Nityanund Roy v. Juggat Chandra Guha and Durga Sundari
1902-08-01
body1902
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT 1. The facts of this case are these:-- A certain taluk belonged to the Defendant No. 2 under the zemindar Defendant. The said Defendant No. 2 sold it to the Defendant No. 1, the transfer having been registered and the notice required under the Bengal Tenancy Act having been served on the landlord. Notwithstanding this, the landlord brought a suit for rent as due in respect of the taluk against the Defendant No. 2, and not against the transferee, the Defendant No. 1. He recovered a decree, and in execution thereof brought the taluk to sale. The Plaintiff became the purchaser at that sale. According to the case set out in the plaint, the Plaintiff, after his purchase of the taluk, made an attempt to realize rents from the raiyats occupying lands in the taluk, but he was unable to do so; and he was informed that long before the sale at which he purchased, the Defendant No. 2 had sold the taluk to Defendant No. 1, and therefore the said Defendant No. 2 had no saleable interest at the time of the Plaintiff's purchase. On these allegations, he claimed for alternative reliefs--first, that his right to the taluk might be declared, and second, that in the event of his not being entitled to such declaratory relief a decree might be given to him awarding as against the zemindar Defendant the purchase-money which he, the Plaintiff, had to pay for the purchase in question. 2. The defence of the landlord Defendant was that the Plaintiff had no cause of action against him, and that he was not entitled to recover the purchase-money from him. 3. Both the Courts below have found that the Defendant No. 2 had no saleable interest at the time when the zemindar brought his suit for rent and caused the taluk to be sold, and that therefore the Plaintiff could not be entitled to the taluk in question, but that he is entitled to recover from the zemindar Defendant the purchase-money he paid. 4. Against this judgment, the zemindar Defendant has appealed to this Court; and it has been contended on his behalf by the learned vakil, that the only remedy that the Plaintiff had was by way of an application under sec. 315 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that a separate suit for the recovery of the purchase-money was not maintainable. 5.
315 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that a separate suit for the recovery of the purchase-money was not maintainable. 5. We are, however, unable to accept this contention as correct. No doubt, sec. 315 provides that in the event of its being found that the judgment-debtor had no saleable interest in the property sold, the purchaser will be entitled to get back his purchase-money from the decree-holder, and that the order for repayment of such purchase-money may be enforced against the decree-holder; but there is no provision in the Code that a separate suit for the same relief does not lie. If we compare the language of sec. 315 with that of sec. 244 of the Code, and refer to sec. 11 of the Code, it will be seen that the Legislature could not have intended that a separate suit for the relief which the Plaintiff has obtained would not lie. The learned vakil for the Respondent has, upon this matter, called our attention to the case of Munna Singh v. Gajadhar Singh I. L. R. 5 All. 577 (1833), in which it has been held by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court that a purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree can maintain a suit against the decree-holder for recovery of his purchase-money when it was found that the judgment-debtor had no saleable interest in the property sold, and he is not limited to the special procedure in the execution department mentioned in sec. 315. That case is clearly in point, and there is, we think, no substance in the contention raised before us. 6. Another point has been raised by the learned vakil for the Appellant to the effect that the Plaintiff could not maintain such a suit unless it was found that antecedent to the institution thereof the Plaintiff had been deprived of his purchase. But it does not appear that any such point was made before the lower Appellate Court. As already mentioned, the Plaintiff in his plaint distinctly states that it was so, and though there is some expression of opinion by the Munsif which might be taken to be rather adverse to the Plaintiff, yet we do not think that that opinion really shows that the statement made in the plaint, to which we have already adverted, is untrue or incorrect.
But beyond this, we are not prepared to hold, as we have been asked to hold, that it must be shown that before the institution of the suit the Plaintiff had been deprived of the property purchased by him in order to afford him a good cause of action. The Plaintiff has very fairly put his case : he has stated all the facts, and said : "Give me either a decree declaring my right to the property, if it really belonged to the Defendant No. 2 at the date of the sale, or, if that cannot be done, give me a decree for the purchase-money against the zemindar Defendant." On investigation it was found that the Defendant No. 2 had no saleable interest at the time of the institution of the suit for rent by the zemindar, and therefore the property could not be brought to sale as the property of that Defendant, or, in other words, that the Plaintiff acquired no title under the sale in question. That being so, we think it was quite competent to the Courts below to give the Plaintiff a decree for recovery of the purchase-money from the zemindar Defendant. For these reasons we dismiss this appeal with costs.