JUDGMENT 1. This appeal arises out of an application under sec. 244 of the CPC made by the Appellants before us for annulment of the possession given to the Respondents, and for confirmation of their possession in certain immoveable property, in accordance with the terms of the decree based on a compromise dated the 29th June 1897 in suit No. 24 of that year. The facts of the case, so far as it is necessary to refer to them for the purposes of this appeal, are shortly these :-- The first five Respondents before us held a mortgage of the properties in dispute from the remaining Respondents, or their predecessors in title. They obtained a compromise decree upon their mortgage in suit No. 200 of 1895, and at the sale in execution of that decree, they purchased the mortgaged properties on the 5th February 1897, and the sale was confirmed on the 9th March following. The mortgagors then brought a suit, No. 24 of 1897, to set aside the mortgage decree and the sale in execution thereof, and on the 29th June 1897 a decree was made in that suit by consent of parties to the effect, that the mortgagors do within one month and a half pay to the mortgagees the sum of Rs. 1,170 odd annas, and file a petition in Court in the said suit No. 24 of 1897, that the mortgage decree in suit No. 200 of 1895, stand satisfied, that the sale in execution of that decree be annulled, and that the possession of the Plaintiffs, mortgagors, be confirmed, but that, in default of payment of the said sum of Rs. 1,170 odd annas within the time specified, the execution sale do stand valid. To raise the sum of Rs. 1,170 odd annas the mortgagors on the 21st July 1897 sold the mortgaged properties by private sale to the present Appellants before us, who, pursuant to the terms of the decree in suit No. 24 of 1897, paid the sum of Rs. 1,170 odd annas to Babu Manick Chandra Dhur, the pleader of the mortgagees, on the 29th July, and the pleader filed a petition in suit No. 24, acknowledging receipt of the money due. This petition was however lost, and no order appears to have been passed on it. 1,170 odd annas to Babu Manick Chandra Dhur, the pleader of the mortgagees, on the 29th July, and the pleader filed a petition in suit No. 24, acknowledging receipt of the money due. This petition was however lost, and no order appears to have been passed on it. Subsequently, on the 19th March 1900, possession was delivered to the mortgagees as purchasers of the properties in dispute, and on the 17th April following an application was made by the Appellants, the purchasers at the private sale above mentioned, under sec. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which has given rise to the present proceedings. 2. It appears that four of the mortgagees, in the meantime, brought a suit for setting aside the compromise decree made in suit No. 24 of 1897, and obtained a decree upon confession of judgment by the mortgagors, who alone were made Defendants, the purchasers of their interest at the private sale mentioned above not having been made parties to that suit. The mortgagees opposed the application of the Appellants before us under sec. 244 on certain grounds, which may be summed up under three heads; first, that the applicants had no locus standi under sec. 244; second, that, even if they had, the adjustment or compromise of the decree in suit No. 200 of 1895, not having been notified to the Court within the time allowed by law, no notice could be taken of such adjustment by the Court; and, third, that the compromise decree passed in suit No. 24 of 1897 had been set aside by the decree in the suit brought by four of the mortgagees. 3. The first Court overruled these objections, and allowed the petition of the Appellants before us ; but, on appeal by four of the mortgagees, decree-holders, the lower Appellate Court has reversed the decision of the first Court and dismissed the application of the Appellants under sec. 244. Hence the present appeal. 4. The points that arise for consideration in this appeal are the three points involved in the three objections of the mortgagees stated above; and we shall consider them in the order in which they have been set out. 5. Upon the first point, namely, whether the Appellants have any locus standi under sec. 244. Hence the present appeal. 4. The points that arise for consideration in this appeal are the three points involved in the three objections of the mortgagees stated above; and we shall consider them in the order in which they have been set out. 5. Upon the first point, namely, whether the Appellants have any locus standi under sec. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, it is contended for the Respondents, that, as the Appellants were not parties to the decree in suit No. 24 of 1897, and as their purchase of the interest of the mortgagors was made after that interest had passed to the mortgagees under their execution purchase, the Appellants cannot claim to be the representatives of the mortgagors, decree-holders, under the decree made in suit No. 24 of 1897. We are of opinion that this contention is not sound. It is true that the interests of the mortgagors, decree-holders, in suit No. 24 of 1897, had passed to the mortgagees under their execution purchase before the private sale to the Appellants, but the decree made in suit No. 24 of 1897 set aside the auction sale and confirmed the possession of the mortgagors, conditionally, of course, upon the amount mentioned in the decree, namely, Rs. 1,170 odd annas being paid within the specified time; and as such payment was made within the time specified, the execution sale must be deemed to have been annulled on the date of the decree in suit No. 24 of 1897. That being so, the Appellants before us acquired by their purchase from the mortgagors the interests of the latter in the property in dispute; and, as purchasers of the interests of the mortgagors, decree-holders, in suit No. 24 of 1897, they became representatives of certain of the parties to that suit within the meaning of sec. 244 of the Code. This view is amply supported by the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Ishan Chunder Sirkar v. Beni Madhub Sirkar I. L. R. 24 Cal. 62 (1896). 6. 244 of the Code. This view is amply supported by the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Ishan Chunder Sirkar v. Beni Madhub Sirkar I. L. R. 24 Cal. 62 (1896). 6. In support of the view put forward by the mortgagees in their second contention, namely, that the adjustment of the decree in suit No. 200 of 1895 not having been duly notified to the Court within the time allowed by law, the Court cannot take any notice of such adjustment, and the sale in execution of that decree must remain in force, the learned Judge in the Court of Appeal below has relied upon the case of Ram Doyal Banerjee v. Ramhari Pal I. L. R. 20 Cal. 32 (1892); but the contention appears to us to be wholly misconceived, and the case cited has no application to the present case. If the decree in suit No. 200 of 1898 had been adjusted by compromise out of Court, the adjustment no doubt had to be notified to the Court, and if it had not been so notified to the Court, it would have been ineffectual ; but the adjustment of that decree was not a private adjustment but was effected by another decree itself as binding as the earlier decree, and superseding the earlier decree. That being so, the only question is whether the terms of the later decree have been complied with. And, upon the facts found, the answer to that question must be in the affirmative. 7. This brings us to the third and last contention urged on behalf of the Respondents, namely, that the decree in suit No. 24 of 1897, setting aside the earlier decree in suit No. 200 of 1895, had itself been set aside by the decree in the third suit, namely, suit No. 876 of 1900. The simple answer to this contention is, that the decree in suit No. 876 of 1900 is no evidence against the Appellants before us, as they were no parties to that decree. The learned vakil for the Respondents contends, that, although the Appellants were not parties to that decree, yet, as the decree was obtained against the original mortgagors, the vendors of the Appellants, they ought to be bound by the decree. The learned vakil for the Respondents contends, that, although the Appellants were not parties to that decree, yet, as the decree was obtained against the original mortgagors, the vendors of the Appellants, they ought to be bound by the decree. That would have been so, if the third suit had been instituted before the purchase of the properties by the Appellants. As however the transfer to the Appellants was before the institution of the third suit, namely, suit No. 876 of 1900, by the mortgagees, the Appellants are in no way bound by the result of that suit. That being so, so long as the compromise decree in suit No. 24 of 1897 remains unreversed by any decree binding on the Appellants, they are entitled to succeed in their present application. At the same time we deem it just and proper that the rights, if any, which any of the mortgagee Respondents may have to show that the mortgage decree in suit No. 24 of 1897 is not binding upon them, should be reserved. The result then is that the order of the lower Appellate Court must be set aside, and that of the first Court restored subject to the reservation just mentioned. The Appellants are entitled to their costs in all the Courts. We assess the hearing fee in this Court at three gold mohurs.