. Sukedeo Narain Singh ILR (1900) Cal. 93, Maxwell on Statutes, 3rd Edition, p. 511). 21. This view is in accordance with the cases of Ram Chandra Dass v. Monohur Boy ILR (1893) Cal. 29, Laldhari Singh v. Sukedeo Narain Singh ILR (1900) Cal. 1892, Anesh Mollah v. Ejaharuddi Mollah (1901) ILR 28 and Mangal Haldar v. Naimuddi Fakir (1901) 6 C.W.N. 101. 22. I would therefore answer the first question in the negative, subject to this qualification that, if the Magistrate refuses to allow the intervention of a party claiming an interest in and actual possession of the subject of dispute, not on the ground of his having no such interest, but on the ground of the law not authorising the addition of any such party, his order is open to revision by this Court. 23. The second question referred to us must be answered in the negative. The Magistrate should do his best to ascertain who the parties concerned in the dispute in a case u/s 145 are. But his order cannot be pronounced to be vitiated by any error of jurisdiction merely because such inquiry has not been made or carried far enough. 1 24. The second alternative of the third question also should, in my opinion, be answered in the affirmative and the first alternative in the negative, if the fresh proceeding referred to in the question is the result not of any fresh dispute arising, but of fresh parties concerned in the old dispute being added as parties, have already pointed out that by reason of the new provisions introduced into the present Code, Section 145, Sub-sections (3), (5) and (7), fresh parties may be added or substituted, such addition or substitution not putting an end to the original proceeding and the rule laid down by the Full Bench in the case of Protap Narain Singh v. Rajendra Narain Singh ILR (1896) Cal. 55, against such substitution or addition can no longer hold good. 25. The fourth question should, I think, be answered in the negative, a mere allegation that some person, who does not appear and raise any objection, has a claim to possession, cannot vitiate the proceeding for want of jurisdiction. 26. 55, against such substitution or addition can no longer hold good. 25. The fourth question should, I think, be answered in the negative, a mere allegation that some person, who does not appear and raise any objection, has a claim to possession, cannot vitiate the proceeding for want of jurisdiction. 26. The fifth and last question should also, in my opinion, be answered in the negative, the fault in the proceeding which is referred to in that question being in the nature of an irregularity not affecting the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. 27. I would accordingly return the cases to the Division Bench, "which has made this reference, with the foregoing answers to the questions referred to us. Hill J. 28. Of the questions discussed at the hearing of these references, those only are really material which relate to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate, since it is only in cases in which a Magistrate has either acted without jurisdiction or improperly declined to exercise his jurisdiction, that this Court has now authority to interfere with his proceedings u/s 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In order therefore to bring these cases within the jurisdiction of this Court, it must be shown that the Magistrate acted in one or other of the ways mentioned. Otherwise we have no power of interference. 29. The two cases referred may be dealt with together, for all that I propose now to do is to express my views upon the questions submitted to us by the learned referring Judges, the ultimate disposal of the cases being in their hands. 30. Mr. Hill's contention on behalf of the Petitioners in the first case was, that it was essential to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate that all persons concerned in the dispute which Section 145 contemplates should be made parties to the proceeding and that, if they are not, the proceedings are bad for want of jurisdiction. He contended that by parties concerned in the dispute was meant all persons claiming aright to possession of the land, etc., the subject of dispute and that it was therefore necessary that all such persons should be brought into the proceeding in order to give the Magistrate jurisdiction to make the ultimate order for which the section provides. He contended that by parties concerned in the dispute was meant all persons claiming aright to possession of the land, etc., the subject of dispute and that it was therefore necessary that all such persons should be brought into the proceeding in order to give the Magistrate jurisdiction to make the ultimate order for which the section provides. He also pointed out that that order is to forbid all disturbance of the possession of the person, whom the Magistrate declares to be in possession, until evicted in due course of law and he argued that the effect of the order being consequently to adjudicate upon the civil rights of persons interested in the land, it would be opposed to the most elementary principles of justice that any one should be affected by it, who had not been a party to the proceeding. 31. I do not propose to follow Mr. Hill through the very numerous authorities, which he cited in support of these positions. Nor do I think that the historical treatment of the subject with which he dealt so skilfully is likely to throw much light upon the actual question now before us. The law, as it now stands, is the result of very recent legislation and I think that Section 145, although not perhaps altogether free from difficulties, may be interpreted without recourse being had to extraneous sources of information all that need, I think, be said from this point of view is that the section as it now stands is virtually a re-enactment of the corresponding section of the Code of 1882 with, however, what appears to me to be a somewhat important addition relative to the summoning of parties and another by which a person interested, who has not been summoned to attend before the Magistrate, is enabled to show that no dispute exists or has existed. There are besides the new provisions as to abatement contained in Clause (7) and the provisos to Clause (4). 32. In entering upon a consideration of the section it is, I think, important to bear in mind the purpose with which it was enacted. There are besides the new provisions as to abatement contained in Clause (7) and the provisos to Clause (4). 32. In entering upon a consideration of the section it is, I think, important to bear in mind the purpose with which it was enacted. It occurs in that part of the Code which relates to the prevention of offences and its object is to bring to an end by a summary process disputes relating to land, etc., which are in their nature likely, if not suppressed, to end in breaches of the peace. The maintenance of the public peace was the object before the mind of the Legislature and where that supreme object is in view, there can be no question but that the convenience and even the rights of individuals must at times be sacrificed for its attainment. It would therefore, I think, be improper, as the tendency has sometimes been, to lean too much in attempting to construe the section upon analogies derived from suits and other civil proceedings, the results of which are very different from those of proceedings under the section and in which the rights of individuals inter se, are alone in question. It is assumed as a possible consequence of a proceeding u/s 145 that the owner of property may temporarily be deprived of possession of what is rightfully his and subjected to other inconveniences. But this and such like considerations it was presumably necessary to subordinate to the imperative necessity of preserving the peace. 33. Turning to the section itself, the principal point dwelt; on at the hearing was the meaning of the words "parties concerned in such dispute," the contention being, as I have mentioned, that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate is dependent on his having all such persons before him. I cannot assent to that view. But in order to answer the different questions submitted to us by the reference, it is necessary that I should say something as to what I understand to be the proper interpretation of the words in question. I cannot assent to that view. But in order to answer the different questions submitted to us by the reference, it is necessary that I should say something as to what I understand to be the proper interpretation of the words in question. Having regard to the object to which the proceeding is directed, I mean by that, the ascertainment of the person actually in possession at the time of the initial order under Clause (I), I should feel disposed to think that they were intended to indicate all persons claiming to be then in possession and I think, that the Magistrate should endeavour to bring all such persons into the proceeding. But the scope of the inquiry under the section is confined to the fact of actual possession irrespective of the merits of the claims of the parties concerned. A claim therefore merely to a right to possession, as distinguished from a claim to be in possession, would be outside the scope of the inquiry. And this is, I think, shown with sufficient clearness both by the provisions of Clause (1) of the section regarding the matter to which the written statements of the parties are to be directed and Clause (4) which prescribes the question upon which the Magistrate is, if possible, to give his decision. I am unable therefore to agree in the view which has been taken in certain oases that all parties interested in, or claiming a right to, the property in dispute, are entitled to be, or should be made, parties to the proceeding. No doubt the difference may be slight in practice, inasmuch as persons who claim to be entitled to landed property usually claim to be in possession of it. But the test is not, I think, the true one and if it were to be adopted it would lead to the creation of numerous difficulties in the application of the section and greatly impair its practical utility. Regard must be had moreover to the sources of the Magistrate's information and to what the nature of that information is likely to be. Regard must be had moreover to the sources of the Magistrate's information and to what the nature of that information is likely to be. What is most likely to be conveyed to him is that so and so and so and so are disputing about the possession of land and that, if he does not intervene, there will be a breach of the peace and it is upon the basis of the information conveyed to him, as it seems to me, that the Magistrate is in the first instance to select the persons whom he will require to attend his Court for the purpose of laying their claims before him, How is he to ascertain, in order that his proceeding may be properly constituted, who all the persons interested in, or claiming a right to the property in dispute, are? To require him to do so would be to impose on him in some cases an almost impossible task and would undoubtedly have the effect of unduly prolonging and greatly embarrassing his proceedings and of depriving them altogether in many instances of their summary character. What, I conceive, the Legislature intended was to bring the dispute to a prompt termination and to compel the parties concerned in it to act their differences at rest without delay and once for all by having recourse to the Civil Courts. But proceedings under the section have too frequently, as any one acquainted with the criminal business of this Court must be aware, been protracted to a most lamentable degree by the application of such principles as those I have referred to above. On the other hand, it seems to me difficult to say that the dispute can be a matter of no concern to persons other than the actual disputants, when the result of the order passed under the section may be to remove from possession a third party, who is not a disputant. 34. Clause (3) of the existing section has however enlarged the powers previously reposed in the Magistrate as to the summoning of parties. I was at first disposed to think that the clause was introduced for the purpose of regulating the issue and service of process generally under the section, thereby leaving it virtually to the discretion of the Magistrate, what persons he would make parties to the proceeding. I was at first disposed to think that the clause was introduced for the purpose of regulating the issue and service of process generally under the section, thereby leaving it virtually to the discretion of the Magistrate, what persons he would make parties to the proceeding. But, on further consideration, I think the intention was to empower the Magistrate, after he has issued the order provided for by Clause (1) to the persons who, from the original information given him, it appears are claiming to be in possession, to bring in any other persons who from subsequent information it may seem to him proper to have before him. But the scope of the inquiry is not thereby enlarged. The copy which may be served under the clause is to be a copy of the order mentioned in Clause (1) which requires the party to whom it is addressed to state his claims as to the fact of actual possession and Clause (4) confines the inquiry to the same fact. The clause in question was, I think, intended to be only supplementary to Clause (1). Then the clause further provides for the publication of a copy of the order in a conspicuous place at or near the subject of dispute, probably with the intention of guarding against collusive proceedings, as well as to give to any one interested, who may through an oversight or otherwise not have received a summons, an opportunity of coming in with his claim and also to notify generally to all persons in the locality that a proceeding under the section has been set on foot. But I would say again that I do not think this general invitation was intended, any more than the power given to the Magistrate of summoning additional parties, to' have the effect of altering the character of the inquiry. 35. The only material question that still remains is the fact of actual possession. 36. Then by Clause (4) it is provided that after the requirement of Clauses (1) and (3) have been complied with, the Magistrate, without reference to the merits of the claims of "such parties" to a right to possession, is to peruse their statements, etc. and come, if possible, to a decision as to the fact of possession. 36. Then by Clause (4) it is provided that after the requirement of Clauses (1) and (3) have been complied with, the Magistrate, without reference to the merits of the claims of "such parties" to a right to possession, is to peruse their statements, etc. and come, if possible, to a decision as to the fact of possession. The words' "such parties" here must, I think, be interpreted with reference to the words in Clause (1) "the parties concerned in such dispute" and must bear the same meaning,--the effect being to restrict the inquiry to the parties concerned in the dispute in the sense I have mentioned above, notwithstanding that persons other than these may have been summoned by the Magistrate or may have come in of their own accord on the publication of the copy of the order in the locality. It appears to me, I may add, from a consideration merely of the language used, as distinguished from the nature of the proceeding, that the words "the parties concerned in such dispute" must have been intended to extend to persons other than the actual disputants. There may, I think, be a dispute between A and B, which is likely to cause a breach of the peace to which C is not strictly a party, but in which he is nevertheless concerned as claiming to be in possession. Had it been intended to confine the proceeding to the actual disputants, I think the appropriate words would have been "the parties disputing." Had it, on the other hand, been intended to include all persons interested in, or claiming a right to, possession of the lands, etc., language conveying that meaning would presumably have been used. 37. Such being in my opinion the meaning of the words in question and the means prescribed by the Legislature for bringing the parties concerned before the Magistrate, the section next provides that the Magistrate shall enter upon the inquiry. Up to that point it appears to me that the Magistrate has very wide powers with respect to the persons whom he will bring into the proceeding. He may alter or add to the array of parties either of his own motion or on the application of any one claiming to be concerned in the dispute in the sense that he claims to be in possession. He may alter or add to the array of parties either of his own motion or on the application of any one claiming to be concerned in the dispute in the sense that he claims to be in possession. The initial order is, no doubt, intended to fix a time within which claimants are to come in, but it would not I think be a matter of any materiality, if, after the date so fixed, but before the opening of the actual inquiry, parties were added. From that time onwards, however, it seems to me that it was not intended, subject to the provisions of Clause (7), that any new parties should be brought in. The "person interested" who is empowered under Clause (5) to show that no dispute exists or has existed, does not of course come in for the purpose of joining in the proceeding, but for the purpose of bringing it to an end. But the section contains no provision for the addition of parties after the commencement of the inquiry and it was no doubt considered that the power conferred on the Magistrate by Clause (3) of summoning such persons as he might deem proper and the means prescribed by the same clause for giving publicity to the fact that a proceeding under the section had been set on foot provided a sufficient guarantee that before the actual inquiry is entered upon all parties really concerned will either have been summoned to attend the proceeding, or will have had the opportunity of doing so afforded them, if they care to avail themselves of it. It would lead to much inconvenience and delay, if it were held that any one claiming to be concerned in the dispute was entitled to come in and join in the proceedings after the commencement of the inquiry. It would probably be necessary in such a case to start the inquiry afresh, as the party added would have, a right to have the evidence taken in his presence and if several claimants successively were to come in in this way, it is evident that the proceedings might be indefinitely prolonged. It would probably be necessary in such a case to start the inquiry afresh, as the party added would have, a right to have the evidence taken in his presence and if several claimants successively were to come in in this way, it is evident that the proceedings might be indefinitely prolonged. I do not say that, if the Magistrate for sufficient reasons thought proper after the commencement of the inquiry to bring in an additional party, that his proceedings would therefore be bad, but I think that he would in doing so be acting in contravention of the intention of the Legislature. I ought, while on this point, to add that in my opinion the Full Bench-decision in Protap Narain Singh v. Rajendra Narain Singh ILR (1896) Cal. 55 cannot, in view of the alteration of the law introduced by Clause (3) of Section 145 as it now stands, be regarded as a binding authority on the construction of the section. 38. Then as to the question of jurisdiction. On being satisfied of the existence of a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace concerning land, etc, within his local jurisdiction, the duty, which is imperative, is cast upon the Magistrate of taking action u/s 145. The two essentials are that there should be a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace and that the dispute should concern land, etc. The section does not primarily contemplate cases in which there have already been overt acts of violence. All the disputants may be persons of peaceable disposition, but if the dispute is in its nature of such a kind that it is likely, having regard to the known conditions of society, to lead to a breach of the peace, that is enough to warrant the Magistrate's intervention and to give him jurisdiction over the subject of dispute. Upon the existence of those conditions and those conditions only, is the jurisdiction of the Magistrate in my opinion dependent. The object, I think, is to take the subject of dispute, so to speak, out of the hands of the disputants and to constitute one of them, whose possession the law will protect, its custodian until the other has established his right (if any) to possession in a Civil Court. The object, I think, is to take the subject of dispute, so to speak, out of the hands of the disputants and to constitute one of them, whose possession the law will protect, its custodian until the other has established his right (if any) to possession in a Civil Court. In certain instances indeed the Magistrate is authorized himself to take possession so that none of the parties concerned may have possession, until a Civil Court has decided upon the right. But, be this as it may, questions of the misjoinder or non-joinder of parties do not ordinarily go to the jurisdiction. A Magistrate would no doubt be acting without jurisdiction, if he entered upon his inquiry without having issued the orders contemplated by Clause (1) of the section. But questions of whether A ought to have been added as being a person likely to be affected by the proceeding, or B omitted as not being concerned in it, or whether C was added at too late a stage and such like, are questions of procedure by which, in my opinion, the jurisdiction of the Magistrate is not affected. 39. There is, lastly, the point raised by the fifth question referred. Upon this question it is not very easy to generalize. But I should think that, when there are independent disputes relative to distinct parcels of land, they ought to be dealt with in separate proceedings. When, on the other hand, the dispute is one, the fact that it embraces several distinct parcels of land, is not, in my opinion, sufficient to necessitate an independent proceeding in respect of each. The matter is not, however, one which, as it appears to me, affects the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. 40. For the foregoing reasons I would answer the questions submitted to us as follows: Question I. To the first branch of the question my answer is--No. To the second branch--I do not think that the Magistrate would be bound to stay the proceedings. Question II. 40. For the foregoing reasons I would answer the questions submitted to us as follows: Question I. To the first branch of the question my answer is--No. To the second branch--I do not think that the Magistrate would be bound to stay the proceedings. Question II. I think the Magistrate ought, before entering on his inquiry under Clause (4) of the section (though not as a preliminary to the initiation of the proceeding, for which latter purpose all that is requisite is that the Magistrate should issue the orders provided for by Clause (1) to the parties named in the information), to satisfy himself to the best of his ability on the information before him as to who are the persons claiming to be in present possession of the subject of dispute, but that he is not concerned to ascertain what persons have or claim to have mere rights to possession. Question III. I am not quite clear as to the intention of this question. But assuming it to relate to the addition of a party after the initiation of the proceeding, I would say that there is no necessity for a fresh proceeding, in consequence of such addition, assuming the party added to have been concerned originally in the dispute which is the foundation of the proceedings. Up to the time when the inquiry begins I think parties may now be added. If they are added after it has begun, I think that that would be an irregularity. But I do not think it would be necessary, in consequence, to initiate a fresh proceeding, but evidence previously taken ought, if the parties so added require it, to be again taken in their presence. Question IV. No. Question V. No. Brett J. 41. I agree with Mr. Justice Hill and have nothing to add to what he has said in his judgment. Henderson J. 42. I also agree with the judgment delivered by Mr. Justice Hill.